

of *change by growth*; and any arrangement which will leave change possible will not be *secure* either from Germany's point of view or from that of her opponents. Germany surely will not consent to any peace that will not secure to her at least all that she gets, on this settlement. And for the same reason that she has hitherto turned down all of England's overtures for a limitation of armaments, a naval holiday, and other proposals of a similar nature: No place in the sun is really secure unless the holder can keep it by his own power. A place held by any other tenure than the tenure of might is held "on sufferance," which makes the holder an object of charity, a "vassal" of the power on whose sufferance it is held.

Germany answers all suggestions for a renunciation of military power in consideration of "liberal treatment" in the matter of a place in the sun in exactly the same manner which the class-conscious workers answer all overtures from enemies, and well-meant advice from "friends," offering "concessions" if they will but follow the methods of conciliation rather than those of the class-struggle. That answer is: In a world based on force one can get only what his power may obtain for him, and he can retain it only as long as that power lasts.

The whole problem of peace-terms therefore reverts back to the question of power, viewed from the point of view of its application in the domain of Modern Imperialism—colonies and the development of undeveloped regions of the world.

There are three possible solutions:

We may deprive Germany of her "power for evil," that is, to take any other place "in the sun" than that which we will assign to her—treating her in the settlement "generously" or otherwise, as our "wisdom" or "sense of justice" may dictate.

We may give her what she wants by way of "a place in the sun," or at least a large instalment on account, giving her at the same time the power to hold it by her own might—which would mean an enormous increase of her military strength.

Or we may go back to what will essentially amount to the

status quo ante in the matter of power, even if it does not in actual holdings and possessions.

The first alternative has already been rejected by us as not leading to a lasting peace, which is the object we desire to achieve above all.

The second alternative would lead to a series of wars similar to the Napoleonic wars, culminating in some such unstable balance of power as one of those that have preceded this war, or in a complete domination of the world by Germany, establishing a Pax Germanica similar to the Pax Romana which accompanied the final triumph of Rome over the world. It is needless to discuss the desirability or undesirability of a Pax Germanica as the world is evidently not ready to accept it.

And the third alternative, by its very character of a compromise, stamps the peace which it would usher in as an unstable settlement, and, therefore, necessarily short-lived.

For reasons already explained, each of these possible alternatives would usher in an era of increased armaments.

Are we, then, doomed to armaments and war? Is there no escape from the vicious circle?

Not unless we are ready to adopt radical measures and eradicate the root of the evil. This way out does not lie in the "victory" of either of the contending parties; but neither does it lie in "negotiations," "give and take," "adjustment," and the other methods of the compromisers or compromising reformers. The case is not hopeless: It does not require the change of human nature, which is beyond human power; nor the extermination of the Germans—which would seem the only way of forever depriving Germany of her "power for evil"—which is beyond "our" power; nor yet the abolition of the capitalist system, for which the world is not ready. But the case is extremely serious, and requires heroic treatment.

The escape from the vicious circle lies in divorcing international security from armed power. This means: *Complete disarmament, and international organization.*