How Stalin Bucharin Destroyed the Chinese Revolution ment. Continued from Last Issue)
About the time the Northern Expeditionary took Shanghai in 1927, what Chil Chal pald great attention to was the selec.
tion of the Shanghai municipal government and how to unite the petty bourgeoisle (the middle and small traders) for opposing the big bourgeoiste; Peng Shu Chih, Lo Yih Nieng became very angry, and tore it to the Shanghal municipal government was not a central problem. The central problem was that if the proletariat did not overpower the military forces of Chiang Kai Chek, the petty bourgeoisie would not stand for us and that Chiang Kai Shek must, under the direction of the imperial1ste, massacre the masses. The Shanghai municipal government would not only be phrase then, but a defeat throughout China would take place, for when Chiang Kal Shek openly betrayed the revolution it would never be an individual action, but the signal for the bourgeoisie in the whole country to go over to the reactionary camp.
At that time, Peng Shu Chih went to Hankow to state our opinion before the International delegate and the majority of the members of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and to consult them on how to attack the forces of Chiang Kai Shek. But they did not care very much about the coup of Shanghai, but telegraphed to me several times urging me to go to Wuhan, in Hupeh province. They thought that the nationalist government was at Wuhan at that time, so all important problems should be solved there. At the same time, the International telegraphed to us instructing 18 to hide or bary all the weapons of the workers to avoid the military conflict between the workers and Chiang Kal Shek, in order not to disturb the occupation of Shanghal hy the armed forces. Having read this telegram, Lo Yth Nung became very angry, and fore it to bits At that time acain obeyed the order of the International and could not maintain my own opinion. Based upon the policy of the International towards the Kuo Min Tang and the imnertallats, fsgueda shameful manifesto with Wang Chin Wel.
The Proposal to Withdraw from the In the beginning of April went to Hankow. When first met Wang Chin Wel heard from him some reactionary words, far different from what said while in Shanghai. told this to Borodin; he said that my observations were right and that as soon as Wang Chin Wet reached Wuhan he was surrounded by Hsu Chien, Kuo Meng Yu, Chen Pung Po, Tan Yien Kal and others, and became gradually colder. After Chiang Kai Shek and Lu Chi Shung continually massacred the workers and peasants, the Kuo Min Tang hated the power of the proletariat more every day, and the reactionary attitude of Wang Chin Wet and of the Central Committee of the Kuo Min Tang developed rapidly. At the meeting of our Political Bureau, made a report on the status of the joint meeting of our Party and of the Kuo Min Tang: The danger of co operation between our Party and the Kuo Min Tang is more and more gerious. What they tried to seize on seemd to be this or that small problem; what they really wanted was the whole leading power. Now there are only two roads before us: either to give up the leading power or to break with them. The attendants angwered my report with silence.
After the cour of May 21 at Changsha, in Huhan province, twice suggested drawal from the Kuo Min Tang. Finally, said: The Wuhan Kuo Min Tang has followed the stens of Chiang Kai Shek! At that time only Yen Pih 81 said: Indeed!
and Chow Eng Lal said: After we withdraw from the Kuo Min Tang the labor and peasant movement will be freer but the military movement will suffer too A11 the rest still answered my suggestion with the attitude of quiet. At the same time discussed this with ChiChiu Bat. He gata: We should let the Kuo Min Tang expel us, we cannot withdraw by ourselves. consulted Borodin.
He said: quite agree with your idea but know that Moscow will never permit it.
At that time once more observed the discipline of the International and the oninton of the majority of the Central Committee and was unable to maintain my own LETTER BY TCHEN DU HSIU opinion. From the beginning could not lorde, tuchuns, and gentry of Hunan and persistly maintain my opinion; up to this Hupeh provinces but was the kinsman, retime could no longer bear it. Then, lative or old friend of the officers of that tendered my resignation to the Central time. All the landowners were directly or Committee.
The chief reason for the reIndirectly protected by the officers. To confiscate the land is only empty words if 13 signation was: The International wishes is conditioned by do not touch the land us to carry out our own policy, on the one hand, and does not allow us to withof the military officers. draw from the Kuo Min Tang on the other. 2) Check the peasants over zealThere is really no way out and cannot ous action with the power of the Party continue with my work.
headquarters. We did execute this shameful policy of checking the peasants overFrom the beginning to the end, the International recognized the Kuo Min Tang zealous action; afterwards the International criticized the Chinese Party as having as the main body of the Chinese national democratic revoluton. In the often become the obstacle of the masses mouth of and considered it as one of the greatest Stalin the words leadership of the Kuo Min Tang were shouted very loudly (see opportunist errors. The Error of the Opposition in Pro. 3) Destroy the present unreliable blems of the Chinese Revolution. So it generals, arm twenty thousand Communwished us throughout to surrender in the ists and select fifty thousand worker and organization of the Kuo Min Tang and to peasant elements from Hunan and Hupeh lead the masses under the name and the provinces for organizing a new army. II banner of the Kuo Min Tang. Up to the we could get so many rifles, why should time when the whole Kuo Min Tang of Feng we not directly arm the workers and peaYu Hslang, Wang Chin Wei, Lang Lin Chih, sants and why should we still enlarge the Ho Chin etc. were openly reactionary and new troops of the Kuo Min Tang? Why abolished the so called three points pol could not we establish the Soviet of workicies: to unite with the Soviet Union, to ers. peasants and soldiers? If there are allow the to join the Kuo Min Tang neither armed workers and peasants nor and to help the labor and peasant move soviets who and how can we destroy the the International instructed us by Bald unreliable generals? suppose that telegram: Only withdraw from the Kuo we should still pitifully beg the Central Min Tang government not from the Kuo Committee of the K110 Min Tang to disMin Tang. So, after the August Con charge them. That the delegate of the Inference, from the Nanchang uprising to the ternational, Lols, showed Wang Chin Wet capture of Swatow, the Communist party the instruction of the III International, still hid under the blue white banner of was of course for this purpose. the Left clique of the Kuo Min Tung. Among (4) Put new working and peasant the masses It seemed that there was troa.
elements into the Central Committee of the ble within the Kuo Min Tang, but nothing Kuo Min Tang to take the place of old more. The young Chinese Communist members. If we have power to deal freeParty, produced by the young Chinese proly with the old Committee and reletariat, had not had a proner period of training in Marxism an class struggles. In organize the Kuo Min Tang, why could we not organize Soviets? Why must we send the beginning of the founding of the Party, our worker and peasant leaders to the It was confronted by the great revolutionbourgeois Kuo Min Tang, who have already ary struggle. The only hope of avoiding been massacring the workers and peasants?
any very grave error was the correct and why should we decorate such a Kuo guidance of the proletarian policy of the Min Tang with our leaders. International. Under the guidance ot such a continuously opportunist policy how could Revolutionary Court the Chinese proletariat and the Commun(5) Organize a Revolutionary Court ist Party clearly observe their own future?
with a well known member of the Kuo Min and how could they have their own indeTang as its chairman in order to judge pendent policy? They only surrendered to the reactionary officers. How can the althe bourgeoisle step by step and subordinready reactionary leader of the Kuo Min ated themselves to the bourgeoiste. So Tang Judge the reactionary officers in the when the latter suddenly magsacred us we Revolutionary Court?
did not know what to do about it. After Those who attempted to execute such the coup of May 21 at Changsha, the metha policy within the Kuo Min Tang were od given to us by the International was: still opportunists of Left tendency. There was no change at all in the fundamental (1) Confiscate the land of the land polcly; It was like taking a bath in a urinal owners from the lower strata, not to use vessel!
At that time, it we wanted to the name of the nationalist government, but carry out the Left policy of revolution, the do not touch the land of military officers. fundamental policy had to be changed. Not a single one of the bourgeoiste, land That is, the Communist Party had to withdraw from the Kuo Min Tang and be really independent. It had to arm the workers and peasants, as many as possible, estabHsh the Soviet of workers, peasants and soldiers and seize the leading power from the Kuo Min Tang; otherwise, no matter what kind of Left policy was adopted, there was no way to realize it. At that time the Central Political Bureau wired to the Communist International to answer its instruction: we accept the instruction and will work according to its direction but it cannot be realized immediately. For all the members of the Central Committee recognized that that instruction was an impractical method. Even the participant of the meeting of the Central Committee, Fanck (it was said that he was the private deputy of Stalin) also thought that there was no posstbility to carry it out. He agreed with the telegraphic answer of the Central Committee, saying: We can only say so in our answer. After the August Conference, the Central Committee endeavored to propagate that the cause of the failure of the Chinese revolution was that the opportunistis did not accept the instructions of the Communist International (of course, the instructions were the above mentioned one: besides these, there were no instructions. to change the tactics at once. we did not know how they could change the olicy within the sphere of the Kuo Min Tang and who were the so called opportunists.
Where Responsibility Lles As the Party has committed such a fundamental error, the other bigger and smaller subordinate errors, of course, would continually take place. I, whose perception was not clear, whose opinion wag not decisive, sank deeply in the atmosphere of opportunism, sincerely carried out the opportunist policy of the Third International; unconsciously became the tool of the narrow faction of Stalin; could not save the Party: and the revolution. All this, both and other comrades should be responsible for. The present Central Committee said: You attempt to put the fallure of the Chinese Revolution on the shoulders of the Third International in order that you might throw off your own esponsibility! Thi statement is ridiculous.
Nobody can permanently withhold his right to criticize the opportunism of the Party leadership, or to return to Marxism and Leninism because he has himself committed opportunism. At the same time, nobody can take the liberty of avoiding his responsibility for executing an opportunist policy because opportunism came from high places. The source of the opportunist policy is the Third International; but why did not the leaders of the Chinese Party make a protest against the Third International, but sincerely carried out its policies? Who could remove this responsibility? We should very frankly and obfectively recognize that all the past and present opportunist policies come from the Third International The Third International should bear the responsibility. The young Chinese Party has not yet the abilty of itself to invent any theories and setule any policy: but the leading organ of the Chinese Party ought to bear the responsibility for blindly executing the opportunist policy of the Third International without a little bit of judgment and protest If we mutually excuse each other and all of us think that we have committed no mistakes. wag it then the error of the masses? This is not only too ridiculous but also does not take any responsibility towards the revolution! strongly believe that, if I, or other responsible comrades.
could at that time have had a clear recognition of the falsity of the opportunist pole fcy: a strong argument against it, even to the point of mobilizing the entire Party for an ardent discussion and debate, a. comrade Trotsky has been doing, the result would inevitably have been a great help to the revolution and would not have made the revolution such a shameful tailure, though might have been expelled from the Third International and split in the Party might have taken place. I, whose perception was not clear and opinion was not decisive, did not do so after all! If the Party were to base itself on such past mistakes of mine or on the fact that strongly maintained the former erroneous line, in order to give me any severe punishment, would earnestly accept it without uttering a word. Continued in Next Issue)
THE STRATEGY OF THE WORLD REVOLUTION By LEON TROTSKY withA brilliant summary and analysis of the policies pursued since 1923 by the leading group in the Communist International on the most important problems confronting the revolutionary movement. An invaluable contribution to the issues of the day and an indispensable part of every worker library much.
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