

cohesive power of the autocratic forces was eliminated from the social structure of Russia. This very thing would likely happen in any other country in which the fetish of government authority would be destroyed in one way or another. In view of this fact, the peace negotiations became a necessity, already as a Russian matter alone. The international of labor is forever indebted to the Russian socialist statesmen, because they utilized this national necessity so as to try to safeguard the vital interests of international labor, even to the point of almost breaking with the masses who wanted peace and peace at any price. No greater mistake can be made in regard to Russia than the presumption that the pacifist leaders compelled the masses to accept a peace which they did not want. The real situation is the very opposite of this presumption.

At this point it should be understood that there certainly existed a certain amount of difference between the tactics of Lenine and Trotzky. Lenine, a cool, calculating exponent of economic determinism, altogether devoid of any sentimental considerations, fully understood the above-mentioned situation and took the propagation of "peace at any price" as a matter of prosaic necessity, well understanding that any particular peace terms at this moment did not count much as the abolishment of the battle-fronts between Russia and Germany was the first preliminary for the success of the Revolution in Russia and in Germany, and only such a revolution would rewrite any peace terms made at this moment. Lenine also had no faith in the possibility of a revolution in Germany during the war, and he foresaw the inevitableness of more harsh terms and ruthless invasion of Russia by Germany if the Hoffmann peace terms were not "accepted." Trotzky, on the other hand, although he, too, understood the above mentioned situation in general, laid more stress, led by his more imaginative and temperamental nature, upon sentimental considerations of the honor of the socialist movement. He also always has been inclined to exaggerate the revolutionary

readiness for action in Germany and the possibility of creating there a revolutionary sentiment by more or less abstract and sentimental presentation of the danger facing the international labor movement through the Hoffmann plans.

We can well presume that the somewhat dramatic performance of Trotzky at Brest-Litovsk—his refusing to sign a treaty with the German imperialists, yet proclaiming the war ended, and his parrying Hoffmann's cool suggestion that in such case the Germans would instantly take Reval, by saying that the working-class of Germany never would allow him so to do—probably would not have taken place if Lenine had been at Brest-Litovsk in place of Trotzky. It is very likely that Lenine would have signed Hoffmann's peace terms at least as readily as he signed the much more outrageous terms now presented by the German government.

Yet, I on my part do not believe that either course would have resulted in anything much different from the situation prevailing in Russia now. If there could have been a difference it might be said that the present situation has some distinct advantages in comparison with the one which might have been created if the Hoffmann peace treaty had been signed. As will be seen from the following paragraph, the writer of these lines does not at all pessimistically regard the present situation in Russia. I do not believe for a moment that Germany will be able to crush Russia or the Russian revolution. And as appalling as the present situation looks it is not a very important matter whether the Germans just now are fifty or a hundred miles more eastward or westward. The advantages of the present situation are that if the Brest-Litovsk treaty had been signed it would have established a somewhat undesirable *modus vivendi* in Germany and Russia. That situation would have been indeed of more actual advantage to Germany because she then would have been able more easily and peaceably to utilize the material resources of Russia. But now, in spite of the bombastic terms of the enforced peace treaty, Germany actually has to fight for every ounce of bread which she will get from Russia. The greatest advan-