

to Stockholm as the "officially sent commis-voyageurs of the Foreign Office."

But even more weighty than the opinions of these valiant and beloved comrades is the testimony of the known facts surrounding the Stockholm Conference. And first and foremost among these facts is the so-called "strike" of the Hungarian Socialists. This "strike" is one of the most remarkable events in the history of the Socialist movement. It consisted in the refusal of the Hungarian Socialists to attend the Stockholm Conference unless the Hungarian Government promised certain internal reforms. In other words, so anxious was the Austro-Hungarian Government for the "success" of the Stockholm Conference and, therefore, for the attendance thereat of the Austrian and Hungarian Socialists, that the latter used the refusal to attend the Conference as a whip wherewith to exact certain concessions from their Government.

History (as we know it at the present writing) does not record whether this truly remarkable "strike" was successful. The impression left by the incomplete press accounts is that it was not, and that the Hungarian Socialists thereupon behaved at Stockholm in a manner not at all pleasing to their rulers. Whereupon the official Hungarian Press Bureau issued a wail which is in itself the best possible commentary on the role which the Socialists of the Central Empires were expected to play at Stockholm and the hopes which the ruling classes within those Empires placed upon that Conference. Says the Bureau:

"From Hungarian Government circles the news reaches us that the behavior of the Hungarian Socialists at Stockholm has made a very bad impression upon those circles. The Hungarian Government was in hopes that the contact between the Socialists of the Central Empires and those of Russia would serve to dispel many misunderstandings and to counteract the intrigues of those Russian elements which are so friendly to England. In responsible quarters the idea of an international rapprochement was therefore received very favorably, and they saw with pleasure that leading Hungarian Socialists should appear at the Stockholm Conference. But many indiscreet assertions of these leaders at

Stockholm propose quite unacceptable solutions of matters of the greatest importance to Austria and to our ally, Germany. They have also adopted an almost unbelievable attitude with respect to the question of nationalities and the question of the indemnification of Serbia."

It is quite evident that the American Socialists were not the only ones who had put faith in "The Hope of Stockholm." Nor are they the only ones who were disappointed in that Hope.

That does not dispose of Stockholm, however. In spite of the apparent readiness of the "Majority" Socialists of the Central Empires to misuse such a conference for the interests of their governments, an international Socialist conference may yet be made an important factor in hastening the day of peace. But this can only be accomplished if the Socialists of the rest of the world will take good care to remove the danger of its being made use of as part of some scheme for a "German Peace." Just how that is to be done presents one of the most difficult problems before the Socialists of the world to-day. This problem is particularly pressing in view of the call issued by the Russian Socialists for another Stockholm Conference. If we do not succeed in solving this problem there is great danger that the second attempt at an International Socialist Peace Conference will go the way of the first. How, then, is this problem to be solved?

One solution is offered by Franz Mehring: Exclude the "Majority" Socialists from the Conference. Aside, however, from the questionable propriety of raising the question as to who should be included in the re-organized International as a preliminary to a Peace Conference, there is the practical consideration that such an exclusion would make the whole conference impossible, as the Central Empires would not issue passports to any delegation that did not include the "Majority" Socialists. We cannot, therefore, accept this solution. This does not dispose, however, of the Mehring suggestion. For that suggestion is accompanied by the statement that the German Socialists for whom he speaks (the Liebknecht group) would not participate in any conference of which the "Majority" Socialists formed a part. An International Socialist Peace Conference, with some of the best inter-