

considers study and research a waste of time has disposed of any further relations with Marx and his kind.

But Scheidemann is absolutely consistent in the position he has taken. The "practical" system of politics really has nothing in common with our Old Masters. But the practical politicians have no business to hide this difference in order to be lionized under false colors.

In denying to them this right, we hope no one will consider us guilty of playing unfair, for we merely emphasize thereby the brilliant virtuosity of Scheidemann.

Our Old Masters had historical minds, and therefore never took the unhistorical stand: War is war, and every war is to be measured by the same conventional hand-rule.

To them every war was the outgrowth of certain conditions and purposes, on which depended the stand that the working class was to take. In respect to these concrete circumstances, they may have differed more or less, but always subject to the deciding qualification that the war was to be exploited as thoroughly as possible in the interest of proletarian emancipation. According to their class theory, there was no difference between peace and war unless it be that in war time the working class must look after its interests even more sharply, and must be even more uncompromising in support of them.

In the year 1859 Lasalle had quite a dispute with Marx and Engels on the war that France was then waging with the assistance of Russia against Austria, which, as the controlling power of the German Bund, tried also to drag in the German states into the conflict. The fact is that there developed, particularly in South Germany, a strong sentiment against France which Engels and Marx believed to be a truly national, instinctive expression, and therefore a source of revolutionary action to be used according to their wish, in a war against the Bonapartist regime. Lasalle on the other hand was of the opinion that the sentiment against France was an inherited prejudice of former days and was therefore essentially reactionary; if the German government wants to tackle France let them try their luck,

but such a war must be made repulsive to the masses as a reactionary manufacture of cabinets, so that inevitable eventualities and changes may then be made to serve Revolutionary progress.

This one instance is cited here—there were others as well—because it shows how easily different opinions can arise on the basis of the actual conditions preceding a war, and also how it can lead to opposite deductions. But, as Marx himself affirmed, it was a question only of "contrary conclusions from the same premises"; in their aims and purposes they were entirely agreed, that it was solely and only a question of the revolutionary interests, which, in their estimation, were at the same time national interests. Engels wrote to Lassalle: "Long live war, if the French and Russians attack us both at the same time; if we are nearly drowning, then in such a desperate situation all parties from the ruling class down must exhaust their efforts to the last man, and the Nation to save itself, must finally turn to the most efficient group." Lassalle remarked in this connection: "Very true; and for the last two months I have been wearing myself out to show that if the government goes to war it is simply playing into our hands, and just on that account is hastening the Revolution enormously." "But," he added, "the war sought by the Prince Regent must be made unpopular among the masses in order to be thus converted into a great revolutionary blessing."

The Prince Regent did not risk declaring war on France in 1859, and so this test never materialized. Neither did the Prince earn any diplomatic laurels by not going to war, which didn't make Lassalle feel bad either. "I believe in the principle of nationality as sincerely as anyone," he wrote to Marx, "but what the devil do you and I care for the honor of the Prince of Prussia? As all his aims and interests run directly contrary to the aims and interests of the German people, it is far more in the interest of the people that the power of the Prince in the outside world should be as small as possible. . . . The power of the German people will develop of its own accord. But it can only and will only be achieved when we have a popular government, and not under our dynasties. The greatness