

American war. The "center" and the "radicals" could agree on the attitude towards the war "in America," but not on a declaration of principles.

That is to say, if the issues had been made and kept clear, and people were honest with themselves and with others. But then that would be against all the rules of "politics." What is the use of having "astute diplomats" and "clever politicians" if not for the purpose of making "combinations" where no unanimity of opinion exists, and so muddle the issues by the use of "judicious" but meaningless phrases, as to catch the unwary? And so the politicians and diplomats in the convention set about making "combinations," and their ink-splashers set about patching up a document which should make as much noise and say as little as possible.

The results were surprising—to those who have never seen these things at work. When the Committee on War and Militarism opened its sessions it was decided to begin with a general discussion of principles. During this discussion Berger, Harriman and Hogan expressed views similar to those of Spargo, Berger going to the extent of expressing a desire that Spargo should be entrusted with the drawing up of the statement of principles, as he was sure Spargo could express his views better than himself. But in the end all three were found among those who signed the "majority report," while Spargo seemingly stood alone in the committee with his views. During the same discussion Berger called the members of the committee who did not agree with his views on nationalism "anarchists" and declared that he did not care to belong to the same party with them. Their statements to the effect that they had no nation to defend elicited from him an angry declaration that they were mere brutes who would not defend their wives and daughters, and that they therefore deserved not to have a nation, wife or daughter, etc., in his well-known jingoistic style. But in the end, he and some of the ultra-radicals were found to belong to the same "majority," and signing a document which purported to condemn all defensive warfare.

The result of "diplomacy" used between the opening session of the committee and its final session was that a committee which

seemed to stand with reference to the three groups above mentioned, as six—five—four—turned out to stand three—eleven—one. The "diplomacy" which was so efficacious in committee was not less so in the plenum of the convention. Instead of dividing 75—75—50, which was the approximate strength of the three groups, it divided, at the crucial moment, into 31—140—5.

Of course there were no conversions. Berger did not change his well-known views, which made him applaud Germany's invasion of Serbia and demand our own invasion of Mexico. Nor did Harriman and Hogan or any of their followers become radical internationalists between the opening of the convention and the adoption of the "majority report."

What happened was this: The "pro-war" element were given to understand that the political exigencies of the hour within the Socialist party demanded that the center and the right should combine to beat the "common enemy," to wit: the uncompromising radicals. This they could do without any real loss of position, as they could always send out a statement of their own to be voted on by the membership. It is true that that involved the rather absurd situation of the members of a "majority" sending out a minority-proposition after the majority-proposition for which they voted had been adopted. But then, "politics is politics."

At the same time the majority-draft—for now that the combination was made it had a majority behind it—was so "doctored" up as to catch some unwary radicals, thereby making the "majority" more impressive. And some radicals—about one-half of those present and voting—were caught by the false sound of the majority-draft and the promise held out to them that they would be permitted to improve it by amendment. A promise, by the way, which was not kept. The radicals soon discovered their mistake and raised a fuss, but it was too late.

The divisions caused by the attempts of the radicals, when they woke up to the situation, to amend the majority-draft showed that more than one-third of the delegates were seriously dissatisfied with the draft because it did not express their radical position. The "pro-war" substituted sent out by the Spargo-Benson group contains the signatures of nearly one-third more of the