320 THE CLASS STRUGGLE DOCUMENTS 321 were huge demonstrations of soldiers shoutino: You want to send us to Russia, but we won go!
In order to allay the storm of popular indignation the Allied governments sent out a statement in which they expressed their deep concern and sympathy for the sad plight in which the Russian people found themselves. They expressed their keen desire to assist Russia to get out of its difficulties. They had no wish to interfere in the internal politics of Russia, they said, nor endeavor to impose any particular kind of government on the Russian people. They definitely declared that they recognized the Russian revolution, and would under no circumstances support any counter revolutionary attempts. They invited all the political groups which had achieved or were striving to achieve governnrental power in Russia to meet Allied representatives on the Prince Islands in the Sea of Marmora in order to submit their claims. They suggested in the meantime that an armistice should be arranged between the warring sections, and demanded that the Soviet Government should withdraw its troops from those territories cutside of European Russia.
If this were a sincere offer of peace it would have been communicated to the Soviet Government through the usual diplomatic channels. But it was not even addressed to the Russian Government, but sent out by wireless for anybody to read who cared to take notice of it. The Allies still refuse to recognize the Soviet Government. The other political groups referred to are the counter revolutionaries Tchaikovsky, Admiral Koltchak, and Generals Denikin and Krasnoff. In inviting them the Allies place them on the same level as the government of Russia. The Allies have been, and are still helping the Counter Revolution. That is what you American and British soldiers are here for. In demanding an armistice with these, and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops the Allies demand that the Red Army give up the fight just when it is beating the Tsarist counter revolutionaries hands down. It is not a peace offer, but a demand to the Bolsheviks to surrender. These conditions were attached to the invitation, as the London Times frankly stated, with the expectation that the Soviet Government would refuse it. The Allied gov.
ernments would then be able to say to their people: You see, we have offered peace to the Bolsheviks, but they refuse. There is nothing else for us but to go on with the war.
But it does not say much for the cuteness of the Allied governments if it imagined that the Soviet Government would walk into a trap so clumsily laid. As a matter of fact the tables have been turned.
The Soviet Government in the note published below accepts almost all the conditions attached to the Allies invitation and announces its readiness to meet the Allied representatives wherever and whenever they desire. It is now the turn of the Allied governments to show whether they desire to discuss peace with the Soviet Government or not.
Soviet Note to Allied Governments To the Government of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States of North America: The Russian Soviet Government has learned from a press telegram of an alleged invitation from the Entente powers to all the de facto governments in Russia, calling upon them to send delegates to a conference to the Prince Islands.
Having received no invitation and learning from press radios that the absence of a reply is being interpreted as a refusal to answer the invitation, the Russian Soviet Government wishes to remove from its line of action every possibility of misrepresentation. Taking into consideration further that its acts are being systematically presented by the foreign press in a false light, the Russian Soviet Government takes this opportunity to state its attitude quite clearly and openly.
Although the situation of Soviet Russia is becoming every dav more and more favorable both from a military and interior point of view, the Russian Soviet Government places such value on the conclusion of an agreement which will put an end to the hostilities that it is ready to enter immediately into negotiations to that end, and even, as it has so often before declared, to pay the price of serious sacrifices under the express condition that the future development of the Soviet Republic will not be endangered.
Considering that its enemies derive their force of resistance solely from the help given them by the Entente powers, and that these are consequently the only real adversaries with whom it has to deal, the Russian Soviet Government states herewith to the Entente powers the points on which it would consider possible such sacrifices in order to put an end to every difference with these powers.
Seeing the special importance assigned in the press, and also in the repeated declarations made by the representatives of the Entente governments to the question of the Russian state loans, the Russian government declares itself in the first place ready to make a concession on this point to the demands of the Entente governments. It does not refuse to recognize its financial obligations towards its creditors belonging to the Entente powers whereas the details of the realization of this point must become the object of special agreements as a result of the proposed negotiations, Further, seeing the difficult financial situation of the Russian Soviet Republic and the unsatisfactory state of its credit abroad, the Russian Soviet Government proposes to guarantee the interests with raw material which will be enumerated in the suggested agreements.
Thirdly, seeing the great interest which has always been shown by foreign capital for the exploitation of Russia natural rịches, the Russian Soviet Government is disposed to grant concessions upon mines, forests, and so on, to citizens of the Entente powers, under conditions which must be carefully determined so that the economic and social order of Soviet Russia should not suffer from the internal rule of these concessions.
The fourth point upon which the Russian Soviet Government finds it possible to negotiate with the Entente powers is the question of territorial concessions. Seeing that the Russian Soviet Government is not determined to exclude at any price from these negotiations the discussion of eventual annexations of Russian territory by the Entente powers, the Russian Soviet Government adds further that in its opinion, by annexations is understood the maintenance in some regions formerly making part of the old Russian Empire with the exclusion of Poland and Finland, of armed forces of the Entente, or maintained at the expense of the Entente, or enjoying the military.
technical, financial, or any other support of these same powers.
As regard the second, third, and fourth points, the extent of the concessions that can be expected from the Russian Soviet Goverpment will depend upon its military situation towards the Entente