98 THE CLASS STRUGGLE DISARMAMENT 99 What is here stated concerning Germany and France is equally true of any number of other selections, e. Austria Hungary and Italy, Germany and Italy, Rumania and Bulgaria, etc. etc.
In conclusion we are bound to find, therefore, that it is an absolutely logical necessity, under the capitalist system, for every nation to maintain at its command the maximum of physical power.
If that be correct, our appeal is foredoomed to failure, and with it the entire policy of which it is a part. For it follows that the power that must be maintained, must then be used as a last resort, unless it were possible to prove that no set of conditions can occur or shall be permitted to occur which shall call for physical test as a last resort, all of which has already been proved to be impossible.
before the Social Revolution in other words, to present society, to society here and now.
Having seen thus far, that such a theory or policy cannot prevent war, we have now to investigate whether it can serve to bring about peace. Of course the peace must be real, and not merely an illusory interruption of hostilities.
First, too, we must understand how to go about it. We cannot, for instance, entertain the use of force by the Governments seeking disarmament: that would be disarmament by military preponderance; in other words, rather a case of armament than disarmament. Verbal protest would not do any good, because it cannot impede the action of bullets and bayonets. There is left only a policy of persuasion, which must be successfully exerted upon those powers that control and authorize the use of weapons and the discharge of guns namely, on the belligerent ruling Governments.
To get anywhere, however, we must take into account the limitations governing the belligerents, and the necessary character of the response to such an appeal. Perhaps a concrete situation might best serve to illuminate the nature of the matter.
Suppose Germany and France consented to attempt to deal with a proposition of this kind. Then Germany would have to believe in and agree to the elimination of armament, provided France stated and believed the same. After both countries had affirmed and confirmed their attitude, the situation would resolve itself to something like this: Germany, after making her declaration of intention to disarm, would have implicit confidence in her own declaration because, applying as it does within her own borders, she controls its enforcement. As to French disarmament, Germany would believe as much as she could see in the present with her own eyesight, but would be very uncertain about the future, which she could neither see nor control. The attitude of France toward Germany would be exactly similar, for it is self evident that no nation can stake its welfare, and, indeed, its very existence, upon a verbal promise which is not to be enforced by the nation whose existence is jeopardized, but by the Government making the promise.
Neither can the offensive and defensive alliances of nations be cited as an approach to disarmament and subsequent lasting peace, because these combinations are made to wage successful war when war becomes unavoidable, and serve that purpose solely. All such associations are effective only for the purpose of waging war, and the specific merits by which they answer that purpose cause them to constitute an obstruction to peaceful disarmament. For, in view of what has been already stated, the establishment of a lasting basis for peace, on the present military foundation, must be regarded as impossible, and any attempt to do away with the military factors equally so. An alliance for making war involves no added risk to the contracting parties in their relations to each other, whereas, in a peacemaking arrangement, each is obliged to place his destiny in the hands of the other. similar case would be that of a merchant who would advocate and enter into a trade combination, in which his success and existence would depend on the benevolent action of his competitors. It would be necessary to show that the benevolence of a competitor is to his own interest as well as to the interest of the party he is blessing with his benevolence, and the nature of competitive interests does not permit of such a proof, in personal any more than in international relations.