346 THE CLASS STRUGGLE EDITORIALS 347 judge from the reports at hand the Socialist coalition in Hungary proved at every turn to be a hindrance to the success of the Soviets. The opportunistic elements of the old social democratic party remained opportunistic even in the communist government. They who were persuaded to join their forces with the Communists whom they had persecuted and jailed, only by the pressure of a revolutionary uprising, were still opposed to all radical measures. They still retained their old democratic ideals and with their hesitation robbed the Hungarian Soviet government of that elan, of that wonderful force that characterize the Russian government. After the experience of our Hungarian comrades we are more than ever convinced that the stupid opposition of the anti bolshevist Socialist elements of Russia was the savior of the Russian Revolution, for there, too, a Socialist coalition government would have meant its dilution and consequently its speedy, and catastrophal overthrow.
This explains the readiness of the opportunistic elements of the Hungarian Soviet Government to immedately proceed with the formation of a socialistic government and that the actual majority of the Peidl Ministry and Peidi himself were formerly members of the Soviet Administration. Of course, the faith of this Socialist government in the honorable intentions of the Allied rulers was shortly disillusioned.
While an American officer was conducting negotiations in Vienna with the Peidl men, promising the assistance of the Allies in the establishment of a stable socialistic government in Hungary, France and Italy were already conniving with Roumania for its overthrow and the accession of a Habsburg Archduke.
In spite of countless political difficulties within the nation and in its foreign relations, in spite of the obstructionist pol. itics of the opportunistic elements in the government, the Soviet dictatorship, in the four months of its existence established a splendid record of achievements. The September issue of The Class Struggle will deal in detail with its activities.
tactics and methods with which to meet a new world. In every country of Europe the Socialist movement had been split asunder, everywhere Left Wing Communists and Right Wing opportunists had become bitter antagonists. In Italy and in Norway alone it has been possible to save the unity of the party because these parties as a whole adopted the program and methods of the Communist movement.
At that time it still seemed possible to follow the example of our Italian and Norwegian comrades in this country. The party membership was undoubtedly in sympathy with the revolutionary movement in Europe. The enthusiastic support they gave to the Bolshevist movement in Russia, to the Spartacists in Germany and to Hungarian Communists seemed to prove that the rank and file was ready to support a radical departure from the methods that have hitherto prevailed in the American Socialist Party. Sentiment in the West was and is undoubtedly with the Communists, and in the East, too, whole States and strong local organizations are strongly in favor of new methods.
Under the circumstances the so called Left Wingers were perfectly justified in organizing their forces for a campaign of intensive agitation within the party. That the partymembership was divided on the question of methods of propaganda and tactics was apparent. But the division was so obviously in favor of the Left that the only possibility of safeguarding the unity of the movement lay in the adoption of a Communist program of action, emphasizing the allegiance of the American party not only to the revolutionary groups in Europe, but to the principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat upon which these groups are fundamentally organized.
Apparently the National Executive Committee entertained the same conviction. Why, otherwise, should it expell the state organizations of Massachusetts, Ohio, Michigan and Pennsylvania for Left Wing sympathies? Why, otherwise, should it suspend entire language federations for the same reason? Why should the State Executive Committee of New York, with the same disregard of constitutional forms, suspend most of the largest locals of the State and proceed with their reorganization long before a referendum of the party membership was finally taken? Why, otherwise, was the referendum on the expulsion of these locals postponed until even their possible readmission by the handful of members that remained in the State was no longer dangerous to the convention? Why, otherwise, should the National Executive Committee allow to the reorganized locals, with but a small The National Convention When the holding of a national convention was first proposed, the project was received with obvious hesitation by the party authorities, coming as it did from that element of the movement which felt the need of a reorientation in party