

possible. No nation can do so without being independent in its own internal affairs.

"I fail to understand how Poland will become annexed to Germany by being declared an independent state, especially if the Polish speaking part of Austria and of Germany (Galicia and Posen) be included in that national unit.

"I fail to see how an independent Finland will mean that it is annexed to Germany. The same holds good for an independent Courland, Esthonia, and Livonia."

Thus does our American Scheidemann outdo his German original. For Philip Scheidemann did not have the gall to pretend that Germany was creating "independent states" out of dismembered Russia. This brazen approbation of the Kaiser's handiwork was left for his American representative. And as if in a desire to add insult to injury Berger hypocritically refers to a possible inclusion of Galicia and Posen in the new Polish "national unit", although there is not a man in Germany or out of it, that believes such a thing possible, and although Berger's own favorite Socialist Party in Germany has expressly declared itself against it.

And this is the man who is to represent the American Socialist movement at an International Socialist Peace Congress!

Berger should be recalled at once. And the Socialist Party locals who want their party represented at the International Socialist Peace Congress, whenever it comes, by a real Socialist and not a Hindenburg Socialist, should lose no time in moving for his recall.

B.

As we go to press, the news comes that Berger was indicted under the Espionage Act; this is unfortunate, as our sympathies are naturally with all those under prosecution by the government. But this must not deter us from doing our duty by the Party. The matter is entirely too important to permit such considerations to influence us in the least. We cannot permit the government to impose upon us undesirable leaders by indicting them.

Strategy and Conscience

In commenting upon the Italian debacle in a former issue of the CLASS STRUGGLE, we expressed the view that the Italian disaster was directly traceable to the nature and character of Italy's war-aims; and we ventured the opinion that the Allies are doomed to bad strategy so long as national selfishness dominates their outlook upon international affairs, thus determining their aims and objects in the present conflict.

We are glad to note that the view that there is an intimate relation between military strategy and political war-aims, in the sense that bad conscience in the matter of war-aims is directly productive of poor strategy on the battlefield, is gradually gaining ground and is now coming to be recognized even in some pro-war quarters in this country as well as abroad.

This is the view taken by the "New Republic" in an editorial article which appeared in one of its recent issues under the suggestive title of "The Price of Victory." In that article the "New Republic" says:

"The underlying cause of the military disasters of the Allies is not only multiplicity in military control, but divergence of political purpose. The attempts made to bring about military co-operation have failed or have insufficiently succeeded, because so many members of the alliance have cherished special political objects which seemed to them of more importance than the common object of defeating German military aggression. These special political objects, *which sometimes were as dubious as they were exclusive*, have had a decisive effect on the military policy of the several Governments. . . . And it was the pursuit of these special *national* objects which has not only prevented them from concentrating on their main job of defeating the German army, but which exposed their military forces to one triumphant German attack after another."

The "New Republic" then points out that the Russian defeat in 1915, the Rumanian defeat of 1916, and the Italian defeat of 1917, were all due to bad strategy directly traceable to those