

would consent to it so long as she has any power of resistance left in here. Shall we, then, limit the operation of this principle so as to make it acceptable to Germany? If so, just what shall be included therein, and what excluded therefrom?

The more we examine the question the more the conviction forces itself upon us that the general principles contained in the Russian peace-formula, standing alone, wouldn't do, admirable as they may be as guiding-lines and serviceable as they may be as general principles from which to start a discussion. And there is the grave danger that, believing ourselves in possession of a real peace-program, we may neglect the discussion of the many and serious problems which are involved in the elaboration of a *real peace-program*, thereby crippling our entire peace-propaganda. For at the present juncture, real peace-propaganda means propaganda for certain definite terms of peace. All else is mere talk, or worse. All the peoples want peace, and all the governments want peace. But they do not all want *the same peace*. It is, therefore, up to us to formulate the terms of the peace that we want, and then try to get the peoples to force this peace upon their governments.

In attempting to formulate a peace-program we must remember that we are not endeavoring merely to secure a cessation of hostilities, at *any price* or for *any length of time*; but that we are working for a *just and lasting peace*.

Such a peace cannot be secured by adopting and carrying out a purely negative program. It is really marvelous to behold how the Socialists of this country have pounced upon the couple of don'ts contained in the Russian peace-formula as if the salvation of the world depended on them, forgetting entirely about the affirmative principle contained therein. As if the status quo ante were the acme of perfection, and all that were necessary to redeem the world from all its troubles was to *restore* this same status in all its beauty—whereupon we would all be happy for ever afterward. This status-quo-ante worship is a new development in the Socialist movement. Before the war this same status was denounced as absolutely intolerable

by all Socialists. It was intolerable both because of the military burdens which the then status-quo imposed upon the peoples, and because of the world-war with which it was pregnant and which threatened to break loose any moment. When war broke out Kautsky wrote that we cannot go back to the status quo ante, and all Socialists agreed with him. The two or more additional years of war which we have had since have brought us nothing which should make us more kindly disposed toward the parent of this world cataclysm—the *status quo ante*.

But it is not merely a question of the undesirability of the status quo ante: we could not restore it even if we wanted to. The status quo ante, it must be remembered, is not a question of that province or this, but of power. That is why those who are in favor of a "negotiated peace" as against a peace by conquest speak of compensations to Germany for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, or such parts of those provinces as may "justly" be awarded to France in the peace negotiations. It is assumed that a just peace requires that no country, or at least none of the Great Powers, should receive any substantial addition of power, or suffer any substantial loss of power, as a result of this war. It is the old idea of the balance of power, supplemented with the idea that the status quo ante represented just the right balance.

It is just this balance, however, that has been damaged beyond repair. The separation of Poland from Russia, which may now be regarded as an accomplished fact, is in itself such a disturbance of the former balance of power to the disadvantage of Russia, and therefore to the advantage of Germany, as to make the restoration of the status quo ante impossible; except, perhaps, by such a dangerous operation as the breaking up of Austria-Hungary, which is certainly not contemplated by the professed worshippers of the "Don't" program. But this is not all: No number of "Don'ts," surely not the present number, can provide against the enormous accession of power to Germany by her *conquest of her allies*, which is also an accomplished fact; an accession of power which is bound to be enormously augmented when that conquest is completed and assumes definite and legal form in the shape of "Middle Europe."