

revolutionary and dictatorial means of the proletariat, that means is entirely outside of the consciousness and practicability of the social democrats; that begins where the action of the social democrats ends.

Consistent relatively of the social democrats to the revolution is, at most, just as passive as the conforming of a forbearing historian to the past revolutions.

A revolution is born and not made," is the favorite phrase of the social democrats, for nothing to advance the revolution concerns it. According to its nature, it would sooner hinder than aid a revolution (the same as a general strike and other semi-revolutionary mass actions). This is very clear if we look at the practicability of social democracy; revolutionary action disturbs this purpose and threatens to end it. As it is impossible to determine the outcome of the revolution in advance, whether it will be a success at the first attempt and not a failure, it always appears possible that the organized activity and political achievements, the organization, buildings, libraries, newspapers, reforms, democratic institutions, rights, etc., of the social democrats are threatened. Upon these is based the entire activity of the social democrats. In the life of social democracy these have developed in the line of self-interests, they are the chief basis for the continuation and the development of bourgeois legal action. It is for this reason that social democracy wishes to protect and guard them even against the revolutionary dangers.

It is true that in the teachings of social democracy references are made to Marx, explanations are also given of results of organized action with the apparent purpose of increasing and preserving it; and also expressly the necessity and success of the proletarian revolution is kept in view. And assuredly, will not occur because of the efforts of the social democrats, but regardless of them. (The bourgeois army, without doubt, will prove a great benefit to the proletarian revolution, contrary to the purpose of this army organization.) If the social democrats could direct the action of the workers according to their wishes, it is very doubtful if the labor organizations ever would venture such an undertaking as a revolution, or any such aim as Socialism; at least insofar that the bourgeoisie do not provoke revolution with weapons in their own hands. In this one incident you see the social democrat rise—but it is not certain that this is a rise—to revolt for the defense and continuation of his bourgeois class struggle. This resembles our rising the latter part of January.

In November we were about to withdraw from the revolution, partly to protect our democratic achievements from dangers; partly because we hoped, through our parliamentary plans, to turn the whole historical cycle; and partly, also, fatalistically thinking, if the revolution is to come now or later, it would come regardless of our position and thus it would prove itself really powerful.

What is the outcome of this historical error? Did we prevent armed combats? No. It was only postponed to such a time when the bourgeoisie were armed to the teeth, as in November. The bourgeoisie can bring about an armed combat with the workers at any time it wishes. The only danger to the workers is the fact that the bourgeoisie can specify the time of the beginning of this class war. When the proletariat begins it, the bourgeoisie in all localities are not sufficiently prepared for the revolution and to a greater or less degree are surprised by it; especially where the conservative ruling power has made itself extensively hated, here the revolution started by the workers can sweep along the dissatisfied layers of society, or at least can scatter and weaken the opposing lines. Where such conditions exist as exist in the warring countries, where even the proletariat has weapons in hands, it is extremely important that a class war should begin; the revolutionary power, within a very brief period, could unarm large numbers, capture a great deal of supplies necessary for the revolution, suitably arrange the most dependable troops for the defensive and offensive against the "internal enemy," also to arrange all its strength into passive or active counter-revolutionary action. It is certain that the government at the beginning of a class war has attempted to arrange the outside political conditions in a way most beneficial to itself, to arrange for foreign help when in greatest need, or at least to protect itself from the external enemy. In November it would have been more difficult for the bourgeoisie in Finland to get assistance from Germany than after a large number of her troops were liberated on the eastern front. We could not have imagined this fact in November.

Secondly, we, middle Socialists, did not desire to unite with the bourgeois "democracy" in any governmental alliance, which kind of an alliance was hoped for by the conservative Socialists that supported the revolution and those that did not. Without this kind of an alliance, the aim of the conservative Socialists, who supported the revolution, could not be fulfilled, i. e., the bringing about of a democracy. This group, or at least a majority of them, advocated that the restriction in the exploitation of food materials, and the

bringing about of the various democratic reforms should be done through the Diet. The conservative Socialists thought it very necessary that in this "red senate" inspired by revolution, there should be some representative of the peasantry. With this in view, a conference was held during the week of the general strike, attended by the conservative Socialists, and social democrats, who invited the representatives of the peasants, and of other "progressives." The result of this conference was that Comrade Tokoi went to question the officials of the senate if they wished to remain in the service of the "Red Senate." Thus the revolutionary desire of the revolutionary Socialists was to bring to life the coalition senate of the spring in a more complete form, through the aid of the Socialist majority, leaving out the most conservative.

Under favorable circumstances, this might have been the direct result of the November revolution. Nothing more. The labor movement of Finland could acquire nothing more. Part of the organized workers, without doubt, would have demanded a further step to be taken, but the easily satisfied majority could have appeased this demand and silenced the revolutionary voice of the proletariat, by turning immediately after having attained their aim, against the desire of the revolutionary workers for dictatorship. By this, the majority surely could have obtained its own purpose. Looking back to it now, makes it seem more realistic than at that time. It is apparent that the bourgeoisie of Finland would have had to yield that much to the revolution in order to save their chief advantages, which were not threatened by the revolutionary movement of the conservative Socialists. According to all probability the November revolution in Finland would, in truth, have become a bourgeois democratic revolution. This most assuredly would have been followed by a split in the ranks of organized labor, the right side to defend the "commonwealth" would join the bourgeoisie, the left would take a stand for true revolutionary Socialism, or communism, and would have risen against the bourgeois state and all its forces.

This is the proximate outcome of the revolution we, the so-called "Marxian Democrats," had in mind as early as on the week of the general strike. But we had two important reasons for not supporting the outset of a revolution. First we did not desire to aid the

alliance of the Social-Democrats and the bourgeoisie. Secondly, we wished to avoid the breaking of the labor party into two bitterly opposing parties, even in this instance our trend was in the direction of the Social Democrats and not towards Marxism. Truly we hindered historical progress, which had ripened into unavoidable conditions, by avoiding this break in the ranks of labor; but this action made it possible for labor to progress in the lines of revolution. This organization was unable to proceed because it had to support two opposing principles. Its collapse was possibly injurious to the action of Social Democrats—to parliamentarism and craft unionism. The aspirations of election returns surely decreased; but for the true progress of labor and the strengthening of class war, this break was a sure benefit. By this break labor would have been freed from injurious and obstructing elements which would not have been so dangerous to a workers revolutionary class struggle while in the bourgeois ranks as in the ranks of the workers. It is true that we could not dictate the outcome of the revolution however we strove. History alone would dictate it. We should have done our part in aiding history. Even history cannot do its duty empty handed. Even though a great ice-flow in the current of Finnish class struggle history had not occurred, it would have been dammed up by the bourgeois democracy, yet this flow would have been a long stride in advance for it would have broken up the huge layer and could concentrate its force upon the small jam until it would have been crushed. The procedure at the time of the breaking of the ice a stream is the quickest and most natural. It was carried on in Russia in this manner. It is the quickest way of getting a start. A large part of the resistance in a shackled bourgeois state here becomes useless. On the contrary, the breaking up of the flow may last for weeks until the whole will suddenly give away.

We kind of checked the beginning of the drift by calling off the strike within a week and postponing the question of revolution until the party convention. Dissatisfaction and bitter anger because of these doings were very general amongst the workers. This dissatisfaction did not break out in open riot against the leadership of the party, but its effect may be very injurious to the future class struggle for it broke the confidence of the workers in the leaders of the movement. Leadership which needed fire to struggle against the enemy of labor, had only the cold coals of suspicion. The suspicion and envy thus created has been a nightmare during the whole period of revolution. In November it already predicted the disorganization of April. The party convention, assembling after some weeks, at that time felt that the surge of general feeling for the revolution had passed, because of the cross-winds this surge was gradually disappearing. The representatives of the party convention were selected already in the spring under different conditions. Half of them seemed to support the revolution, the other half was against it. We of the center, wished by all means to keep our party together, and "succeeded." The summarizing resolution did not contain a word for or against the revolution, but had considerable of the spirit of Independent class struggle: in addition it had a group of reformation demands from the bourgeoisie, encouraging the workers to make armed preparation, not for offensive purpose, but for purpose of self defense.

Self defense became the greatest momentary need of the bourgeoisie. Seeing that they were temporarily free from the dangers of revolution they commenced to prepare consciously for the offensive. Publicly they carried on a fierce anti-Socialistic chase, and in a less conscious manner developed their war plans; gathered arms, organized and drilled the slaughter guard and sent agents with rush business to foreign countries. Locally unorganized revolutionary eruptions burst forth automatically with their anarchistic side interests. One burst in Abo. Parliamentary procedure was now injurious to the affairs of the workers. It only employed unnecessarily the powers which might have been used in the preparation for the approaching revolution. It only blinded and led astray from seeing what is about to happen, what the bourgeoisie prepared for and what the proletariat should have prepared for. When the November revolution threatened, by majority action, the diet passed a resolution that in the parliament, no governmental clique, would have the greatest governmental power. This seems a real, even though, a weak step toward a real faultless "democracy." At a meeting of the Constitutional Committee we attempted to draft on paper a plan for the construction of this beautiful state, we also decided to give a prize for the grandest flag patterned for the flagpole of Finnish Democracy.

Then we heard from the mouth of Sir Svinhufvud (dictator of Finland) the Constitution of Capital which has only one article: "Iron hand regime!"

This was a brutal and blood-thirsty Constitution, but it referred to the reality and violence of the history of class wars, when many social democrats were dreaming of a democratic constitution won through a victory in election.

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at 2 p. m.

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