

real navy, that is, a navy which means sea-power, must have "points of support" commensurate to its size, if its size is to count. It must have a large sea-coast at home, and supply-bases, coaling stations, etc., in all parts of the globe.

In other words, in order that she may be on sea what she was on land, in the world what she was on the European continent, Germany had to pursue an aggressive policy on land as well as on sea. The matter of the possession, or at least control, of her "natural" sea-coast, which extends to the straits of Dover, became to her "a matter of life and death." And as the possession or control of a sea-coast is never "secure," from a military point of view, without the possession or control of the hinterland, the possession of Holland, Belgium and Northern France became absolutely indispensable to the "security" of her "future." So, also, was the control of the Balkan Peninsula, with its road to Asia, and Germany's "natural" eastern sea-coast on the Adriatic and the Mediterranean.

From a militaristic point of view, and in a world in which war is not merely a possibility but a probability, the reasoning is unassailable. Just think of the role which the Flanders coast has played and is still playing in Germany's submarine campaign in the present war. But the possession of that coast by her was impossible without the invasion of Belgium.

Germany's hunger for colonies, and "a place in the sun" generally, of necessity leads her to an aggressive militaristic policy on land as well as on sea. It is not necessary to inquire here into the ethics of Germany's demands in this respect; nor into the question of whether or not the German masses would really benefit by their country's achieving these objects. It is sufficient for our purpose, which is the attainment of a lasting peace, that the German masses think they will, and that almost the entire nation stands behind the German Government in the demand for the objects if not exactly in the approval of all the means whereby these may be attained. It is sufficient in this connection to point to the peace program of the "majority" Socialists as propounded by their delegates to Stockholm. It

may, therefore, be taken for granted that we cannot have peace, at least not a lasting peace, until these demands are somehow satisfied.

This is the basis of all the arguments for a "negotiated" peace, as opposed to a "dictated" peace. These arguments are not only sound, but absolutely unanswerable. Unfortunately, the conception of a negotiated peace is a purely negative one, and therefore utterly inadequate. We cannot secure a lasting peace by merely not robbing Germany of her colonies, for she was "hungry" and therefore aggressive under the status quo ante with those colonies in her possession. Nor can we solve the problem by being "generous" with her by giving her some more colonies and a larger "place in the sun" than she had before the war. During the last few years before the war England attempted to conciliate Germany by making her all kinds of concessions—the last one on the very eve of the war. But that did not do any good. For it is not merely a "place in the sun" that Germany demands, but such a place as she is entitled to. What she is "entitled" to is, naturally, a matter of very serious difference of opinion even among "reasonable" people, not to speak of two opposing camps of imperialists. And in a world in which the sword is the ultimate arbiter, we shall not have peace until Germany shall have had *that* place in the sun to which *she* deems herself "entitled."

But even that is not all: Germany does not ask merely for *such* a place in the sun as she deems herself entitled to, but for the ability to hold it by her own power. She seeks not only increased opportunities, but also increased power. That is what she means when she says that her future *growth* must be made "secure."

The element of *growth*, and even more so the element of *security*, makes a *permanent adjustment* between the different nations as to their respective "places in the sun" utterly impossible. Any adjustment that will fix permanently and *securely* the status to be created by the peace settlement which will follow this war will necessarily be so rigid as to exclude any possibility