

nevertheless a great mistake to identify the two without further ado. For the purposes of the two are essentially different. The purposes of German Militarism under Bismarck were, primarily, to create and preserve German Unity under Prussian hegemony; and viewed from the broader point of view of modern history, the wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870 are not essentially different from the many other wars by which other nations, including our own, have achieved or preserved their unity. It is true that the actors involved and the methods used have injected into these wars a poisonous virus the malignity of which is not quite spent even now; and will forever differentiate them from other wars of unification. But they were wars of unification nevertheless.

In this connection, and as proof of the fact that these wars were not mere wars of conquest, and that the older German Militarism was not always actuated by lust of conquest or military glory, it is well to remember that when, in the war of 1866, after Sadowa and Koeniggratz, Austria lay prostrate at Prussia's feet, and the gates of Vienna lay open before Prussia's armies, the latter refrained from taking any territory from her vanquished foe or even humiliating him further by entering his capital. The history of those days is well known: The professional soldiers insisted on "reaping the fruits of their hard-won victories"—after the manner of all professional soldiers. But the author of three wars within seven years, the Iron Chancellor who founded the new German Empire on Blood and Iron, stayed their hands. Not out of moral scruples, of course; for these were quite foreign to the make-up of the author of the Ems despatch. But out of policy: this particular conquest and this particular glory did not fit into the scheme, was not calculated to help the purposes for which the war was conducted. The moral of which is: that "militarism" is not an inborn quality of character, an ebullition of the spirit; but very sober and calculating business. It is in fact a means to an end: the end being the achievement of some purpose or the accomplishment of some task which a nation finds set before it in the course of its historic development. Of course

once the spirit and organization of militarism have been created they have a tendency of becoming an end in themselves and of giving birth to certain by-products which have no direct relation to the historical necessity which called forth the militaristic growth, and may even be harmful to those historical aims and purposes which it was to accomplish. But the real source of life of any "live" militarism is this historic necessity, and as soon as that disappears, it must become decadent and ultimately break down of its own weight like a colossus with feet of clay.

The historic necessity to which the Prussian Militarism of the Eighteen Hundred Sixties was a means, was German Unity. Had German Unity been accomplished and no other historic cause intervened, Prussian Militarism would have entered upon a period of decay, and finally would have broken down and disappeared. Unfortunately, German Unity was not fully accomplished, largely *because* Prussian Militarism played so important a part in the attempt to achieve it. And before this historic purpose was achieved or definitely abandoned, there arose another task for Prussian, now German, Militarism. Nevertheless, there was a certain period of time during which German Militarism had lost its aggressive character, and assumed a "defensive" quality, in so far as militarism *can* be defensive. That was during the period following the Franco-Prussian war and until about the year 1890. During that period Bismarck followed a distinctly "peaceful," non-aggressive policy. Again, not because he had become convinced of the superior moral value of "peaceful" methods as opposed to his previous "war-like" policies, but because there was no useful purpose to be served, from his point of view, by following the methods previously used by him with such marked success.

With the organization of the German Empire, German Unity was achieved in so far as that was possible under Prussian hegemony. Prussian Germany thereupon became a "satiated" nation; and her principal care was to preserve the status quo against violent shocks, to keep what she had, and to make the best of it in a "diplomatic" way. Hence his alliance with Austria and his re-insurance treaty with Russia; his purely "continental"