

co-operation of the two parties, while not an ideal state, is the only condition that makes a Socialist government possible under the given circumstances. Every attempt to overthrow this compromise government only sets one part of the proletariat in opposition to the other, thus making the strength of the entire proletariat impotent, and making sure the victory of the counter-revolutionists; just as in 1794, when the quarrels between Hebert, Danton and Robespierre sealed the downfall of the party of the Mountain and the victory of the bourgeoisie.

However, the demand to carry the revolution still further may, in another sense, be interpreted as not being altogether inimical to the present government. It would certainly be disastrous should the working-class masses begin to believe that now everything is as it should be and the government will provide all necessities of life. But there need be no fear that they will go to sleep again. Even if there should be such a danger, it would be counter-acted by our opponents. Their first shock is over, they are beginning to rally and use the new freedom for their own advantage. By no means should any one hinder them in this. The urgent need rests upon us, however, of meeting their activity, their work of agitation and organization with ours, to use the general awakening of the masses so as to win them over to our aims. The mass of the proletariat and also groups of the petty-bourgeoisie and intellectuals had a close interest in Socialism. Why many of them did not join us, was merely because they doubted our power. They voted for the Centrists, Liberals, National-Liberals and Conservatives not because their programme appealed to them more, but because they believed in their power. Now that we have gotten the power into our hands many of these blind ones have begun to see clearly. They will now believe in us, and work with us, if we give them an opportunity to join us in our activity.

And because the belief in our power means so much to so many unenlightened members of the lower strata, I do not see such an advantage, as many of my friends do, in postponing the gathering of the Constituent Assembly. Their belief in our power cannot increase with further delay. It may rather de-

crease, as soon as the shock, caused by the unheard of cataclysm begins to abate. The champions of the delay count upon the lesson to the masses from the practical application of Socialism. But we cannot work by magic. We may speed the work of nationalizing production, but a decided improvement in the welfare of the masses will first be possible when we succeed by advanced nationalization to increase the productivity of society's work. This may require one or two years. But it is just these unenlightened masses, whose support is most important, that expect Socialism to make a paradise of this earth tomorrow. Not to call the National Assembly together until Socialism has by its accomplishments won over the doubtful ones, we cannot.

On the other hand, it is a lack of faith, absolutely beyond my comprehension, to fear that we are lost as soon as we place our programme before the public. I have complete confidence in its conquering power after the frightful sufferings of the past four years. Waiting will not enhance this power, but weaken it. It gives an impression of insincerity, of hesitation and lack of faith in one's own strength. And that is particularly bad where it is necessary to convert doubting, undecided elements. They wish to convene the National Assembly only after Socialist measures have been executed. How can they be carried out, however, with the present government machinery? And how will they bring this change uniformly and thoroughly throughout the country without a Constituent National Assembly?

For instance, one of the first measures will be the nationalization of coal mines. But how can this be done while the relation between Prussia and the rest of the country is not settled? Things cannot remain the way they are now. The coal mines must come under the ownership of the federal government, but the Prussian state must not be allowed to dispose of that question alone. On the other hand, can Lippe-Detmold nationalize anything? And how about the nationalization of the water power? Shall they come into the control of the states or the nation?

It is clear that the foundation of the new state must first be laid, before nationalization can be attempted in practice, not merely in decrees. First to establish government ownership and