

ment represents the weak spot in our party life. It is the question of the employment of military specialists, or to speak plainly, the former officers and commanders, for the creation of the army and the administration of the army. At present all the fundamental administrative devices of our army are constructed on the principle that the type should be a combination of one military specialist and two political commissaries.

Already I have on more than one occasion had to speak in public meetings about the fact that in the matter of officering the army, of operations and battles, we intend to place full responsibility upon the shoulders of the military specialists, and hence to give them also all the necessary rights. Of this, many of us are afraid, and these fears find expression in the resolutions of various Party organizations. I have such a resolution in my pocket—received it yesterday from the northwestern country. It contains a splendid characterization of the difficulties which confront us. How much violence of every kind (this resolution points out) may be observed on the part of several Soviet representatives, how much negligence, unscrupulousness, and dishonesty—yes, even dishonesty!—on the part of representatives of the Soviet power, of those elected by the workers' organizations. Yes, there is much, there is very much of this now! And there again it is the duty of the Party to take a merciless attitude toward such phenomena in our own midst, for they will ruin the land, they will ruin our party. Not only those must be prosecuted who are themselves directly or indirectly guilty of embezzlement of the public moneys, but those also who shall be indulgent toward any manner of indecency and vice. Comrades, we must carry out our sifting process with iron-like inexorability, for there are in all this many dangerous and disturbing symptoms. It is just this that our comrades in the Northwest demand. In the resolution I have mentioned, which describes this situation splendidly, they demand that the Party adopt drastic measures, measures that will cauterize these moral wounds with glowing irons.

And this resolution points with the same disquietude to another danger, namely, the employment of generals who (as it expresses the thing) will lead the country into a new Korniloff adventure. True, the danger of a Korniloff adventure is not out of the question. However, this danger is nourished not by the employment of one or two dozen former generals but through roots that go deeper.

How do violence, carelessness, and even unscrupulousness develop? They come exclusively from the fact that persons are

holding positions which they cannot master. Examine at close range what is now happening in the Ukraine. Those who fought splendidly and heroically against the Kaledins, Dutoffs, and Korniloffs, who conquered these enemies that stood on the same technical level with them, failed us when they were confronted by the German military machine and felt the sene of their utter helplessness. Hence their dissatisfaction with themselves. They, these commanders of guerilla bands fight against one another, accuse each other, not infrequently fight less against the Germans than against the native population. The example of what is happening in the Ukraine shows us that if we are to speak seriously about the defense of the Soviet Revolution by force of arms, by means of war, we must reject all the empty talk of the Left Social Revolutionaries about partisan or guerilla warfare, and all measures that make use of small bands, and proceed to the task of creating a regular army. Only if this regular army exists can these partisan bands play a positive part on its flanks. But in order to create such an army we need trained specialists, including the former generals. As I have said before, the difficulty of the Soviet government at the present time consists not in combating sabotage, the back of which is already broken, but in enlisting the activity of the former saboteurs.

The second question concerns the so-called principle of election of the army. The whole purpose of this principle lies in its use to fight the old make-up of the officers' machine, to control the commanding personnel. As long as the power was vested in the class that is our enemy and the commanding personnel appeared a tool in the hands of this power, it was our duty to strive, through the election principle, to break the class-opposition of the commanding personnel. But at the present time the political power lies in the hands of the same working-class from whose ranks the army is recruited. Under the present regime in the army—I tell you this with absolute frankness—the election principle appears politically unnecessary and from the technical point of view impractical, and in the decree it is to all intents abolished.

Let me ask you: Is the election principle applied throughout in your industrial unions and co-operatives? No. Do you elect the officials, bookkeepers, clerks, cashiers, the employees of definite professions? No. You elect from among the workers of the Union in whom you have the most confidence your supervisory council and leave to this body the appointment of all the necessary employees and experts. The same thing must be done in the army. Since we have once established the Soviet