

policy, encouraging France in the acquisition of colonies, while keeping Germany out of colonial "adventures."

It is now commonly said that Germany has been preparing for the present war for forty-four years, that is, since the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian war. This statement is very far from accurate. Far from preparing for a new war, Germany was distinctly peaceful during a period of about fifteen to twenty years immediately following the Franco-Prussian war—in so far as an armed nation can be "peaceful."

At the close of that period there opened up a new era in the history of capitalistic civilization, the era commonly referred to as that of Modern Imperialism. The salient characteristic of that era is the hunt for spheres of exploitation in the form of exclusive privileges for the "development" of undeveloped countries. This transformed Germany from a "satiated" country into a "hungry" one; *hungry for colonies*. This involved the abandonment of Bismarck's "continental" policy and the turning of the German Empire into a World Power. The new policy was officially announced in the present Kaiser's famous declaration that: "the future of the German Empire lies on the sea." This turned Germany upon a new career of militarism and war-like aggression. It was not merely a question of acquiring a few colonies in Africa or elsewhere, for the purpose of colonizing there the "surplus" population of the German Empire as some simple souls imagine; or of getting admittance into the "markets" of these undeveloped countries for the purpose of selling goods, as some other simple souls believe. Germany has no "surplus" population, for one thing. And if she had such a surplus there would be no difficulty in disposing of it: the civilized over-lords or "protectors" of undeveloped countries have a broad "welcome" for all colonists and no questions asked. Nor are there any "trade" difficulties in undeveloped countries to speak of. It so happens that England is the principal colonial power of the world. And that "grasping" nation has followed an undeniably liberal policy in her colonies, keeping their doors open to the trade of the entire world. China keeps her doors

open by international agreement. Turkey's foreign trade is regulated by an international commission, and there are no discriminations as far as ordinary "trade" is concerned.

What was involved was the right to participate in the exploitation of the resources of the "undeveloped" portions of the globe on a scale commensurate with the "greatness" of the nation, otherwise known as obtaining a "proper place in the sun." But that was utterly impossible under the conditions of the status quo ante bellum. Under that status Germany was a "continental" nation—the world overseas being pre-empted by other nations, principally by England. This was not merely a question of colonial possessions or dependencies, but of sea-power. England, by virtue of her position as the leading sea-power of the world, had a predominant influence in all decisions affecting the future of all undeveloped countries, whether they were formally tributary to her or not. Such a condition was neither profitable to those elements of the German nation whose prosperity depended on imperialistic expansion, nor did it comport with the "dignity," "honor," or "station in life" of the "leading nation of the world." It was manifestly "impossible" for the "most civilized nation of the world" to stand idly by while other nations were "civilizing" the "uncivilized" world, and incidentally "pegging out claims" for their own "posterity." This made the future of "the Greatest nation on earth" "insecure." It was being left a *mere* "continental" power in a world of "World-powers." If this great nation was to retain her greatness, and "count" in the world for as much as she counted on her own continent, she evidently had to bestir herself and become in the world what she was on that continent: Bismarck's successors must do for Germany in the world what that great statesman had done for Prussia in Europe.

This meant, in the first place, the building of an enormous navy; a navy, if not exactly as large as the English navy, at least of a size to be *dangerous* to the English navy when alone and sufficient to *beat* the English navy with the assistance of some other navy. But a strong navy does not mean merely a certain number of ships, with their men and armaments: a