50 THE CLASS STRUGGLE THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION 51 tionary policy was abandoned, and the Council co operated with the infamous gathering of the social patriots at Stockholm, against the protests of the Bolsheviki, who insisted on co operation only with revolutionary Socialism. It required only this to emphasize the non revolutionary character of the Council as dominated by the moderates, that they joined hands with Schiedemann and the social patriots of all countries. Moderate Socialism acted as the comis voyageur of bourgeois diplomacy.
This was the policy of reaction dominating the Council of Workmen and Soldiers, which had become identified with the government and its willing tool. When on June 23 the masses of Petrograd, aware of the counter revolutionary trend of events, decided upon a formidable demonstration, the moderates in the Council declared violently against the proposed action. In the Council itself, Tseretelli accused the Bolsheviki of intentions to overthrow the government by armed force. Tseretelli had become counter revolutionary, had constituted himself the guardian of the authority of a government that betrayed the hopes of the inasses and that secretly plotted war with other imperialistic governments. Overthrow the government by armed force! Is this not a method of revolution? What an accusation, what a terrible indictment, coming from a man who cloaked himself in the garb of the revolutionist, who had himself applauded the use of that armed force which overthrew the Czarism! The accusation of Tseretelli is an historic one it is an expression of the complete moral and revolutionary bankruptcy of the moderates in the Council.
The proposed demonstration was abandoned. This apparent victory heartened the government. It yielded to the pressure of the Allies for an offensive, and this offensive was organized and decided upon secretly. It was kept a secret from the Russian people, at a time when the Allied capitals knew about it. On July the offensive was launched, was temporarily victorious, and it was then that the Russian people were informed. But the counterattacks came, and the offensive, as was natural, was smothered in its own impotence. Under the circumstances, the offensive was sheer murder of the Russian soldiers, who were unprepared. But the Council, in spite of an increased opposition vote, approved of the government and its offensive. Although the government was bent on war, it knew that an offensive was as yet impossible; it launched the premature offensive as a diplomatic trick, under pressure of the Allies and in order to secure their financial assistance. The Bolshevist organ Pravda openly asserted this character of the offensive. And, to be sure, the Provisional Government under the circumstances was dependent upon the Allies, not alone because of its bourgeois war policy, but because it needed money to carry out the policy. The money could have been secured by expropriating the wealthy, and by taxing industry heavily; but the government was not of a character to adopt this policy. And so the Russian soldiers were sacrificed, in the interest of imperialism and the counter revolution.
In spite of its failure, the July offensive had important results.
It strengthened the reaction; it aligned the moderates in the Council more firmly with the government: Council and government became more thoroughly one and reactionary. The sinister forces of the imperialistic bourgeoisie indulged openly in counterrevolutionary activity. The Cadets, emboldened, challenged the Revolution on the autonomy granted the Ukraine, and resigned from the government.
But, simultaneously, the masses were aroused, determined upon One of the secret documents published by the Bolshevist government shows the true character of this Stockholm Conference. It is a telegram dated August 18, 1917, from the Russian Ambassador in Stockholm to the Provisional Government, reporting a conversation with Branting, who declared that he was willing to drop the Conference if Kerensky considered it untimely, and that Branting would use his influence with the Dutch Scandinavian committee to this end. The telegram concludes by asking secrecy and not compromising Branting, as otherwise a valuable source of information would be lost. Socialist Conference the willing tool of diplomacy! No wonder the Mensheviki fraternized with Scheidemann and Branting at Stockholm! On June 27 a meeting was held in the Russian headquarters, attended by Brussilov and other Russian generals, Minister Terestchenko, the American Senator Root, the British Ambassador Buchanan and the American General Scott. The decision for an offensive was only taken under strong pressure of President Wilson, who had fixed the as ultimate date July 1, threatening to cut off financial negotiations in case of refusal. Quoted in The New International of October, 1917,