

to have a navy—the seas being considered international domain along with the undeveloped “territories.” These are matters of detail, however. Important in themselves, but not bearing directly on our problem of securing permanent peace. This will be assured when armed force and national security, whether present or future, have been divorced from each other; the one abolished and the other placed under international protection.

When the Great War broke out, much was said about this being “a war to end war”; and now a whole lot is being said about its being a war “to make the world safe for democracy.” There can be no doubt of the fact that complete disarmament is a sure means, and the only practical means of making an end to war. It is also the best, and probably the quickest means of making the world safe for democracy. Neither the German nor any other autocracy could maintain itself in an unarmed world for the space of a brief winter’s morn.

Nor would there be much trouble in settling the vexing problems of nationality, which now defy all attempts at solution. The fact is that the problem of nationality is now really insoluble, except in very few instances. It is sufficient to read the books of Toynbee, Brailsford, and other liberals and radicals who have attempted to solve the question, to completely despair of the possibility of any solution of the problem under present conditions. But all difficulties disappear the moment the world has disarmed itself—for the real difficulties of the problem are of a military character, and will therefore disappear with the disappearance of military establishments. Even the so-called “economic” difficulties connected with the settlement of the question of nationalities are really military. Take, for instance, the question of Alsace-Lorraine: There are many people who believe that Germany would even now be willing to cede to France the French-speaking parts of Lorraine, if it were not for the iron ore of the district which Germany cannot afford to relinquish. This sounds awfully “economic.” In reality, however, it is a purely military question, and would disappear with the disappearance of the possibility of war. As a matter of fact, Germany never had any trouble of getting all the iron ore she wanted

from any iron ore district in France. What the talk of the iron ore deposits of Lorraine really means is this: *That in case of war* Germany could not rely on the supply of those deposits, either for her munitions or industries. But this difficulty would manifestly disappear with the disappearance of war, and with it the entire problem of Alsace-Lorraine.

The same is true of Northern France and Belgium: In so far as these regions are not desired by Germany for purely military reasons, they are coveted for “economic”—military reasons—for their coal and iron ore deposits, which are absolutely free to Germany in times of peace, but unavailable, or not readily available, in time of war.

The end of war would also mark the end of the Polish problem. To-day, the Polish problem is practically insoluble. A really free and independent Poland is an utter impossibility—that is why the German attempt to create an “independent” Poland was bound to be a failure even if it had not been conceived in fraud and born in iniquity. A really free and independent Poland requires not only the union of all Polish lands, but also an outlet to the sea, which means the possession of the formerly Polish but now German city of Danzig. But Germany would no more think of ceding Posen and Danzig to a free and independent Poland than she would of ceding Schleswig-Holstein and the Kiel Canal to an independent Denmark strengthened by the absorption of Norway and Sweden. The cession of Posen would bring Berlin entirely too near the frontier to make it comfortable from a military point of view; and the cession of Danzig would interfere seriously with Germany’s control of the eastern Baltic. But all these considerations would disappear the moment the spectre of “the next war” would be laid to rest.

The same is true of the question of nationalities in Austria, in the Balkans, in Asiatic Turkey: In each and every one of these cases the real obstacle to a proper solution lies in the military situation; the granting of independence or complete autonomy to a subject nationality means a weakening of the state from a military point of view. No military nation will therefore agree to it willingly, and it presents a grave problem even to non-militaristic nations.