

The Slogan of the Defense of the U.S.S.R.

The sharpening world economic crisis has already passed over to a semi-open conflict between the imperialist powers, first in South America and then in Asia, and has now drawn into this orbit the fate of the Soviet Union, through the German situation, the Manchurian developments and the internal economic effects flowing from the contradictions. In such a trying period the defense of the Soviet Union must be of first consideration for every Communist. The Communist party has rightly considered it its duty to lead the struggle for the defense of the Soviet Union. But the leaders have left unanswered the question of how to defend the Soviet Union.

Since Stalinism has gained control of the C. I., and the Soviet Union the slogan of the Defense of the Soviet Union has been thrown around fast and furious. Day in and day out, in America, the slogan, "Defend the Soviet Union" rings in our ears. One would think, as if by magic, this slogan will throw a spell over the world and create an iron ring around the Soviet Union. But one only needs to remember: "We" can build socialism in one country "if" we can prevent intervention, and then we can understand why this slogan is used in such large doses. On the false basis of the theory of socialism in one country sprouted the misuse of the slogan, "Defend the Soviet Union."

Propose of Slogans

Slogans are not abstractions above the ebbs and flows of the class struggle. To issue slogans for the establishing of Soviets after the revolution has turned its back or to issue slogans for the Soviet to seize power before the vanguard and the class are prepared, is to make a mockery of revolutionary slogans. Centrism and the Right wing have used this slogan year in and year out—because there is danger of intervention. In this same period the Soviet officials, including Stalin, have informed us that world Capitalism and the Soviet Union can exist peacefully side by side. The contradictory position of the C. I. and the Soviet officials flows logically from the wrong theory of socialism in one country.

Capitalism will never cease its struggle against the Soviet Union. The form of the struggle changes from time to time. In periods of economic war between the two systems, the constant use of the slogan converts it into so many hollow words, transforming sections of the C. I., from fighting units for the overthrow of their own capitalists, to auxiliaries to prevent intervention against the Soviet Union. In times when economic war is being transformed into open military war against the Soviet Union, the slogan, "Defend the Soviet Union" has meaning. Even then it will have to be concretized. Centrism has converted this slogan into a meaningless phrase.

To defend the Soviet Union one must know HOW to defend our fatherland. We all agree it cannot be accomplished the "socialist" way. The "socialists" issue the slogan, "Hands off the Soviet Union" and then the Second International's representatives in the capitalist governments render full aid to the imperialists in their struggles against the Soviets.

Right & Centre Misuse Slogan

We must also realize, on the other hand, the Right and Centre wing of Communism in using the slogan, "Defend the Soviet Union", and then turning around and advocating, opportunist or adventurist policies in China, in Spain, in Germany and the rest of the world are in words, but not in action, defending the Soviet Union.

Marxism is not distinguished from opportunism merely by abstract slogans. Slogans must have revolutionary content and be issued to fit the concrete situation. How could the Chinese workers and peasants defend the Soviet Union in 1926-27? How could the E. C. of the C. I. defend the Soviet Union in the Chinese Revolution? How could the world proletariat defend the Soviet Union in the Chinese Revolution? Not by repeating in prayer-like fashion the slogan, "Defend the Soviet Union". The only way the Communists could defend the Soviet Union and all that goes with it was by pounding out and executing a Marxian policy in the Chinese revolution. The Right-Centre bloc failed in this task and persecuted and expelled the Left Opposition for advocating the only policy that could materially defend the Soviet Union and the World Revolution.

Scare Headlines on Manchuria

For over a half year the Daily Worker has presented scare headlines on the Manchurian situation with countless columns of news but not one Marxian analysis of its relation to the world situation. In the last two months the Japanese army has been advancing toward the borders of the Soviet Union. The danger from the side of Japanese imperialism has grown in the last two months. But the way the Daily Worker has handled this problem, the Communist followers' consciousness has been dulled rather than sharpened.

An analysis of the process of Japanese consolidation in Manchuria, a necessary base for an attack on the Soviet Union: the relations of the East to the European allies and the events in Germany would keep the world proletariat informed at each step, enabling us to take the proper steps to defend the Soviet Union.

The defense of the Soviet Union cannot be satisfied by the slogan of "Defend the Soviet Union." To defend the Soviet Union one must concretize slogans for each situation. For this purpose, one must approach the problem, not from the position of building socialism in one country, but from the position of the world revolution, from the standpoint of the Permanent Revolution, which also

makes necessary the industrialization of the Soviet Union as rapidly as possible. A Chinese revolution, a Manchurian invasion, a Spanish revolution and a struggle for power with the Fascists in Germany calls for different methods, forms and slogans in order to defend the Soviet Union.

Civil War in Germany

When Civil War threatens Germany, when the C. I. policies in Germany need a complete overhauling when a Fascist victory in Germany will mean a direct threat of death hanging over the Soviet Union—the world-wide use of the slogan, "Defend the Soviet Union", without a word or analysis, without pointing out the road to struggle is the best way how not to defend the Soviet Union, how to make a joke out of the slogan.

The Communist League of America, the Left Opposition stands in the forefront in the struggle for the defense of the Soviet Union by standing in the forefront of the international class battles, analyzing, pointing out and leading the way in the struggle for a correct Marxian line, within the Soviet Union and throughout the world.

—H. O.

Bonus Battle

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passenger train from Cumberland on. Instead, the freight cars were stranded somewhere in one of the damp cold Allegheny valleys. All night long the hungry men shivered with cold. The next morning, the cars were taken through Cumberland where the men protested the double crossing of railroad officials. (Other contingents had similar experiences.) They demanded they be put on a passenger train, as promised. The petty officials passed the buck, one to the others. Finally the men were again put on a freighter for Washington and for the hospital.

Under those conditions, the government officials fear an epidemic will break out, which of course is likely. But the prescription of the government doctors is not that the government should provide sanitary camps, cots and decent food, but that the men should disband.

What these experts really fear is an "epidemic" of protests demands and militant action. These chinovniks, these bureaucratic Canutes are trying to stem the gathering revolutionary tide. They are working day and night to intimidate the soldiers, to break them up and keep them isolated from the twelve million unemployed and the organized working class, with whom, and only with whom they can solve the question of bread, work and freedom. They can solve it only by the overthrow of the capitalist system that threw them into the butchery of the last war, and is now cynically throwing them on the scrapheap, like so much useless machinery.

Vets in Militant Mood

"Did the United States ever have ragged soldiers?—Not until today," reads one slogan. "Millions for war—not a cent for the hungry." "We need cash—not a tombstone"—these are typical slogans across the rusty dilapidated autos about the camp. "What are you going to do, Uncle Sam?", asks another.

During the day I was there, there were several rallies. The men were addressed by some pious congressmen, who promised to work for the passing of the Bonus Bill. They cheered him loud and strong every time he assured them they'd win their demand. The sergeant who was beside the congressman conducted the cheering, as though the men were at a schoolboys' rally. Toward the end of the proceedings, this sergeant was handed a telegram from Father Coughlin promising a \$5,000 contribution—on one condition—that it would not be used for the benefit of the reds and other radicals. (These Christian fathers!)

"Just imagine who it is from," spoke the sergeant who grins with every congressman and secret-serviceman, "just imagine, from Father Coughlin!—Hip, hip, boys, now three cheers!"

After the cheering he continues, "If you'll fight clean, if you'll fight upright and stay away from these communists, we'll get more contributions and nobody will go hungry."

While he was speaking, a "regimental commander", a fat pug, flanked by two "bulls", was going through the crowd, stopping to speak to small groups. "Look here boys, if any of the Communists open their mouth, go bluff—right in the mouth!" He thrust his fist out to show them how. The sergeant on the speakers' stand was shouting, "Fight clean, fight upright, stay away from these Communist people. All here who are against the Communists say: Aye! Hip, hip!"

Now, the first cheer was loud, but only at the outer portions of the crowd. The second was distinctly muffled. The third cheer fell almost dead; the soldiers refused to raise their voices and although you did not hear it, you felt the muttering and rumbling of the men.

The secret-servicemen and the "regimental commanders", as I've said, are doing everything to prevent the issues from being brought before the soldiers. Openly and secretly they are intimidating the men. Of course they can't liquidate the one demand for cash in the palm of their hand—which is their one strength. And it may be this demand, now that the bill is defeated, that will be the piercing point that will cut a path to the other sections of the organized working class. Meanwhile they are isolated,—soldiers of fortune. They are like a mass of dangling roots in mid-

Unemployment

(Continued from page 1)

present situation in the following terms: "Never has there been a clearer demonstration of the part that the accumulation of capital... plays in normal business activity. Every promise of sustained improvement in the industries making goods for personal consumption has failed of realization because supporting improvements in the 'capital goods' industries has not occurred."

Yes, the capital goods production—production of means of production—failed to improve. And quite naturally so. Just remember the enormous production capacity now unused. This is the constant part of capital which in the process of accumulation increases much more rapidly than variable capital (labor power). In other words there is already such a huge overproduction of capital—of means of production—to the extent that they serve as capital.

One can get a glance from another angle of the capital investment problem by merely taking a look at the figures of new capital emissions. According to Otto P. Schwarzschild, president of the National Statistical Service Inc., the total new financing in the United States (stocks and bonds, but not including municipal bond issues) for the first five months of this year aggregated \$229,078,000. This compares with a total for the first five months of last year of \$1,600,697,000; and for the same period of 1930, of a total of \$2,869,080,000. From this first crisis year till today there is a drop of 92 percent in capital emissions.

These figures illustrate but once again the fact that during times of crisis the demand for industrial capital seriously diminishes. And yet the "wise" capitalist rulers speak of the expansion of credits to start the wheels of industry turning! For them, however, the question still remains: how are they going to "break the backbone of the crisis?"

The Government's Part

"The government must first bring its house in order", insists the Wall Street bankers. "The budget must be balanced", was their demand. Now it is balanced—at least, it is a sort of a balance. Provisions are made for supporting the policy of credit expansion. But this credit expansion, instead of turning the wheels of industry, goes into loan capital to pay previously contracted obligations. So, in other words, the government becomes a more active guarantor for these loans advanced to pay interests and principals to the marauding brigands of Wall St. The budget balancing has extended taxation to make up for the expense; and, of course, the excursion into the field of indirect taxation met with some success. The sales tax schemes were finally, in the main, put over, leaving the collections for payment of the bills a broader field, embracing all who are still in a position to buy.

Apparently the so-called relief bills pending before Congress are also making progress. The ideas of those senators and representatives, who champion the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, to secure large appropriations for public works, are rather violently frowned upon. That would be too much like a dose. The Wagner bill now before the Senate meets the favor of those representing the higher brackets of present society. It provides for \$300,000,000 in loans to the states—a drop in the bucket even as charity for the millions of unemployed. It provides for \$500,000,000 for public works—to be spread over a long period of time. It provides for \$1,500,000,000 in debenture for loans to what is called self liquidating enterprises, this to be administered by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

The Problems Still Remains

The government is surely putting its house in order and following closely the most hopeful designs of the Wall Street pirates. Further enormous sums in credit expansion are to be made available with the hope that the wished for business expansion will result. But there is still a long way to go and that depends entirely on different factors. To recapitulate some of these factors are: (1) Restoration of confidence, within capitalism, in the continuity of the process of reproduction. This is not a mere abstract problem; it involves such questions as markets, profit rate, etc. (2) Raising of the present level of commodity prices. This in other words will mean, at least, a degree of inflation which is practically on the way. (3) Checking the fall in the rate of profit by further increase of capital and thus increasing the mass of profit. This is the crux of the problem. It spells an increase in the intensity of exploitation and further depression of the wage level.

In this we consider only the home front; there still remains for consideration such questions as prospects in the world market. But these indications alone bear witness to the coming higher composition of capital and with it the greater intensity of competition and of class conflicts. They indicate the enormous contradictions in preparation for the next stage.

—ARNE SWABECK.

(Another article in this series will follow next week, dealing especially with the world markets and some prospects—Ed.)

air, and lest they shrivel and die, it is extremely necessary to carry them over to the soil of the revolutionary proletariat.

The soldiers are ready to listen to us. We must win them over. Concentrate your work on Washington.

—EX-SOLDIER.

A Political Biography of Stalin . . .

by LEON TROTSKY

Editor's Note

The Daily Worker last week published Stalin's interview with Emil Ludwig, in which the infallible, the best disciple of Lenin spouts freely the wisdom of latter-day Bolshevism. Among other things, he hurls another of his notorious stinking bombs against comrade Trotsky. It suffices to characterize the Best Disciple by reprinting the following lines from "Materials for a Political Biography of Stalin", written some time ago by our comrade.—Ed.

Eight years of struggle since Lenin; eight years of struggle against Trotsky; eight years of the regime of the epigones, first the "three", then the "seven", and finally the "one"—this entire significant period of the decline of the revolution, of its ebbing on an international scale, of the lowering of its theoretical level; brought us to a, in the highest degree, critical point. In the bureaucratic triumph of Stalin a great historical period is culminated and, at the same time the inevitability of its defeat in the near future is indicated. The culmination of bureaucracy foretells its crisis. It may be very much swifter than its growth and rise. The regime of national socialism and its hero come under the blows not only of inner contradictions, but also of the international revolutionary movement. The world crisis will give the latter a series of new impulses. The vanguard of the proletariat will not be able and willing to succumb in the clutches of a Molotovist leadership. The personal responsibility of Stalin is fully involved. Doubts and anxiety have entered the souls of even the most trained ones. And Stalin cannot give more than he has. He is threatened with a descent which may prove to be swifter in proportion to the artificial character of his ascent.

In any case Stalin is the central figure in the present unstable period. The characteristics of Stalin have a great political interest in connection with the course of the sixteenth congress. The present issue of the Bulletin is devoted to a considerable extent to a characterization of the chief of the apparatus, as a political worker and as a theoretician.

In the following lines we want to contribute some material to the political biography of Stalin. Our material is extremely incomplete. We choose the most essential from what we have in our archives. But in our archives, as yet many essential, maybe the most important material and documents are temporarily missing. From the archives of the police department which intercepted and copied in the course of decades the letters of revolutionaries, documents, etc., Stalin in the course of the last years has meticulously collected material with the help of which he was able on the one hand to maintain a hold on insufficiently reliable friends, throw a shadow on opponents, and, primarily, protect himself and his adherents against the publication of these or other excerpts or episodes which would damage the false monolithism artificially created by their

Back Numbers of Militant Wanted

Some time ago we issued an appeal for missing back numbers of The Militant. As a result of this appeal comrades in different parts of the country sent in what they had and we made up a number of files which are now on sale. We are sure that comrades still have in their possession extra copies of the numbers we need. If they will send them in at once we will be able to make up an additional number of files. We need not emphasize the financial importance of the sale of these files to us. It is obvious.

The numbers we need are: Vol. 1, No. 1, November 15, 1928; Vol. 2 No. 4, February 18, 1929; Vol. 3, No. 31, October 1, 1930; Vol. 4, No. 2, January 15, 1931; Vol. 4, No. 10, May 15, 1931.

We need all of these numbers, but at the moment we need the last one a little more than the others. A little more than a year ago we made up a number of files of The Militant from Vol. 1, No. 1 to the last issue of 1930. Comrades who bought these files have been waiting for bound files of the subsequent issues.

We need about thirty of the missing issues for 1931. Comrades, don't wait. Send in all of these issues that you have at once.

What Next?

On August 1 What Next? will be off the press. Work is going forward on it steadily and rapidly. We would like to get it off sooner because of the swift pace of the developments in the German situation. Whether we can do it depends to a large extent on the response to the China book and to the number of paid advance orders that our comrades can get NOW. Every advance paid order moves the date up a little.

The book will be approximately 150 pages. It will be put up in paper covers at 50 cents each, and in cloth at \$1. The usual reduced rates for bundle orders will apply.

Now comrades it is up to you! If you want to see WHAT NEXT? out sooner than August 1 help us by pushing the China book and by getting paid advance orders for WHAT NEXT?—NOW.

biographies. These documents we do not have. The extreme inadequacy of our information must be kept in view, in appraising the following material.

1. On December 23, 1925 the following police information was published in the party organ, Zaria Vostoka, by Stalin's closest friends: "From the information received by me again from the agency, Djugavshvili was known in the organization by the nicknames, Soso and Koba; worked from 1902 in the social democratic party organization first as a menshevik and then as a bolshevik, as a propagandist and leader of the first district (railroad)." In reference to this police information about Stalin published by his adherents no refutation has appeared anywhere, as far as we know. From this information it transpires that Stalin began his work as a menshevik.

2. In 1905 Stalin belonged to the bolsheviks and was taking an active part in the struggle. What were his views on the character and perspectives of the revolution? As far as we know there are no documents in circulation on this account. No articles, speeches, or resolutions by Stalin have been reprinted. Why? Obviously because the republication of Stalin's articles or letters for that period could only damage his political biography. There is no other explanation of the stubborn forgetfulness of the "chiefs" past.

3. In 1907 Stalin took part in the expropriation of the bank of Tiflis. The mensheviks following the bourgeois philistines expressed indignation against the "conspiratorial" methods of bolshevism and its "anarcho-Blanquism". We can have only one attitude toward this indignation: contempt. The fact of taking part in a resolute, the only partial blow at the enemy can add only honor to the revolutionary resoluteness of Stalin. It is astonishing, however, that this fact has been removed in cowardly manner from all the official biographies of Stalin? Is it in the name of bureaucratic respectability? After all we think not. It is more likely for political reasons. For, if participation in expropriation in itself cannot compromise a revolutionist in the eyes of revolutionists, the false political appraisal of that situation compromises Stalin as a politician. Separate blows at the institutions of the enemy, including "treasuries", are compatible only with the revolutionary offensive of the masses; i. e., with the ascent of the revolution. When the masses are retreating, partial, separate, partisan blows unavoidably degenerate into adventures and lead to demoralization of the party. In 1907 the revolution was receding and the expropriations degenerated into adventures. Stalin, at any rate, showed in that period that he was unable to distinguish between high and low tides. He will disclose in the future more than once (Esthonia, Bulgaria, Canton, the third period) incapability of political orientation on a broad scale.

4. Stalin, from the time of the first revolution leads the life of a professional revolutionist. Prisons, exiles, escapes. But during the entire period of the reaction (1907-11) we do not find a single document—article, letter, resolution—in which Stalin formulated his own appraisal of the situation and its perspectives. It is impossible that such documents do not exist. It is impossible that they are not preserved, if only in the archives of the police department. Why don't they appear in the press? It is perfectly obvious why: they are unable to strengthen the absurd characterization of the theoretical and political infallibility of the apparatus, which means Stalin himself—creates for itself.

5. Only one letter of that period, due to oversight, got into the press and it entirely confirms our hypothesis. On the 24 of January, 1911 Stalin wrote to his friends from exile. This letter was intercepted by the police department, was reprinted on December 23, 1925 still by the same more servile than wise editorship of the Zaria Vostoka (Dawn of the East). This is what Stalin wrote: "You have certainly heard about the 'tempest in a teapot' abroad; blocs—Lenin and Plechanov on one side, and Trotsky-Martov-Bogdanov on the other. The relation of the workers to the first bloc, as far as I know, is favorable. But in general the workers are beginning to look with contempt on the work abroad; let them climb on the wall to their hearts' content; in our estimation those should work to whom the interests of the movement are dear, and the rest will happen." This, in my estimation, is for the best."

This is not the place to consider how correctly Stalin defines the composition of the blocs. The question is not in this. Lenin led a fierce struggle against legalizers, liquidators, and opportunists, for the perspectives of the second revolution. This struggle determined fundamentally all the groupings abroad. But how does the Bolshevist Stalin appraise these battles? As the most helpless empiricist and unprincipled practicalist: "a tempest in a teapot; let them, so to say, climb on the wall; work, and all will be well." Stalin welcomes the frame of mind of theoretical indifference and the imaginative superiority of the near-sighted practicalists. "In my estimation, this is for the best", he writes, addressing those moods that were characteristic of the period of reaction and downfall. We have in this manner in the person of the Bolshevist Stalin not even a political

conciliationism, for conciliationism was an ideological current which strove to create a principled platform,—we have a blind empiricism which entirely disdains the principle problems of the revolution.

It isn't difficult to imagine what a castigation the editorship of the Zaria Vostoka got for publishing this letter, and what measures were taken on a general governmental scale to prevent such letters from appearing in the future.

6. In his report at the seventh plenum of the E. C. C. I. (1926) Stalin characterized the party's past in the following manner: "... the history of our party if taken from the moment of its birth in the form of a Bolshevist group in 1903, and traced through its subsequent stages up to our time; can be said without exaggeration, to be a history of the struggle of contradictions inside the party—there is not and cannot be a 'middle' line in questions of a principle character—". These imposing words are aimed against ideological "conciliationism"; in relation to those against whom Stalin led a struggle. But these absolute formulas of ideological irreconcilability are entirely contradictory to the political physiognomy and political past of Stalin himself. He was, as an empiricist, an organic conciliator, but particularly as an empiricist he did not give his conciliationism a principled expression.

7. In 1912 Stalin contributed to the legal party of the Bolshevists, Zvezda (The Star). The Petersburg editorial board in direct struggle with Lenin, issued this paper at first as a conciliationist organ. Here is what Stalin wrote in the programmatic editorial: "... we will be satisfied if the paper, not falling into the political infatuations of the different fractions, will successfully defend the spiritual treasures of the democracy, on which at present obvious enemies and false friends are boldly encroaching." (Revolution and C. P. S. U. (B) in "Materials and Documents", Vol. 5, page 161-162.)

The phrase about political infatuations of different (!) fractions is aimed wholly at Lenin, at his "tempests in teapots", at his eternal readiness to "climb on the wall", out of some "political infatuations."

Stalin's article, in this manner, entirely coincides with the vulgar-conciliationist tendency of the above quoted letter of 1911, and wholly contradicts his later announcement of the impermissibility of a middle line in questions of a principle character.

8. One of the official biographies of Stalin proclaims: "In 1913 he was again exiled to Turuchansk, where he remained until 1917." The Stalin jubilee number of Pravda expresses itself in the same way: "The years of 1913-14-15-16 Stalin spent in exile in Turuchansk" (Pravda, December 21, 1929). And not a word more. These were the years of the world war, the collapse of the Second International, of Zimmerwald, Kienthal, of the deepest ideological struggle in socialism. What part did Stalin take in this struggle? Four years of exile should have been years of intensive mental work. The exiles in such circumstances keep diaries, write tracts, work out these platforms, exchange polemical letters, etc. It is impossible that Stalin in four years of exile did not write anything on the fundamental problems of the war, the International, and revolution. But it would be futile for us to look for some traces of Stalin's mental work during these astounding four years. In what manner could this occur? It is perfectly obvious that if only one single line could be found where Stalin formulated the idea of defeatism or announced the necessity of a new International, this line would have been published long ago photographed and translated into all languages, and enriched with learned commentaries by all the academies and institutions. No such line was found. Does this mean that Stalin did not write at all? No, it does not mean this. This would be entirely incredible. But this means that among all the material written during these four years there was nothing, absolutely nothing, which can be used to-day for the strengthening of his reputation. In this manner the years of war, when the ideas and slogans of the Russian revolution and Third International were forged, proved an empty space in the ideological biography of Stalin. It is very probable that at that time he spoke and wrote: "Let them climb on the wall there and arrange storms in a glass of water."

9. Stalin arrives in Petrograd with Kamenev about the middle of March, 1917. Pravda, directed by Molotov and Shlapnikov, had a vague, primitive, but nevertheless "left" character directed against the provisional government. Stalin and Kamenev put aside the old editorship as too left and took up a thoroughly opportunist position in the spirit of the left mensheviks: (a) support of the provisional government as far as (b) military defense of the revolution (i. e., the bourgeois republic); (c) a union with the mensheviks of the Tseretelli type. The position of Pravda on those days presents indeed a scandalous page in the history of the party and in the biography of Stalin. His March articles which were the revolutionary result of his meditations in exile explain perfectly why not a line from Stalin's works from the war epoch have appeared up till now.

(To Be Continued)