thousands and even millions of men, both within Russia and outside of it, the Revolution meant a change of allegiance as far as the war is concerned, a change of the "side" on which they ranged themselves in their sympathies, hopes and efforts. Whether or not this change of sentiment will affect a sufficient number of people to outweigh, from a military point of view, the disorganization of the Russian army which must necessarily follow such a tremendous internal upheaval, it is too early to judge. That depends largely upon the moral effect of the Revolution on the Poles of Russian Poland, the different Slav nationalities of the Austrian Empire and the working class of Germany and our information with respect to what is going on in these regions of the world is so meagre as not to permit of any intelligent estimate.

But there are some effects of the Russian Revolution upon the World Conflict which are quite certain, and these are of the most tremendous importance. One of these is the passing of the dream of a separate peace between Russia and Germany. Ever since the great retreat of the Russian armies from Poland in the summer of 1915 this possibility has been staring the Allies in the face, and the possibility was turning more and more into a probability as time was passing on, until it finally became almost a certainty. It is now known that negotiations for such a peace were well under way ever since last September, and that had the Revolution not intervened the Czar of Russia and the Emperor of Germany would now probably be openly avowing the friendship which they have always had for each other in secret, and "their" Empires would be allies instead of enemies. This possibility has now been done away with forever. The nightmare of an alliance between the evil forces of Russia and Germany to terrorize the civilized world shall trouble us no more. And even a separate peace between the two "countries" is beyond the range of probabilities so long as the evil powers which have been exorcised by the Revolution in Russia still remain dominant in Germany.

It is interesting in this connection to note the fact that the anti-war faction of the Social Democratic Party of Russia led

by Axelrod and Martoff took occasion in its first manifesto after the Revolution to brand as a lie and spurn as an insult the imputation that it favored a separate peace.

In speaking of the French and English "government Socialists," this manifesto mentions, as the acme of their misdeeds, that they "do not even shrink from the insinuation that the Russian Social Democracy, after the manner of the Romanoff clique, is considering a separate peace with Germany."

But even more important than the impossibility of an alliance between Czar and Emperor and the improbability of a separate peace between Free Russia and Autocratic Germany is the effect the Russian Revolution is bound to have on the kind of peace in which the World War will terminate. An imperialistic peace is impossible as long as the Russian Revolution maintains itself in its present condition, with the proletariat and the revolutionary peasants in the ascendency. And here we must note a distinction between the two stages of the Russian Revolution, in their relation to the two most important effects of the Revolution upon the war: The dream of a separate peace, dreamed by the combined reactionary forces of Russia and Germany, dissolved immediately upon the passing away of the "Romanoff clique." But the assurance of a just and lasting, non-imperialistic peace did not come until the revolutionary proletariat obtained control of the situation. Outwardly the second stage of the Russian Revolution was signalized by the retirement of Miljukoff and the entry of six Social Democrats, among them Tzeretelli and Skobeleff, into the Provisional Government. And the first act of the new Provisional Government was the definite announcement of the now famous "No Annexations; No Indemnities" policy.

That this policy is going to win is now almost a certainty. Unless the hold which the really revolutionary forces now have upon the situation in Russia should be broken by a counter-revolution this policy must win, as Revolutionary Russia is not in a mood to temporize or compromise. And it is extremely doubtful whether the forces of Imperialism in the camps of the Allies would dare to even attempt such a move. The indications are that since the signal failure of Mr. Wilson's attempt to lecture