

talk but could not act, because of the antagonism of class interests; or else, under the pressure of events, it might act, but in the interest of one or the other group. It was no accident of history that the head of this government was Kerensky, an orator, a master of words. Only words, only fine phrases and glittering slogans, could be the expression of an actual two-class government in a revolutionary situation. And where the government of Kerensky acted, it fatedly acted against the revolution. Where revolutions do not act, they are submerged in a welter of words. If the revolutionary class shrinks before the task of assuming power and reorganizing society, the ruling class inevitably acts in the interest of reaction. Every day that passed in the making of phrases and without action was a defeat for the Revolution. The policy of phrases makes for reaction. The slogans of the Revolution may be used and assimilated by the time-serving politicians of the bourgeoisie and moderate Socialists: its *action*, never.

Under the coalition government, industry was demoralized, the bourgeoisie using its ownership of industry to starve the proletariat and paralyze the Revolution by locking out the workers and sabotaging industrial production. Agriculture was demoralized, because the government dared not carry out the revolutionary task of expropriating and distributing the lands, as this task antagonized the interests of the bourgeoisie represented in the government. These bourgeois representatives sabotaged any revolutionary measures of the government, when pressure compelled the government to act, which was rarely. The task of internal reorganization could be undertaken either by a strictly bourgeois government, which would have meant a reorganization dominantly in the interest of the bourgeoisie; or by a strictly revolutionary Socialist government, which would have meant a reorganization in the interest of the proletariat and proletarian peasantry. Where the government paltered on the land question, the Bolsheviks told the peasants, "Seize the lands immediately, and organize agriculture through your Councils." Where the capitalists used industry to strike at the Revolution, the Bolsheviks told the workers, "Seize the work-shops, and organize and manage production through your own efforts and the technical staffs."

The Provisional Government wanted the problems of the Revolution settled by the Constituent Assembly, and kept postponing the convening of the Assembly. The Council, dominated by the moderates, acquiesced in this paltering policy designed to cut the ground from under the Revolution. The Bolsheviks insisted upon action—the immediate revolutionary action of the masses.

The test of action, of power, was inescapable. The revolutionary impatience of the masses increased in the measure that the Provisional Government evaded the necessity of action and adopted an international policy that allied new Russia with the Imperialism of Great Britain, France and Italy. The Kerensky government did not simply palter on the issue of peace: it actually repudiated peace, and secretly conspired with the governments of the Allies to continue an imperialistic war. Not only were the secret agreements of the Czarism not published and repudiated\*, but the Provisional Government itself used secret diplomacy in making arrangements of its own to continue the war with the Allies. Words promised peace, but acts constituted war. The policy of trying to influence the governments of the Allies to revise and re-state their war aims was not only a futile and bourgeois policy, but it was insincere in that secretly the Provisional Government plotted war. The Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionists accepted this policy: they contributed to the delusion of a war for democracy,—a war "to defend the Revolution": but *which* revolution? In the first flush of the Revolution, the moderates in the Council appealed to the proletariat to break with their imperialistic governments; but gradually this revolu-

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\* In the matter of publishing the secret treaty agreements, as in other matters, the Kerensky government took its cue from the Allies. In a secret telegram to the Russian Charge d'Affairs in Paris, dated September 24, 1917, Tereschenko, Kerensky's Foreign Minister, said: "... a publication of a treaty which is generally known would be completely misunderstood by public opinion and would only give rise to demands for the publication of the agreements which had been concluded during the war. The publication of these, and especially of the Rumanian and Italian treaties, is regarded by our allies as undesirable. In any case we have no intention of putting difficulties in the way of France or of placing Ribot in a still more painful position . . . no obstacles will be placed in the way of publishing all agreements before or during the war, in the event of the other Allies who are parties to them consenting."