

QUESTION BOX

GEORGE STANTON, Brooklyn— Question: From Lenin's "The Third International and Its Place in History"...

ELLEN G., Bridgeport— Question: How would you answer the accusation frequently thrown at me: Oh you radicals, if somebody gave you a lot of money you'd act just the same as the capitalists?...

G. ZEL, New York— Question: Bela Kun, in the Daily Worker of Sept. 21, 1934 states that on July 20, 1932 the German Communist Party appealed to the leadership of the Social Democracy for a united front against fascist terror...

CHINA'S "RED" GENERALS RECAANT

Capitulate to Kuomintang and Attack Erstwhile Comrades

Shanghai, China, Aug. 31.—While functionaries and "leaders" of the Stalinist party in China's cities continue to surrender themselves to the Kuomintang...

Ho-chung Surrenders The first of these is Kung Ho-chung, who, it is reported, surrendered on July 27 after his army had been defeated somewhere in the region of the Hunan-Kiangsi border area...

Military Adviser to Chiang But the redoubtable Kung, because of his 4-5 years' experience of active military campaigning, including the art of guerilla warfare, has a much greater value for the Kuomintang than merely a propagandist...

Chiang Kai-shek is now working at Chiang Kai-shek's military headquarters at Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi province, helping to map out the new offensive which is being prepared against the Red armies of Central China...

Advice from "Red" Commander The former Red commander told the staff of General Chiang's staff aerial and artillery bombardments had inflicted heavy casualties upon the communist forces and seriously undermined their morale...

ernment commanders might make a greater use of the bombers and field pieces at their disposal.

The economic blockade against the Red areas, Kung related, had produced a most telling effect on the morale of the communist troops. Salt and rice were most scarce in the communist districts, and the relentless methods used by the Reds in commandeering food from the populace had engendered great public discontent...

Kung attested to the great utility of the blockhouses that the government troops had erected around the dwindling communist area. The line of blockhouses, he said, had crippled the activities of Red guerrillas, who had formerly been used with telling effect for harassing the government lines.

Aside from military tactics, the erstwhile Red commander emphasized the importance of propaganda as a means towards exterminating the communists. He pointed out that the communist regulars, numbering about 100,000 strong, had for years been fighting government troops many times their strength.

Kung said that he joined the communists in 1927 with the idea of working for the welfare of the masses. After eight (!) years' experience as a high communist commander, he was now convinced that communism was impractical in China, and realized that the San Min Principle rather than Marxism afforded the way towards national salvation.

Inventions Unnecessary Here Comment on the above would seem to be entirely superfluous. But it might be added that since no indignant denials of Kung's capitulation have emanated from Stalinist quarters so far as we can discover, there is no more reason to doubt that it is "genuine" than

there was to doubt the scores and hundreds of other Stalinist capitulations to the Kuomintang during the past two years. We shall, of course, be accused by the Stalinists of making use of reports in the enemy press to slander them. Alas, all these reports have proved authentic. The Kuomintang has no need to invent betrayals of the revolution by the Chinese Stalinists. There is an ample supply of "genuine" betrayals.

The second capitulator was announced to the world thus in the China Weekly Review of Aug. 25: "Li Chien-wu, Commander of the Independent 'Red' regiment, who for the past few years has been harassing the people along the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi border regions, has surrendered with 104 bandit officers and soldiers to the Peace Preservation Regiment at Pingkiang, northeastern Hunan. They surrendered with 73 rifles and one machine-gun. The bandit commander has been brought to Changsha by the units under Major-General Teng Nan-chi from Pingkiang."

Another "Red" Traitor It is has been reported that Li Tse-liang, described by government news agencies as "one of the ablest commanders of the communist army, unexpectedly arrived at Pingkiang in northeastern Hunan, near the Kiangsi border, on August 22 and offered his services to the government." According to the Central News, Li was brought under escort to Changsha on August 29, and there he "told newspaper reporters . . . that he believed communism was bound to be a failure in China and therefore had escaped from the red ranks to join the government forces."

These three capitulations, we may be sure, will be followed by many others as the perspective of the peasant war grows more and more hopeless. The military forces of Chiang Kai-shek and his allies have succeeded in recent months in inflicting severe blows on the revolutionary peasant armies in China. The dormancy of the city proletariat makes this possible, giving the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang practically a free hand against the revolting peasants.

"Soviet China" Faces Extinction A stage has now been reached where there would seem to be little doubt that, in the absence of unforeseen developments which would serve to weaken the offensive of the Kuomintang forces, the so-called "Central Soviet District" in Kiangsi will be wiped off the map before many more months have passed. What, then, will become of the Stalinist myth of a "Soviet China"? The Stalinists will, however, manufacture new myths to cover up old ones. If the revolutionary peasants of Kiangsi are given a blood-bath by the Kuomintang troops (the price which history is

apparently going to exact for further demonstrating the falsity of the Stalinist formula of the "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry"), the courage and tenacity which the peasants display in defending their conquests (however hopelessly) will be seized upon as evidence of a "new revolutionary upsurge" in China.

Readers of Stalinist journals all over the world will be regaled with accounts of a defeat metamorphosed into "victory." They have done it in the case of Germany. Why not China?

Peasant War Will Continue The liquidation of the "Central Soviet District" in Kiangsi would not mean, necessarily, the end of the peasant war in China. The acute continuance of all those problems which have stimulated the peasantry to revolt might cause the flames of the peasant insurrection, extinguished for the time being in Kiangsi, to flare up in other, probably more isolated and therefore less accessible, parts of the country. The peasant movement now proceeding under Soviet slogans would continue under different conditions. Losing its one definite geographic base in Kiangsi, it would assume completely the character of guerilla warfare.

In this way, means would be provided whereby the Stalinists could continue their lying propaganda. Glossing over the important central fact that their "Soviet government" at Jukin had been overthrown, they would be able to point to the flaming guerilla warfare, which would undoubtedly assume a violent character over widely-scattered areas, as "evidence" that "Soviet China," far from being defeated, was advancing and extending.

The Passing of a Shadow Such are the methods of confusionists. Some will be deceived, especially those who wish to be deceived. But it is to be doubted whether the Chinese proletariat, which long ago deserted the Stalinists in disgust, will be misled any further. Moreover, the Stalinists, depending as they do upon the fat subsidies they receive from the "Central Soviet District", would no longer possess the means for spreading their illusions. Once those subsidies cease, they will be utterly unable to keep up the shadow of a pretense to a real political existence.

The revolutionary problem in China remains: To arouse the Chinese proletariat to action by means of a program of democratic demands, having as its perspective a lightening of the fearful economic burdens and political disabilities of the workers and the creation of favorable conditions for further struggle; to fight for a plenipotentiary national assembly; to link the struggles of the proletariat with struggles of the lower strata of the oppressed petty-bourgeois elements in the cities under the hegemony of the proletariat. Apart from this, there is no perspective of victory for the peasant war in China and there can be none. —LUCIFER.

WORLD OF LABOR

BRITISH WORKERS OVERWHELM FASCISTS Before us is a photograph of a sea of British workers, over 100,000 strong, surrounding a tiny island of Oswald Mosley's Blackshirts, less than 3,000 in all with about as many cops to protect them. And what a reception the fascists received from the workers! Here is an item from the Daily Telegraph, British capitalist paper: "The Black Shirts, hemmed in by long lines of police on either side and resembling so many prisoners, went through a long avenue of jeering spectators."

This sea of angry workers gathered in Hyde Park seethed with hostility to Mosley's dupes and not a word of all their speeches could be heard above the shouts of derision from the proletarians. The workers assembled at this monster demonstration in defiance of the exhortations from the labor leaders and the Daily Herald, organ of the British Labor Party, for everyone "to stay away."

It seems to us from this distance that the miserable handful of Fascists should have been ducked by the workers who, from all reports, were raring to go. The I.L.P. and the C.P., however, put the damper on the demonstration with the order from each of the four platforms of the counter-demonstration: "No provocation from the workers—ignore provocation from others—show our strength and our discipline." While this admonition may be perfectly well under other circumstances, our opinion leans towards teaching the Fascists a lesson of direct proletarian action whenever and wherever possible—especially when the workers' sentiment is so unmistakable and their strength so omnipotent.

LEFT SOCIALIST THREATENED Spaak, editor of Action Socialiste, has been threatened with expulsion from the Belgian Labor Party (S. P.), by the General Council for his criticism of their weak leadership of a recent textile strike. A sub-committee proposed that the general council recommend to the annual conference the expulsion of Spaak. But cunning Vandervelde, who knows that it is much better to keep a left wing leader bound hand and foot within the party than to create bad feeling by expelling him, made a shrewd proposal. Spaak would not be expelled if he agreed to cease publication of his paper and serve instead on a committee of three to edit a discussion organ. But in no case was he to write on trade union subjects. If Spaak acquiesces it means the ball-and-chain around his political activity in the party. There can be no intra-party peace on the basis of the proposals of a king's footman like Vandervelde, except the peace of the grave.

BANANA WORKERS HOLD FIRM The strength and solidarity of the banana workers strike in Costa Rica, is indicated in the fact that for the first time in the history of the United Fruit Company, one of the company's ships, S. S. Peten, arrived in New York with empty holds. The solidarity of the Cuban workers prevented the loading of the ship in Cuba, following its being unable to get a load at Puerto Limon, Costa Rica. On the other hand, the extent to which the United Fruit Company dominates the political situation in the Central American countries, is made quite clear by recent events in the strike situation. An agreement, settling the strike was signed at the Ministry of Labor offices in San Jose, on August 28, by Congressman Manuel Mora, of the Communist Party, representing the striking workers, and representatives of the government and the planters respectively. Among the terms of the settlement, which was a great victory for the workers, were the following provisions: Common Labor—Wages increased from 4 colons to 4.20 colons daily (4 colons equal \$1 U.S. approx.), hours reduced from eight to six daily; Axe labor—Wages increased from 4.50 and 5 colons to 7 colons daily; Piece work rates—Increase of 35 to 100 percent in rate paid. All pay to be in cash and not in company scrip as heretofore; Company commissaries in the camps to post price lists which must not be higher than the prices charged in stores of the nearest private commercial establishments; hospital privileges to be guaranteed by the employer at his expense; all tools excepting machetes to be furnished by the employers and not by the workers as heretofore; hygienic housing conditions in all labor camps and plantations; official government recognition of the Workers' Union of the Atlantic; no discrimination against workers for strike activity; federal intervention to procure liberation of workers imprisoned or strike activists.

In addition to the foregoing, the Executive, through the Ministry of Labor, promised to intervene with the United Fruit Company to secure the latter's adhesion to the conditions of the settlement. On the foregoing conditions, the workers agreed to call off the strike, but the company refused to acknowledge the settlement. Therefore the strike has been continued, and the government, which had sought a quick solution in order to reestablish trade and industry, upon which its own income and life depend, now sides openly with its master, the United Fruit Company.

Repression and provocation are on the order of the day. The United Fruit Co., the newly formed "Anti-Communist League" and the government itself vie with each other in their efforts to provoke the workers. At dawn on September 12 the national police made a savage raid on general strike headquarters at Finca Los Angeles and after shooting up the whole settlement, endangering the lives of the strikers, their wives and children, arrested everyone they could catch and expelled them from the country without any further formality. Comrade Jaime Cerdas, member of the C.C. of the C. P. and also of the general strike committee and one of the most active organizers were soon enveloped in flames and now the somewhat decimated but just as resolute general strike committee is obliged to meet elsewhere.

In the attempt to smash the strike, every method is being used. The workers cannot be intimidated, and are lacking up the leadership of the strike to the fullest degree. The strike leadership on its part, is straining every effort to prevent the workers from restoring to acts of terrorism, all the more difficult in view of the provocative actions of the Company and the government. Evidently what the company hopes for is an insurrection, as it would be the surest means of checking the development of an international movement for the organization of the plantation workers of the whole Caribbean area. Above all, the forces of reaction realize the importance of the proletarian vanguard and are concentrating their efforts to destroy it.

At the Special Session of the Costa Rican Congress, opened last week, an attempt is being made to outlaw the Communist movement. Charges of high treason have already been brought against Congressman Mora. It is apparent that this is but an effort to provoke an outbreak such as occurred in El Salvador several years ago, which would give the government a legal excuse to murder the militant working class leaders.

The History of the Frisco General Strike

By JIM OSBORN and DICK ETLINGER

(Continued from last week)

The program of the employers at first was based on the belief that the strike would not be of long duration and that the teamsters could be used to break the strike by hauling cargo to and from the docks as they had during the 1919 strike. When this failed and in addition the longshoremen were joined by the other marine workers they resorted to police brutality and terrorism to the worst kind. The police were mobilized to beat up and arrest the strikers and drive them from the waterfront. In addition the red scare was played up continually by the newspapers and the charge that the leadership of the strike was in the hands of the communists was hurled daily in the press in the hopes of causing dissension in the ranks of the strikers. The employers also attempted through the activities of Ryan, the International President, to put over an agreement, the effect of which would have been to preserve the same status that existed prior to the strike.

Ryan's June 16 agreement left the other marine unions entirely out of the settlement and provided for a hiring hall financed by the employers and jointly operated. In such a hiring hall the longshoremen would have had no power whatever. These agreements were correctly exposed by the left wing and were overwhelmingly voted down by the men.

The leaders of the San Francisco Central Labor Council also played a great part in the efforts of the employers to defeat the strike. As before stated, they were forced by the sentiments of the rank and file to issue an appeal to all unions for support, but at the first opportunity they launched a vicious attack on the strike by securing the passage of a resolution condemning the strike leaders of the I.L.A. as reds. The Stalinists furnished an excellent opportunity for them to do this by their tactics of denuncia-

tion of the American Federation of Labor at a mass meeting of twelve thousand workers called by the Strike Committee in support of the strike. Also in opposition to the wishes of many of the strike committee they put on the platform as a speaker, the representative of the Marine Workers Industrial Union. This played directly into the hands of the labor scab and they succeeded in passing this resolution of attack on the strike by an overwhelming majority. This attack in the heat of the strike was hailed with glee by the shipowners and the capitalist press and brought forth a congratulatory telegram from William Gray, president of the A. F. of L.

The tactics of the police right from the beginning of the strike was one of brutality and intimidation. The strike had only been in effect a few days when the police began a campaign to break the morale of the pickets. The first move was to force the pickets off the waterfront side of the Embarcadero which naturally greatly hampered their effectiveness. The strike committee should have organized their forces and made a militant attempt to maintain their right to picket in front of the docks. This would have greatly stimulated the morale of the pickets and would also have drawn the rank and file of the labor movement much closer to the marine workers. The police constantly made statements in the press that they would begin cracking down on the strikers if the strike was not settled. This was more than a verbal gesture as they were cracking the heads of the pickets at every opportunity.

After the longshoremen turned down Ryan's fake agreement of June 16, the Industrial Association of San Francisco, acting on behalf of the employers, began making preparations for the opening of the port. On July 3 a few trucks were moved under police protection from

the docks to a central warehouse. Thousands of strikers and sympathizers were on the water front to prevent the movement of the trucks. The militancy of the strikers at this time was unquestioned. They would immediately congregate at any dock where they heard freight was going to be moved and in spite of the police succeeded in overturning several trucks. The big battle to move the trucks was continued on July 5. On that day thousands of strikers and sympathizers were again on the waterfront. The police were reinforced by hundreds of deputies, all of them armed to the teeth with instructions to shoot. The strikers had only a few sticks and stones. In addition to hurling tear and vomit gas, the police and deputies opened fire on the pickets and over seventy strikers were shot, the great majority of them in the back. Two strikers were killed near the I.L.A. headquarters several blocks from where any trucks were being moved. Following this massacre the militia was called in and began to patrol the waterfront.

The murderous attack of the police on the strikers fired the feelings of the rank and file of the labor movement to a white heat. The teamsters union in a packed meeting, in spite of the plea of Casey and the other officials about the sanctity of contracts, voted six to one to come out on strike in support of the marine workers. After the teamsters the butchers and chauffeurs immediately followed. The labor officialdom faced with the threat of a general strike had only two alternatives. Either to oppose it openly, which action had in it the danger of their complete isolation and repudiation by the trade union movement, or to head it off by accepting leadership and thus control it. They naturally chose the second course as did the labor leaders in Great Britain during the general strike. The San Francisco labor officials took command in order to betray the move-

ment at the first favorable opportunity.

Their first move was at the meeting of the Labor Council held on July 6, the day after the massacre. After passing a resolution condemning the Governor for calling out the militia and stating that the San Francisco police were capable of handling the situation, thereby showing their loyalty to the city administration with which they were politically affiliated, they then presented a resolution calling for the appointment of a committee of seven to take control of the waterfront strike and advise the labor movement of San Francisco as to what action should be taken in support of the strikers. As a sop to the I.L.A. they also endorsed the aims of the strike for collective bargaining and the right of the I.L.A. to control the hiring halls. Here again the absence of a militant left wing enabled the bureaucrats to pass this resolution. In spite of the opposition of a handful of delegates who saw that the officials by this move were seeking to prevent the general strike, it was overwhelmingly adopted by the vast majority of the delegates in the belief that such a committee was necessary in order to build the machinery for the successful calling of a general strike. That the Strategy Committee was out to settle the strike and not to call a general strike was evident right from the start. At the teamsters meeting, called for the purpose of deciding whether all of the teamsters should go out on a general sympathetic strike, the committee used all of their influence to prevent such action from being taken. The teamsters, however, were not influenced by these tactics and after listening to the speech of Harry Bridges, the chairman of the joint marine strike committee, voted 6 to 1, as previously mentioned, to go out on strike.

(Continued next week)