

of the greatest revolution in the world, down to the deepest hell as betrayers and traitors to liberty and progress? But still more possible is another outcome. Either the Czecho-Slovaks will successfully perform the work they are asked to do to-day, and, having re-established reactionary monarchy in Russia, will find reaction and monarchism strengthened in Austria as well—and never will get the price anticipated by them, or—they will not be successful in their plan and will be cast aside just as you are ready to cast aside Kerensky to-day.

Recent dispatches from Washington are that the Czecho-Slovaks have been recognized by the United States as an independent nation and that they will be given all possible aid in their struggle against Germany. Nothing is said in that declaration about the war between the Czecho-Slovaks and the Russian Soviets. So far the Czecho-Slovaks, with the exception of a few regiments on the western and on the Italian fronts, are mainly fighting Russia.

Every friend of independence of small nations will rejoice in the recognition given the Czecho-Slovaks. But you must admit that this recognition, given at a time when it mainly will tend still more to complicate the Russian situation and serve as an excuse for actual war against Russia, thereby loses much of its altruistic color. And again I cannot refrain from comparing this act with the attitude of the Allies toward the revolutionary Finnish workers. They are actually fighting the Germans. Some of them are actually co-operating with the Allies on the Murman coast. They represent not only a national aspiration, but an actual popular majority, which was the Government of Finland, and would be to-day, if it were not for the German occupation in Finland, which is directly and indirectly encouraged by the Allies through the encouragement given to the pro-German "White Guard."

But let us consider the present situation without any regard to its political side. What do you expect to accomplish in Russia? You certainly cannot imagine that the present forces in Vladivostok can accomplish anything in the way of a military occupation of Russia. By sending a few hundred thousand troops more,

—and in this respect you will have to depend on the Japanese,—you may accomplish as much as an occupation of the region between Vladivostok and Irkutsk—a distance as long as from New York to Utah. But even that is scarcely one-third of the distance from Vladivostok to the Ural mountains, and Irkutsk is still about six thousand miles away from Moscow. And when you have accomplished that, what then? The Baikal tunnels are blown up and without them it will be impossible under even the most favorable conditions to penetrate the vast region of almost insurmountable mountains around the Lake of Baikal, and by the time you get your hundreds of thousands of troops to Siberia the winter will set in and things drag on till next May.

You are counting, of course, on the possibility of a popular uprising of the population in Siberia against the Bolsheviks. But is it really necessary to indulge in such futile hopes, now that you know better? The Allied intervention has been a fact in Siberia for more than a month. Nothing in the way of a popular uprising has taken place.

A dispatch in the daily press reports the joyful reception accorded the Allies in Archangel. It tells that the people came out to meet them and that the Americans parading through the streets were cheered. In accordance with an old tradition the hospitality of the city was offered them by the peasants who brought bread and salt. A high mass was celebrated in thanksgiving of their arrival. But these stories, especially that of the celebrating of the high mass, just as well prove that the joy was all on the side of a small minority, as it is a well-known fact that the Russian workers have lost their interest in high mass. Has there been any intimation of a *popular* welcome to the Allies in Russia? Every Russian peasant and workman feels that whatever "government" you may succeed in establishing in Russia, in the place of the Soviets, at once will proceed to deprive the Russian peasants of the land and liberties they have acquired.

There can be no more chance for a popular uprising in Russia against the program of the Soviet Government than there would be a chance in America of a popular uprising of farmers against an increase in the price of corn and milk.