

On the Defense of the U.S.S.R.

The Struggle for a Proletarian Party

By JAMES P. CANNON
National Secretary, S.W.P.

(Continued from Page 2)
national-freedom movement which may develop among the Byelo-Russian and other nationalities in the Soviet Union.

Defense of the Soviet Union

27. We have always stood for the unconditional defense of the Soviet Union against the capitalist world or internal attempts at capitalist restoration. Never was it more necessary to reiterate this principle than today, when the unfolding of the Second World War demonstrates that inherent in it is an attempt by the imperialists to restore capitalism in the U.S.S.R. Defense of the Soviet Union is a class duty, as it is a class duty to defend any section of the labor movement against the capitalist world. We defend the Soviet Union against capitalist blows, irrespective of the circumstances and immediate causes of the conflict.

28. Defense of the U.S.S.R. is the logical corollary of our analysis of the first workers' state. All kinds of democratic, idealistic, ultra-left, anarchistic theories, ignoring the character of Soviet property relations or the class contradiction between the Soviet state and the bourgeois states, lead logically, especially in case of war, to counter-revolutionary conclusions.

29. Our conception of the defense of the U.S.S.R. remains in its basic fundamentals the conception which the revolutionary movement held at the very birth of the Soviet State. The defense of the Soviet Union was always conceived of as an integral part of the international revolution. The defense of the Soviet Union was conceived of as subordinated to the world revolution, in the specific sense that a part is subordinated to the whole. The Bolsheviks in 1918 were prepared to risk the existence of proletarian power in the Soviet Union for the sake of the German revolution, by virtue of the criterion that the success of the German revolution—one of the major advanced countries—was more important than the Russian revolution. Likewise today, if the U.S.S.R. were allied with Germany in the war, the German revolution would unquestionably menace the immediate interests of the defense of the U.S.S.R.; nevertheless we, like the Bolsheviks in 1918, would be for the most decisive measures to assure the success of the German revolution. This in no wise signifies the negation of the defense of the Soviet Union or a conflict between it and world revolution; for the world revolution, or any part of it more significant than the Soviet Union, such as the German revolution, would constitute in the end the most decisive defense of the Soviet Union.

30. Since the triumph of the Soviet bureaucracy (1923), the defense of the Soviet Union has involved a clear distinction between the needs of the Soviet Union and the needs of the bureaucracy. Since 1923 defense of the Soviet Union, for revolutionists, has in no way signified political support of the rulers of the Soviet state. In 1920 we supported the Red Army march into Poland as motivated by the interests of the revolution, likewise the aid given by the Red Army to the revolutionists in Georgia in wresting it from a puppet-government of the imperialists. Those were acts dictated by revolutionary considerations to the revolutionary-internationalist government of the Soviet Union. The Stalinist bureaucracy, however, represents interests and ideas almost the opposite of the interests and ideas of the October Revolution and we can therefore give no support to its politics, including its military politics (invasion of Poland, Finland, etc.).

Not Defense of Bureaucracy

31. Since 1927 our movement has proclaimed that the needs of the defense of the Soviet Union as a workers' state is fundamentally separated from the bureaucracy's defense of the U.S.S.R. It was then stated that, in the interests of the genuine defense of the Soviet Union, the proletarian vanguard can be obliged to eliminate the Stalin government and replace it with a revolutionary-internationalist government which would coordinate the defense of the U.S.S.R. with the furthering of the world revolution. The change of government was then conceived to be possible by the reform of the Communist party. In 1933 the Bankruptcy of the Communist International became evident when the great German party was ordered to go down before Hitler without striking a blow. We abandoned the perspective of reform of the Communist parties, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The necessary change of government could, consequently, take place only by building a new revolutionary party capable of taking over the government (the new party was of course illegal by fiat of the Stalin government). By 1936 the complete extirpation of the former power of the Soviets made clear that the political revolution would take place only in the form of armed overthrow of the Soviet bureaucracy. The development of our program for the regeneration of the Soviet state, as thus outlined, was always, however, and remains so today, predicated on the conception that the task of regeneration was the best and most decisive way of defending the first workers' state.

32. Our abandonment (1933) of the perspective of regenerating the Communist International and its parties did not fundamentally affect our perspective of regenerating the Soviet state. A party and a state are not objects of the same order. A party is a selection of people on the basis of certain ideas and methods. This selection, in the Third International, became so fundamentally opposed to Marxism that we were obliged to abandon all hope of regenerating it. But the Soviet state differs from a party in that it is a complex of social institutions which continues to persist in spite of the fact that the ideas of the bureaucracy are now almost the opposite of the ideas of the October Revolution. Above all, the nationalized property in the means of production persists and determines the class character of the Soviet Union. That is why we do not renounce the possibility of regenerating the Soviet state. That dictates to us its defense against the capitalist world.

33. Defense of the Soviet Union against imperialism includes, of course, the newly occupied territories which, with the nationalization of their means of production, have become identical in class character with other parts of the U.S.S.R.

34. Our slogan for an independent Soviet Ukraine is the application to the field of the national question of our general slogan for the revolutionary overthrow of the bureaucracy. In the same sense that the revolutionary overthrow of the bureaucracy does not conflict with the defense of the Soviet Union, but on the contrary, best serves that defense, so the independence of the Soviet Ukraine will facilitate the defense of the Soviet Union. The same considerations motivate our slogan for an independent Soviet Finland.

What Unconditional Defense Means

35. Our defense of the Soviet Union is an unconditional duty. It is unconditional in two senses:

(a) We do not demand that the Soviet bureaucracy, prior to our participation in the defense of the U.S.S.R., make any agreement or concessions. Indeed, "defense" can have meaning only in this sense. For if we demanded that the bureaucracy first comply with certain conditions, or that the circumstances under which we would defend a workers' state against imperialism be of a certain character, that would not be defense at all but, rather, defeatism. For is it not a fact that we are ready to defend the United States, for example, under certain conditions—e.g., control of the country by the working class? "Conditional defense" is a misuse of terms. One is either a defenist or a defeatist.

To require nothing of the bureaucracy as a condition for our defense of the Soviet Union—that signifies also that our defense has nothing in common with that of the bureaucracy.

(b) We do not shelve our aim of a political revolution in the U.S.S.R. during the war. Recognizing that the overthrow of the bureaucracy would immensely strengthen the U.S.S.R. in conducting the war, our objective of a political revolution remains in the period of the war and, indeed, becomes absolutely imperative. A number of considerations should make this obvious. If the course of the war should push Stalin into a complete military alliance with Hitler, pressure for capitalist restoration would in all likelihood come most immediately from "ally" Hitler and the "compradore" wing of the bureaucracy. Hitler would demand entry into the country for German technology to facilitate war production—but in the form of capitalist concessions, and he would be supported in his demands by the "compradore" wing of the bureaucracy. Enmeshed in the alliance, the bureaucracy

would resist ineffectively, if at all. Under such conditions the resistance to capitalist restoration would require mobilization of the Soviet masses in revolutionary struggle against capitalist restoration and its agents within the Soviet Union. Such a mobilization could have as its object only a political revolution for the regeneration of the Soviet state.

The difference between this political revolution and a social revolution in an imperialist country, apart from the obvious fact that the former would not have as its task the overturn of private property, is that, whereas in the imperialist country we continue the class struggle without considering the effect on the military front, in the Soviet Union the political revolution would have to be carried on with one of its objects being to safeguard the borders at all times against imperialist invasion. In this sense, and only in this sense, our aim of political revolution is subordinated to the task of defending the state property against imperialist attack.

They Bow To "Democrats"

36. The attempt of the democratic-patriots (Norman Thomas, Lovestone, etc.) to characterize our policy as a capitulation to Stalinism is a conscious and deliberate falsification. They had to go over bodily to the camp of the "democratic" imperialists (American Labor Party resolutions) before they had the effrontery to so characterize the same policy which in former years (when they were tail-ending the Stalinists) they slandered as "anti-Soviet." No less contemptible is the attempt to draw from our position the implication that we will join Stalin in crushing proletarian movements in the Soviet Union or elsewhere. Our struggle against Stalin's armed forces in Loyalist Spain should be sufficient refutation of the charge. We defend the nationalized property of the Soviet Union against the imperialists. Successful proletarian revolutions, in the Soviet Union or elsewhere, would constitute the best possible defense of the Soviet Union. Hence we would defend those revolutions, arms in hand, if necessary against Stalin's armed forces. That is the obvious meaning of our specific slogans for an independent Soviet Ukraine, an independent Soviet Finland, and a political revolution for the regeneration of the Soviet state.

37. The fundamental difference between our conception of defense of the U.S.S.R. and that of the Stalinists is today especially sharply posed. On the question of the German revolution Stalin is whitewashing Hitler, presenting his "peace" policy as good coin, calling the masses to struggle only against those opposed to Hitler's policy. The Comintern press indignantly repeats Goebbels' charges against the British as responsible for the attempted bombing of Hitler, and utilizes the occasion to warn the workers that Hitler's replacement would most likely take the form of a monarchist restoration aimed against the U.S.S.R.—ergo, Hitler should remain. We, on the contrary, insist that the hostility of the German working class against the Nazi regime must in the course of the war find the way to destroying the Nazi regime. Not merely because the Nazi regime is an unstable, treacherous ally of the U.S.S.R. but above all because a German revolution would far outweigh in importance the Russian Revolution.

The specific weight of the German revolution and its successful prosecution are in no way impeded, however, if the vanguard of the German working class gives due consideration to the needs of the U.S.S.R.—its real needs and not those asserted by the bureaucracy. If, for example, Hitler finds himself constrained by the logic of the situation to send military supplies to the Soviet Union, the German workers would have no reason, in that concrete instance, to resort to strike or sabotage. The development of the German revolution would find sufficient scope while facilitating whatever material aid the Soviet Union would be receiving from its imperialist ally.

38. In the imperialist countries fighting against the U.S.S.R. in a war, also, the proletariat must not lose sight of the interests of the U.S.S.R.; in cases of real necessity, the workers must resort to the most decisive action in order to hinder the sending of soldiers and supplies against the U.S.S.R.

The practical differences dictated to the workers on each side in connection with the defense of the U.S.S.R. in no way modify the fundamental principle that, in all imperialist countries, independent of the fact as to whether or not they are in alliance with the U.S.S.R., the proletariat must develop the class struggle with the purpose of seizing power as soon as possible.

THE MAIN DANGER

39. For the revolutionary vanguard in the democratic imperialist countries, where their voices are being drowned out by the anti-Soviet thunder, the real danger now is not the danger of confusion between our concept of what is worthy of defense in the U.S.S.R. and that of the Stalinists, but the danger that we may give direct or indirect help to the dominant political current which tries to identify the U.S.S.R. with the Fascist states. In order to inspire the workers to defend the Soviet Union, it is vitally important to make clear to them what we defend (nationalized property), against whom (the imperialists and the bureaucracy), and how (by revolutionary means). This work of developing clear and inspiring slogans will not produce miraculous results, for we are working amid the thunderous din of democratic-

(The following article is the first chapter of a pamphlet written by comrade Cannon to sum up the seven-months' discussion in the party on the question of the Soviet Union and the "organization" question. The pamphlet was published in the Internal Bulletin. Now that the Third National Convention of the party has settled the disputes by a decisive majority, this article will acquaint our readers with the party's estimate of the dispute. In the next issues of the APPEAL we shall publish other chapters of comrade Cannon's pamphlet—Editors.)

What the Discussion Has Revealed

Political struggles in general, including serious factional struggles in a party, do not take place in a vacuum. They are carried on under the pressure of social forces, and reflect the class struggle to one degree or another. This law is demonstrated in the most striking manner in the development of the present discussion within our party.

At the present time the pressure of alien class forces upon the proletarian vanguard is exceptionally heavy. We must understand this first of all. Only then can we approach an understanding of the present crisis in the party. It is the most severe and profound crisis our movement has ever known on an international scale. The unprecedented tension in the ranks signifies a conflict of principled positions which is obviously irreconcilable. Two camps in the party fight for different programs, different methods and different traditions.

What has brought the party to this situation in such a short space of time? Obviously it is not a suddenly discovered personal incompatibility of the individual leaders involved; such trifles are symptoms of the conflict, not causes. Nor can a conflict of this depth and scope be plausibly explained by the flaring up of old differences of opinion on the organization question. In order to understand the real significance of the crisis it is necessary to look for profounder causes.

For those who understand politics as an expression of the class struggle—and that is the way we Marxists understand it—the basic cause of the crisis in the party is not hard to find. The crisis signifies the reaction in our ranks to external social pressure. That is the way we have defined it from the outset of the crisis last September, immediately following the signing of the Soviet-Nazi pact and the beginning of the German invasion of Poland. More precisely, we say the crisis is the result of the pressure of bourgeois democratic public opinion upon a section of the party leadership. That is our class analysis of the unrestrained struggle between the proletarian and the petty-bourgeois tendencies in our party.

We define the contending factions not by such abstract general terms as "conservative" and "progressive." We judge the factions not by the psychologic traits of individuals, but by the programs they defend. The discussion has revealed not a difference of opinion about the application of the program—such differences frequently occur and usually have a transitory significance—but an attempt to counterpose one program to another. This is what has divided the party into two camps. Naturally, these terms, which we have used from the beginning of the discussion to characterize the two tendencies in the party, are meant as definitions and not epithets. It is necessary to repeat this in every debate between Marxists and petty-bourgeois politicians of all types; the one thing they cannot tolerate is to be called by their right name.

The leaders of the opposition consider it outrageous, a malicious faction invention, for us to place this class signboard above their faction, when their only offense consists in the simple fact that they turn their backs on the Soviet Union and deny it defense in the struggle against world imperialism. But our definition and description of such an attitude is not new. Back in the days when

imperialist propaganda. Our voices may very well be drowned out for a time by the first waves of patriotism: We are going today against the stream. He who argues against our program from the standpoint that it is difficult to make it persuasive to the workers, is thereby yielding to the democratic pressure; if logical, he will end up in the patriotic camp.

40. We are not a government party; we are the party of irreconcilable opposition, not only in capitalist countries but also in the U.S.S.R. Our tasks, among them the "defense" of the U.S.S.R., we realize not through the medium of bourgeois governments and not even through the government of the U.S.S.R., but exclusively through the education of the masses, through agitation, through explaining to the workers what they should defend and what they should overthrow. Such a defense cannot give immediate miraculous results. Our work must be directed so that the workers on whom we have influence should correctly appraise events, not permit themselves to be caught unawares, and prepare the general sentiment of their own class for the revolutionary solution of the tasks confronting us.

This kind of defense of the U.S.S.R. naturally differs, as night from day, from the official defense which the Stalinists conduct. The difference is summed up in these slogans. The Stalinists say: "For the Fatherland! For Stalin!" The defense waged by the Fourth International is carried on under the slogan: "For Socialism! For the world revolution! Against Stalin!"

REJECTED BY CONVENTION

Minority Resolution On The U. S. S. R.

(REJECTED BY CONVENTION)

1. The present war, which began with the invasion of Poland by the German army on September 1st of last year, is a new struggle among the great powers for a re-division of the earth; for the hegemony on the European continent, and in particular for rule over the majority of oppressed mankind, living in the colonies and semi-colonies of Africa, Asia, Oceania, and Latin America. Thus, in its decisive aspects, the present war is of the same general character as the war of 1914-18, this time occurring on a foundation of far more acute and desperate conflict and social degeneration. All attempts to describe the war, from the point of view of any of the participants, as being fought for the rights of national self-determination (Poland, Finland), for the sake of "democracy against fascism" (Britain, France), to "break the hold of capitalist plutocracy" (Germany), for "socialist liberation" or "defense of the Russian proletarian revolution" (Soviet Union) are only social-patriotic devices for hiding the true character of the war from the masses, and enlisting the support of the masses for one or another participant or group of participants.

2. From the socially reactionary character of the war there follows the strategy which revolutionary socialists are obligated to adopt with respect to it. The revolutionary orientation may be summed up as THE STRATEGY OF THE THIRD CAMP. This strategy envisages the struggle on a world scale against the war, against all the belligerent governments and belligerent armies, and for the international socialist revolution. The troops of the potential army of the third camp are to be found in the ranks of the workers and poor farmers, the women and the youth, in all countries, in the enslaved populations of the colonies, semi-colonies, subject-nations, throughout the world, all of whom have only sorrow, starvation and death in prospect from the war, and for whom socialist revolt against the war alone can offer solution. The ranks of the army of the third camp will be forged by the rejection of any support of any of the warring governments or armies, the resolute pursuance of the class struggle in all countries, irrespective of its influence upon the fortunes at the military fronts, and the fight for liberation by the peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies. The guiding slogans of the third camp are summarized by: AGAINST THE WAR! PEACE THROUGH SOCIALISM! FOR THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE OPPRESSED PEOPLES THROUGH THE SOCIALIST UNITED STATES OF EUROPE! FOR A SOCIALIST UNITED STATES OF THE AMERICAS! FOR A FREE AFRICA! FOR A FREE

ASIA! FOR A WORLD FEDERATION OF SOCIALIST REPUBLICS!

Puts U.S.S.R. In Imperialist Camp

3. The Soviet Union is participating integrally in the world imperialist war for the re-division of the earth. The Russian revolutionists and the Russian masses generally neither desired nor welcomed Stalin's war. The Soviet workers and peasants and the nationally oppressed peoples of the U.S.S.R. will express their discontent and hatred of the counter-revolutionary bureaucracy and its predatory war as an anti-war opposition movement—the only real basis for the revolutionary overthrow of Stalin in the present war. The reactionary character of its participation is demonstrated equally by: the policy and aims of the Soviet government and army—bureaucratic expansionism—which in no way advance or defend the interests of the Russian or the world proletariat, but on the contrary are solely in the interests of the preservation and extension of the power, privileges and revenues of the bureaucracy; the character of the alliance with Germany; and by the effects of its participation, which are in no way to advance the pre-requisites of the socialist revolution—above all the independent struggle of the proletariat and the colonial peoples for power, freedom, and socialism—but on the contrary to wipe out those pre-requisites. Stalin's present war is no more a "war in defense of nationalized property" than Daladier's is a "defense of democracy."

4. Revolutionary socialists are obligated therefore to revise the former conception of "unconditional defense of the Soviet Union," which under the circumstances of the present war, leads to a strategy which is in direct opposition to the interests of the world socialist revolution. The general strategy of the third camp applies to the Soviet government and armies as to the other belligerent powers. In certain concrete cases, as, for example, in the invasion of Finland, we raise such slogans as, "Withdraw the Red Army from Finland!" "Stop the war!", etc. The slogans FOR A FREE SOVIET UKRAINE! and for freedom of the other non-Russian nationalities within the Soviet Union who may wish it, FOR WORKERS' CONTROL OF INDUSTRY! FOR WORKERS' DEMOCRACY! DOWN WITH PRIVILEGE! FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE BUREAUCRACY!, and the struggle for these and for the other economic and social demands of the workers and peasants, irrespective of the effect of this struggle upon the mili-

Shachtman was paraphrasing Trotsky and not Burnham, he himself wrote:

"At bottom, the ultra-leftists' position on the Soviet Union, which denies it any claim whatsoever to being a workers' state, reflects the vacillations of the petty-bourgeois, their inability to make a firm choice between the camps of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, of revolution and imperialism."

This quotation, from an article written in the New International by Shachtman two years ago, can be accepted as a scientific definition of the opposition combination and its present position, with only one small amendment. It is hardly correct to describe their position as "ultra-leftist."

The leaders of the opposition in the past have written and spoken a great deal along the lines of the above quotation. Year in and year out in innumerable articles, documents, theses and speeches the leaders of the opposition have been promising and even threatening to defend the Soviet Union—"In the hour of danger we will be at our posts!"—but when the hour drew near, when the Soviet Union almost began to need this defense, they welched on their promise.

So with the program in general, with the doctrine, the methods and the tradition of Marxism. When all this ceased to be the subject for literary exercises in times of tranquility and had to be taken as a guide to action in time of war, they forgot everything that had been said and written and started a frantic search for "new and fresh ideas." In the first half-serious test they revealed themselves as "peace-time Trotskyists."

And this shameful performance, this betrayal of Marxism, has taken place in the American section of the Fourth International even before the formal entry of American imperialism into the war. In the bible of the opposition, their document on "The War and Bureaucratic Conservatism," we are assured that the party crisis "was provoked by the war." That is not precisely accurate. America has not yet formally entered into the war, and thus far we have only a faint intimation of the moral and material pressure which will be brought to bear against the proletarian vanguard under war conditions. Not the war, but merely the shadow of the approaching war was enough to send Burnham, Shachtman and Abern on their mad stampede.

Gratuitously attributing to the party their own panic, these philosophers of retreat and capitulation express the opinion that comrades who read their document on the party regime "will draw from it cynical or discouraged or defeatist conclusions." They add: "The future is dark." And Burnham, who bared his petty-bourgeois soul in a special document entitled, "Science and Style," proclaims with malicious satisfaction—the wish is father to the thought—the downfall of the Fourth International. The reality is diametrically opposite to these lugubrious observations.

In the proletarian majority of the party there is not a trace of pessimism. On the contrary, there is universal satisfaction that the defection of a section of the party leadership revealed itself in time, before the war, and under conditions where it could be combated openly and in free discussion and beaten down. The virtual unanimity with which the proletarian cadres have rallied to the defense of the party and the Fourth International, the militancy and irreconcilability with which they have met the attack of Burnham, Abern and Shachtman is living proof of the vitality and indestructibility of our movement. That is a good omen for the future. It gives us confidence that it will stand up against the real test of war when it comes. It gives grounds for the most optimistic calculation that the Fourth International will not only "survive," but conquer in struggle.

We Do Not Fear the Future

As for the "hard future"—the Bolshevik-Marxists never expected that the period of the death agony of capitalism could produce anything but crises and war with their inevitable repercussions in workers' organizations, including the party of the workers' vanguard. From these "hard" circumstances, the Fourth Internationalists only drew the conclusion that the grandiose social convulsions, which we foresaw and analyzed in advance, create the conditions out of which the oppressed masses, impelled by iron necessity, must carry through the social revolution and the reorganization of the world on a socialist basis. Only one thing is needed: a genuine Bolshevik party of the vanguard. Only Marxism can be the program of such a party. Burnham and his sorry disciples, the ex-Marxists, ex-Trotskyists, offer a program that has nothing in common with Marxism or the proletarian revolution. From this arises the fundamental conflict between the majority and the opposition, a conflict which is manifestly irreconcilable and to which all other questions, however important, are nevertheless subordinate.

In the course of a few months discussion the differences between the majority and the opposition have reached such depth and scope as to completely overshadow all questions of party regime. If all the alleged faults of the regime were true, and then multiplied ten times over, the whole question would pale into insignificance beside the principled differences which now clearly separate the two contending factions. The struggle of the opposition ostensibly began as a struggle against the "Cannon regime," and as a defense, or at any rate as an anticipation, of the "changing" position of Trotsky. But in a short time it unfolded as a fundamental conflict with the Fourth International over all the questions of our program, our method and our tradition.

tary front, together with the international orientation proposed in the general slogans applicable to the war, these alone answer the needs of the Russian masses, including the genuine defense of nationalized property and its utilization for socialist development, and will fuse their struggle with that of the masses of the entire world for PEACE THROUGH SOCIALISM.

Poses Various Possibilities

5. It is not possible to give in advance a detailed reply to all hypothetical variants of future developments of the war. But, for example, if the present enemies of Germany were to engage the Red Army on Russian or non-Russian soil, as an extension of their opposition to Russian aid to Germany and conflict with Stalinist bureaucratic expansion—that is, if the character of Russia's participation in the war would remain the same (as described in point 3), our present position would remain unchanged. However, if the character of the war changes from one of inter-imperialist conflict, in which the Red Army acts as a pawn of one imperialist power and as an instrument of bureaucratic expansion, into a war determined by the capitalist imperialist politics of destruction of Soviet state property and the reduction of Russia to a colony—that is, if determined by the world antagonism of capitalist imperialism and Soviet nationalized economy—our position would change corresponding to the change in the character of the war. In such a war, the Stalinist bureaucracy, despite the fact that it continues to defend, in its own way, its power and revenue, would be conducting a progressive war. The revolutionary working class would in this case adopt the position of defense of the Soviet Union. Our position would be dictated by the interests of the world proletariat which coincide with the struggle to defend Soviet nationalized property from liquidation by any imperialist power or powers. The defense of the Soviet Union would be conducted by us independently, without for a moment abandoning the political struggle against the counter-revolutionary bureaucracy.

6. In the United States, our main enemy remains at home. The special task of the Socialist Workers Party is resistance to all attempts of the bourgeoisie and its government, and of the labor bureaucracy and social-patriots, to exploit the crimes of Stalinism for the purpose of identifying it with revolutionary socialism, and for the purpose of whipping up an imperialist pro-war spirit among the masses and of dragging the country into war.