

influence, and a new ideology. Industry developed in great proportions, absorbed from without and reproducing all the features of large scale, concentrated industry. The industrial technology, not being developed slowly from within but acquired full-grown from without, did not reproduce normally all stages of the historical development of Capitalism. One consequence of this was that a large industrial middle class never developed in Russia, that class of industrial petty bourgeois which historically is the carrier of democracy and revolution. The Russian bourgeoisie was the bourgeoisie of Big Capital, of trusts and financial capital, in short, of modern Imperialism. You had these two extremes: on the one hand, backward, undeveloped peasant production; and on the other, the typical concentrated industry of imperialistic Capitalism.

The inner conditions of Russian Capitalism required the intensive development and exploitation of the home market. But this would necessarily mean two things: the end of low wages and a revolutionary struggle against the Czarism. The bourgeoisie rejected this policy, mortally afraid of the consequences it might have in arousing the strength and revolutionary class consciousness of the proletariat. The home market was allowed to remain largely undeveloped; and the bourgeoisie embarked upon a policy of export trade, exploiting Asia Minor, Persia and the Far East, and making loans and investments in "dying empires"—in short, Imperialism. This was a policy which had no revolutionary consequences, and that promised, immediately, larger profits than the intensive development of the home market. But it also meant the end of the bourgeoisie as a liberal and revolutionary force, it meant immediately and ultimately a compromise with the Czarism.

The revolution of 1905 marked the turning point of this development. During this revolution, betrayed and maligned by the "liberal" forces, the bourgeoisie beheld the spectre of a proletarian revolution, of a revolution that might not persist within the limits of bourgeois interests, and that might turn against the bourgeoisie,—as has actually been the case. The danger was too palpable: why take risks, particularly when the policy of Imperialism offered an apparently easy way out? But such are the con-

traditions of Capitalism, that the bourgeoisie inevitably digs its own grave no matter which way it may turn. The new policy had momentous consequences. It made the bourgeoisie reactionary; moreover, it assisted in clarifying the class consciousness of the proletariat by constituting it *the* revolutionary force. Prior to the revolution of 1905, the political prisoners were dominantly bourgeois intellectuals; after, they were dominantly proletarians.

The significance of Russian Imperialism in the course of the revolution should not be confused because of the fact that Imperialism generally means the maturity of the industrial development of Capitalism. Events are not interpreted simply by formulas. Japan is imperialistic in its policy, and yet it is not a fully-developed industrial country. The prevailing historical situation and modifying factors are of the first importance. The development of concentrated industry in Russia produced a mass of surplus commodities and of surplus capital, which had to be disposed of; to be sure, this could have been done internally, but that would have required the development of the home market, with revolutionary consequences; the Russian bourgeoisie, accordingly, chose the policy of export trade and Imperialism. The social consequences were identical with those in other countries: the liberals and intellectuals generally became lackeys of Imperialism; democracy and liberal ideas were accepted within the limits of the new autocracy necessary to promote the interests of the imperialistic bourgeoisie. All social groups, on the whole and essentially, except the proletariat, became reactionary and counter-revolutionary.

The imperialistic bourgeoisie, accordingly, enthusiastically accepted the war against Germany and Austria, and for the Dardanelles, Constantinople, Asia Minor, and the promotion of its imperialistic interests generally as against the Imperialism of Germany. But their hopes of a profitable victory lagged, as the corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy of the Czar bungled the management of the war. Defeat, instead of victory, stared the imperialists in the face. The bourgeoisie tried through extra-parliamentary means to avert the collapse. This was not sufficient. There was no decline in the patriotic enthusiasm of the bour-