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d) You state that it is mistaken to say that the "nationalists as a whole" are merely tools of the bourgeois opposition. We agree with this fully, but the article does not say it. The article, in this connection, speaks not of the nationalists "AS A WHOLE" but of the nationalists. And from the context of the sentence as well as from the whole line of the article, which you endorse, it is clear that here were meant the nationalists that are ~~fight-~~ ~~ing~~ actually fighting Machado and not the leaders that are in the camp of the bourgeois opposition.

e) You state that we "correctly emphasize the chief danger as the Right tendency in the CP of Cuba" and you observe that at the same time we ought to have exposed another danger, the danger of "left" deviations and putchism, such as, the slogans of "permanent strike", armed rebellion, and immediate formation of Soviets in October, 1930. We wish to point out that the article does expose also the "left" dangers but not in detail and not with sufficient concreteness. The article speaks of remnants of petty-bourgeois reformism and RADICALISM as still hampering the growth of the party. The article also calls upon the party to "wage a determined struggle against all tendencies toward.....putchism and conspiratorial romanticism, and remnants of anarchit ideology". But the article concentrates on the Right tendencies, firstly, because they constitute the main danger, secondly because the letter of the American Party to the Cuban Party, which preceded the letter of the Buro and to which ~~we~~ we refer in the article, deals with almost exclusively the "left" tendencies. We are in agreement with you that while emphasizing the fight against the Right danger as the main danger we must expose and fight systametically the leftist and putchist tendencies.

f) You state that for conspirative reasons we should not have published the number of members of the Cuban party nor should we have stated that the Cuban party has a small percentage of natives. The first point could have easily been left out of the article, but this cannot be said of the second point. The small percentage of native Cuban workers in the party is a real weakness which must be overcome in the most ~~axaxaxia~~ determined manner. Although this weakness is especially characteristic of Havana, it exists in other places also. Besides, the Havana organization is the biggest and most important part of the Party. In order to arouse the party to the vital need of overcoming this weakness, it is necessary to speak about it and to fight against it in such a manner as to mobilize for our correct instructions the party membership and its sympathizers. And, under the existing circumstances, there is no other way in which this can be done effectively except through the El Comunista. That such statement in our press may be made use of by our enemies is quite true, but this is true of EVERY open discussion of our weaknesses. Nevertheless, we do discuss them in the open, because it is necessary and because it helps us more than it can help the enemy.

3. On the article "Our Immediate Tasks in Nicaragua and Honduras" you make the following observations:

a) You endorse our "correct estimate" of the latest events in these countries, but you criticize our failure to "give any concrete indications of the immediate tasks of the Communists in Honduras". To this we wish to reply that the Buro had worked out for both countries a very elaborate program of immediate work which has been sent to the comrades of these countries even before the article