THE DRAFT PROGRAM OF THE COMINTERN

(CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS ISSUE).

 THE QUESTION OF THE CHARACTER OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION.

The slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat which leads behind it the rural poor is inseparably bound up with the question of the Socialist character of the coming, third revolution in China. And inasmuch as not only history, but also mistakes which people make in meeting its requirements, repeat themselves, we can already hear the objection raised that China has not yet matured for a Socialist revolution. But this is an abstract and lifeless formulation of the question. Has Russia, if isolated from the rest of the world, matured for Socialism? According to Lenin it has not. It has matured for the dictatorship of the proletariat as the only method of solution of national problems which cannot be delayed.

But the general destiny of the dictatorship as a whole is in the final analysis determined by the trend of world development, which, of course, does not exclude but presupposes a correct policy on the part of the proletarian dictatorship, the consolidation and development of the workers' and peasants' alliance, flexible adaptation to national conditions on the one hand, and the trend of world development on the other. This fully holds good also for China. In the same article "As to Our Revolution" (January 16, 1923) in which Lenin establishes that the peculiarity of Russia lies in the fact that it proceeds along the lines of the peculiar development of the Eastern countries, he dubs as "endlessly hackneyed" the argument of European Social Democracy to the effect "that we have not developed enough for Socialism, that we have not, as some 'learned' gentlemen say, the necessary objective economic prerequisites for Socialism". But Lenin ridicules the "learned" gentlemen not because he himself believes in the existence of the necessary economic prerequisites for Socialism in Russia but because he holds that from the absence of these prerequisites necessary for an INDEPENDENT construction of Socialism it does not at all follow, as the pedants and philistines think, that the idea of the conquest of power has to be rejected. In that article Lenin for the hundred and first or perhaps for the thousand and first time replies to the sophisms of the heroes of the Second International:

"This INCONTROVERTIBLE consideration (about the immaturity of Russia for Socialism)... is not decisive in an evaluation of our revolution." (Volume 18, part 2, page 118 and 119).

That is what the authors of the draft program will not and cannot understand. Notice that the argument about the economic and cultural immaturity of China as well as Russia—China of course more so than Russia—is incontrovertible. But from here it does not in the least follow that the proletariat has to give up the idea of capturing power, which capture is dictated by the whole historical position and revolutionary situation in the country.

The concrete historical, political and actual question is not whether China has economically ripened for Socialism, but whether she has ripened politically for the proletarian dictatorship. These two questions are not by any means identical. They might have been identical were it not for the fact that we have a law of uneven development. That is where the law holds good and fully applies to the inter-relationships between economics and politics. Thus, has China matured for a proletarian dictatorship? Only the progress of the struggle can give a categoric answer to this question. Likewise only the struggle can settle the question as to when and under what conditions will the real unification, emancipation and regeneration of China take place. Anyone who says that China has not ripened for the dictatorship of the proletariat declares thereby that the third Chinese revolution is postponed for many years.

Of course matters would be quite hopeless if feudal survivals would really DOMINATE in Chinese economics, as the resolution of the E.C.C.I. asserts. But unfortunately, SURVIVALS in general cannot dominate. The draft program also on this point does not rectify the committed errors, but repeats them in a roundabout and loose manner. The draft speaks of the "predominance of feudal medieval relations both in the economics of the country as well as in the political superstructure ... " This is fundamentally wrong. What does PRE-DOMINATE mean? Is it by the number of people involved? Or it it by the dominant and leading role in the economics of the country? The extraordinarily rapid growth of home industry on the basis of the all-embracing role of merchant and bank capital-complete dependence of the chief agrarian districts on the market, enormous and ever-growing foreign trade, all around subordination of the Chinese villages to the towns—goes to show the unconditional predominance, the direct sway of capitalist relations in China. Serf and semiserf relations are indentably very - and Than

have originated partly in the days of feudalism, they partly constitute a new formation which regenerates the old on the basis of the retarded development of the productive forces, the surplus agrarian population, the activities of merchants' and usurers' capital, etc. However, not "feudal" (more correctly, serf and, generally, pre-capitalist) relations DOMINATE but capitalist relations. Only thanks to this unconditional role of capitalist relations can we speak seriously of the prospects of proletarian hegemony in the national revolution. Otherwise we find that the different ends do not meet.

The role of the Chinese proletariat in production is already very great. In the next few years it will increase still further. Its political role, as events have shown, could have been gigantic. But the policy of the leadership was, as has been shown, entirely directed against the capture of a leading role by the proletariat.

The draft program says that successful Socialist construction is possible in China "only on condition of direct support from countries under the proletarian dictatorship." Thus, here, in relation to China, the same principle is recognized which the Party always, recognized in regard to Russia. But if China has no sufficient inner forces for an INDEPENDENT construction of Socialist society then, according to the theory of Stalin and Bucharin, the Chinese proletariat should not take power in any of the stages of the Revolution. Or perhaps the existence of the U.S.S.R. settles the question otherwise? Then it follows that our technique is sufficient to build up a Socialist society not only here in the U.S.S.R., but also in China, viz., in the two economically most backward big countries. Or perhaps the inevitable dictatorship of the proletariat in China is "admissable" because that dictatorship will be included in the chain of the worldwide Socialist revolution thus becoming not only its link, but its driving force? But this is precisely Lenin's main idea in relation to the October Revolution, the "peculiarity" of which lies precisely along the lines of development of the Eastern countries. We see thus how the revisionist theory of Socialism in one country evolved in 1925 in the struggle against "Trotskyism" confuses and muddles up matters in approaching any new big revolutionary problem.

The draft program goes still further along these lines. It distinguishes China and India from "Russia of 1917, Poland ('etc.'?) as countries with a certain MINIMUM of industry sufficient for successful Socialist construction" or (which is more definitely and therefore more erroneously stated elsewhere) as countries possessing the "necessary and sufficient material prerequisites . . . for the complete construction of Socialism." Here as we already know there is a mere word play on Lenin's expression "necessary and sufficient" prerequisites, a false and inadmissable play because Lenin definitely enumerates the political and organizational prerequisites, including the TECHNICAL, CUL-TURAL AND INTERNATIONAL prerequisites. But the other chief point is HOW can one decide a priori whether a "MINIMUM OF INDUSTRY" is sufficient for the complete building up of Socialism once it is a question of an uninterrupted world struggle between two economic systems, two social orders, of which our ECONOMIC basis is in this struggle immeasurably weaker?

If we take the economic lever only, it is clear that we in the U.S.S.R., and particularly so in China and India, are sitting on the incomparably "shorter" end than world capitalism. But the whole question is determined by the REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE between the two systems on a world scale. The political long end of the lever is ON OUR SIDE, or, to speak more correctly, must be in our hands, provided we pursue a correct political line.

In the same article "As to Our Revolution", after the words that "a certain cultural level is necessary for the establishment of Socialism", Lenin remarks: "Although no one can tell exactly what this certain cultural level might be." Why can no one tell? Because the question is settled by the struggle, by the competition between the two social systems and the two cultures, ON AN IN-TERNATIONAL SCALE. Fully departing from this idea of Lenin's, which follows from the very substance of the question, the draft program declares that Russia had in 1917 precisely the "minimum technique" and hence also the culture necessary for the building up of Socialism in one country. The authors of the draft are trying to say in the program that which "no one can say" a priori.

It is impossible, one cannot, and it is stupid to seek a criterion for the "sufficient minimum" within national statics ("Russia prior to 1917") when the whole question is decided by international dynamics. In this was a arbitrary and isolated national

tional narrow-mindedness in politics, the prerequisite for inevitable national reformist and social patriotic blunders in the future.

ON THE REACTIONARY IDEA OF WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' PARTIES FOR THE EAST.

The lesson of the second Chinese Revolution is a lesson for the entire Comintern, first and foremost for all Eastern countries.

All arguments brought forward in defense of the Menshevik policy in the Chinese Revolution must, if we take them for what they are worth, be held trebly good for India. The imperialist yoke has in India, in that classic colony, immeasurably higher palpable forms than in China. The survivals of feudal and serf relations in India are immeasurably deeper and greater. Nevertheless, or, more correctly, precisely because of that, the methods applied in China which undermined the revolution must result in India in even more destructive consequences. To abolish Indian serfdom and overthrow the Anglo-Indian bureaucracy and British militarism is a thing which can be accomplished only by a gigantic and irresistible mass movement of the people, and precisely because of its powerful sweep and irresistibility, its international purposes and relationships, it will not tolerate any half-way and compromising opportunist measures on the part of the leadership.

The Comintern leadership has already made not a few mistakes in India. Conditions have not yet allowed these errors to reveal themselves on such a scale as in China. It is, therefore, to be hoped that the lessons of the Chinese events will straighten out in good time the line of the leading policy in India and in other Eastern countries.

The central question for us here, as everywhere and always, is the question of the Communist Party, its complete independence, its irreconcilable class character. The greatest danger on this path is constituted by the organization of so-called "Workers' and Peasants' Parties" in the Eastern countries.

In 1924, a year which will be regarded as a year of open revision of a series of fundamental ideas of Marx and Lenin, Stalin advanced the idea of 'dual composition of Workers' and Peasants' Parties" for the Eastern countries. It was based on the same ground of national oppression. Cables from India, as well as from Japan, where there is no national oppression, have of late frequently reported about activities of provincial "Workers' and Peasants' Parties" as of organizations which are related, and friendly to the Comintern, as if they were almost our "own" organizations, without, however, giving a more or less concrete statement as to their political physiognomy; in a word, it is exactly what has not so very long ago been written about the Kuomintang. The least dubiousness in this sphere is destructive. It is a question here of an absolutely new, entirely false and thoroughly un-Marxian orientation on the main question of the Party and of its relations to the class and the classes.

The necessity for the Communist Party of China to be affiliated with the Kuomintang was defended on the ground that the social composition of the Kuomintang was a Party of workers and peasants, that nine-tenths of the Kuomintang-this figure was repeated hundreds of times-belong to the revolutionary elements and are ready to march hand in hand with the Communist Party. However, during and since the coups d'Etat in Shanghai and Wuchang, these revolutionary nine-tenths of the Kuomintang have disappeared. No one has as yet found their traces. And the theoreticians of class collaboration in China, Stalin, Bucharin and others, have not even taken the trouble to explain what has become of the workers and peasants, the revolutionary, friendly and entirely our "own" nine-tenths of the Kuomintang membership. However, an answer to this question is of decisive importance if we are to understand in the future the fate of all these "dual composition" parties and have a clear idea of their very conception which throws us back far behind not only the program of the C.P.S.U. of 1919, but even the manifesto of the Communist Party of 1847.

The question as to what has become of the celebrated nine tenths becomes clear to us only if we understand, first, the impossibility of a dual composition, that is, a dual class Party, expressing simultaneously two mutually exclusive historical lines the proletarian and petty-bourgeois lines,—secondly, the impossibility to have in capitalist society an independent peasant party, that is, a party independent of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

Marxism has always taught, and that was accepted by Bolshevism, that the peasantry and the proletariat are two different classes, that every identification of their interests in capitalist society is false, and that the peasant can join the Communist Party if, from the property viewpoint, he adopts the views of the proletariat. An alliance of the washers?