

Spector's Statement to Canadian Party

Toronto, November 6th, 1928.

To The Political Committee,
Communist Party of Canada.

Following upon the motion at yesterday's session of the Polcom to endorse the expulsion of the three comrades J. P. Cannon, Max Shachtman, and Martin Abern, from the Workers Party of America for their stand on behalf of the opening of a serious discussion of the fundamental problems of the Communist International, a motion which I was unable to support, certain questions have been directed to me by the Polcom as to my own position. These may be boiled down to the following:

First whether I believe that the ideological line of "Trotskyism" is correct and whether I am prepared to carry on an aggressive campaign against Trotskyism and the comrades who have been expelled from the W. P. for their solidarity with the platform of the Russian Opposition.

In reply to the question whether I am prepared "to wage an aggressive campaign against Trotskyism," I can assure the Polcom that I am prepared to wage an aggressive campaign for Leninism. Historical Trotskyism was liquidated with the entrance of L. D. Trotsky into the Communist Party and his collaboration with Lenin following his return to Russia in 1917. Trotsky has declared before the Russian Party that in all questions bearing any character of principle at all, in which he had differences with Lenin prior to 1917, Lenin was correct. The revival of the issue of so-called "Trotskyism" by the majority in 1924 and 1925 was an attempt to obscure the real issues by an artificial issue. Zinoviev who was one of the leading comrades in the fight against Trotsky has not only admitted since that the latter was correct in his fight for internal Party democracy in 1923-24, but also that the issue of "Trotskyism" was then invented by himself and a few other comrades for strategic purposes, to link up the current differences with differences that had long passed into history.

The comrades in the vanguard of the fight against "Trotskyism," were most of them further removed from the position of Lenin on his return to Russia and his presentation of the April Theses of 1917, than L. D. Trotsky. Zinoviev and Kamenev, Rykov, Losovsky, etc. were opposed to the insurrection by which the Bolsheviks conquered power and were for a coalition of all the Socialist Parties. Comrade Stalin, prior to Lenin's return had written articles for co-operation with Tseretelli. When so much is made of the differences between Trotsky and Lenin during the course of the revolution itself, it should be borne in mind that all these differences are being exaggerated and distorted for factional ends, and that silence is maintained on the differences that other comrades, Bucharin for instance, had with Lenin but who are nevertheless regarded as one hundred percent Leninists. Comrade Bucharin not only fought Lenin on the Brest Litovsk question but also on a Trade Union question, and on the question of State Capitalism. On the Peasant question he was the author of one of the most dangerous slogans ever put out by a leading comrade, the slogan of "enrich yourselves," the objective significance of which meant a call on the Kulaks to intensify their exploitation of the poor peasantry. The present leader of the C. I., Bucharin, had to be overruled on the question of the validity of partial demands in the Communist Program by the intervention of Lenin, Trotsky and others at the Fourth Congress.

Not only did Lenin during his lifetime deny all slanderous rumors of any differences between himself and Trotsky on the Peasant Question, but up to his last days he considered L. D. Trotsky his closest collaborator as may be seen by the correspondence which passed between these two leaders of the revolution in the letter to the Institute of Party History by L. D. Trotsky. Lenin called upon the latter to defend his views for him on the following questions, the National Question, the Question of Workers and Peasants Control, the Monopoly of Foreign trade, the struggle against Bureaucracy, etc. It is high time that a stop be put to the falsification of Party history that has accompanied the unscrupulous and demagogic campaign against the revolutionist who next to Lenin was the most authentic leader and organizer of the October Revolution, and was so recognized by Lenin himself. Trotsky today stands foursquare for the maintenance of the principles of Leninism, uncontaminated by the opportunist deviations that have been smuggled into the Comintern and U.S.S.R. policy by the present Rykov-Stalin-Bucharin regime and to which the lessons of the Chinese revolution, the economic situation in the U.S.S.R., the situation within the C.P.

We print herewith in part the statement of Comrade Spector to the Political Committee of the Communist Party at its meeting on Nov. 6th, 1928 in response to the demand that he state his position on the expulsion of Cannon, Abern and Shachtman from the Workers (Communist) Party of America and on the issues connected with the expulsion. As reported in the last number of The Militant Comrade Spector was forthwith suspended from the party and removed from all responsible positions. He was declared expelled from the party for refusing to retract his stand.

In view of the great prominence and popularity of Comrade Spector as the outstanding Communist leader in Canada his arbitrary expulsion has made a sensation in the labor movement and has called forth the greatest indignation of the rank and file of the Party. Comrade Spector was elected to the Executive Committee of the Communist International at the Sixth World Congress. He has been for years the Chairman of the Party and editor of its organs, the Canadian Worker and the Canadian Labor Monthly. He represented the Communist Party of Canada at the Fourth and Sixth World Congresses of the Communist International.—Editor.

S.U., and the experiences of the Anglo-Russian Committee bear eloquent witness.

For these latter are the real issues. In retrospect it is clear that the Sixth Congress, meeting after a delay of four years, nevertheless failed to measure up to its great tasks. Eclecticism and a zig-zag line replaced a real analysis of the rich treasures of political experience of the past four years. The discussion of the Chinese revolution, the greatest upheaval since the November revolution, was utterly inadequate. As in the case of discussion of the failure of October 1923 in Germany, the attempt to throw major responsibility for what happened in China on the leadership of a Chinese Communist Party will not down. The responsibility for the opportunist policy of our Party in China lies in the first place with the Ex. Committee of the Comintern and with the formulations of policy of Stalin, Bucharin, Martynov. Lenin at the II Congress proposed a clear line in the Colonial question, for the independence of the Communist Parties and the working class movement even in embryonic form; against the National bourgeoisie, struggle for proletarian hegemony in the National emancipation movement even when the National Revolution has only bourgeois democratic tasks to solve; constant propaganda of the Soviet idea and creation of Soviets at the earliest moment possible; finally, possibility of the non-capitalist development of backward colonial and semi-colonial countries on condition that they receive support from the U.S.S.R. and the proletariat of the advanced capitalist countries.

Otherwise, Lenin pointed out, the alliance with the national bourgeoisie would be dangerous to the revolution. This alliance could only be affected on the basis that the bourgeoisie carried on an effective struggle against imperialism and did not prevent the Communist Party from organizing the revolutionary action of the workers and peasants. Failure to exact these guarantees would lead to a repetition of the Kemalism of the Turkish national struggle which has made its peace with Imperialism. Nearly every one of these cardinal points of Lenin's revolutionary colonial policies was violated in China. By throwing out the smoke screen that the creation of Soviets would be tantamount to the dictatorship of the proletariat, despite the fact that Lenin proposed the Soviets already as a form of the democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants in the 1905 revolution, the leadership of the Comintern misrepresented the criticism and theses of the opposition and covered up their own opportunist mistakes.

Our Chinese party was subordinated to the National bourgeoisie in the Kuomintang under cover of the old Menshevik Martynov policy of the "Block of Four Classes" (renunciation of right to criticize Kuomintang from the outside, renunciation of the right to criticize Sun Yat Senism, renunciation of an illegal fighting apparatus, and of the creation of cells in the National Army.) The working class movement was subordinated to the Government of the National bourgeoisie (prohibition in certain cases of picketing and strikes, disarmament of the workers, etc.) The C.P. maintained silence at the beginning of the repression period (coup d'etat of Chiang Kai Shek etc.) The enlarged Executive of the C. I. did not subsequently straighten out the line. The slogan of Soviets was issued not when the revolutionary movement was at its height but when the bourgeoisie had already betrayed and the workers and peasants were being decimated. Stalin was making a speech still hailing Chiang Kai Shek as a revolutionary warrior only a few days prior to Chiang Kai Shek coup in a speech, which was criticized at the time by Comrade Radek, and which was of course suppressed to avoid compromising himself. The opportunist line followed in the Chinese rev-

olution is of course by no means isolated. I have dwelt at some length on the opportunist line followed in the refusal to break with the traitorous British General Council in the Anglo-Russian Committee. The Anglo-Russian Committee was a political block between two trade union centres. The proposal of the opposition demonstratively to break with the General Council was falsely represented as being a parallel to leaving the old unions. Any Communist who reads the resolutions adopted by the Anglo-Russian conferences of Paris, July 1926 and Berlin, August 1926 and finally of the Berlin conference, at the beginning of April 1927 should convince themselves that an absolutely impermissible capitulation line was followed. At the latter meeting the Soviet representatives went on record recognizing the General Council, "as the sole representative and spokesman" of the British Trade Union movement at a time when the traitors of the General Council were suppressing the minority movement. But at the Enlarged Executive of May 1927, Comrade Bucharin sought to justify the Berlin capitulation by the theory of "exceptional circumstances," that is, that it was in the diplomatic interests of the Soviet Union which was under threat of war danger from the provocation of the British Government.

Such an attitude has little in common with the instructions of Lenin to the Soviet delegation that went to the Hague Conference, to ruthlessly unmask the Pacifists and Reformists. By the policy pursued in the Anglo-Russian Committee the British Communist Party developed such a degree of opportunism that it was at first even opposed to the Soviet Trade Union manifesto announcing the treachery of the Left as well as the Right Labor fakers of the General Council and wanted to continue a fight for the re-establishment of the moribund Anglo-Russian Committee. The whole line followed in the Anglo-Russian Committee was, like that in the Chinese Revolution, based on maneuvers with the reformists at the top instead of regard for the unleashing of the mass movement below.

The economic analysis of the opposition on the situation within the U.S.S.R. on the danger of the growth of the Kulak, the Nep man, and the bureaucrat has been swiftly vindicated. Undoubtedly there are Thermidorean elements in the country which are striving to bring their class pressure to bear on the Party. The highest duty of a revolutionist is to warn of these dangers and to propose the necessary measures to combat them. That was always the case while Lenin was alive. The crisis last February in connection with the grain collection proved strikingly the danger of the Kulak. The events in Smolensk, the Don Basin, the Ukraine, etc. proved the absolute necessity not only for such a campaign of self-criticism as Comrade Stalin felt the need to initiate but for effective internal Party democracy. One of the first guarantees of such real Party democracy would be the return of the exiled revolutionary oppositionists and their reinstatement with full rights to their former positions in the Party.

I have been a foundation member of the Communist Party of Canada since its organization in which I took a joint part. I have also been a member of the C.E.C. practically all the time since. Regardless of the immediate organizational consequences, I find myself compelled to make the above statement and to further register the fact that nothing on earth can separate me from the Revolutionary Communist movement. Everything that I have stated flows from my convictions that the deviations from Leninism in the C.I. can and must be corrected by a struggle within the International and its sections. Long live the Communist International! Long live the Proletarian Revolution!

MAURICE SPECTOR.

In The Next Issue

"THE JULY PLENUM AND THE RIGHT DANGER"

By L. D. Trotsky

This Leninist analysis of the present conflict in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has just been received and is now being translated for publication in the next issue of The Militant. The wild rumors in the Capitalist Press and the silence of the official party organs throw no light whatever on the swiftly-moving and momentous developments now taking place in the Soviet Union and in the Communist Party there. Trotsky's article throws a clear and searching light on the entire situation, analyzes the class forces at work, explains the position and role of the conflicting groups in the party and indicates the revolutionary bolshevik policy for the solution of the problems.

The Right Danger in the American Party

CONTINUED FROM LAST ISSUE

The perspective of the Lovestone group is in opposition to that outlined above. Its perspective is based upon an overestimation of the reserve power of American capitalism and an underestimation of the leftward drift of the masses. It is characterized by:

1. Overestimation of objective difficulties and underestimation of the growing favorable opportunities for the proletarian class struggle.
2. Overemphasis of the weakness and smallness of the Party and underemphasis of its great task for leadership in the developing class struggles and its ability to undertake the solution of these tasks.
3. Failure to realize the seriousness of the war danger and the coming of serious struggles as is seen in the failure to build an underground apparatus.
4. Playing down the symptomatic significance of such sporadic struggles among the unorganized as the oil strike in Bayonne, automobile strike in Oshawa, etc.
5. Seeing in the present political situation no signs or promise for political conflict and mass political movements.
6. Revising the perspective for struggle outlined in the February thesis which was forced upon the majority by the minority of the Central Committee. This revision was made in the policies of the Lovestone group since February in articles by Lovestone and Pepper, and in the May resolution of the C.E.C. Plenum. Failure to publish the February Thesis.

These characteristics of the perspective of the Lovestone group lack the outlook for struggle and organization towards it.

IV.—Failure to Orientate Towards New Unions and the Organization of the Unorganized.

To organize the many millions of unorganized workers is the major task of our Party. The building of the Party as the leader of the workers in all phases of their struggle against American imperialism depends largely upon its carrying thru vigorously this basic task of organization. With great masses of workers developing moods and movements of struggle, under the pressure of the industrial depression, rationalization, and the capitalist offensive, the organization of the unorganized now becomes the more urgent and possible.

The old craft unions, which are chiefly based upon the skilled and privileged workers, are controlled by ultra-reactionary leaders, and following a class collaboration policy, and which have been undermined and driven out of the basic industries by the employers' offensive, will not organize the great unorganized masses. This can be accomplished only through new unions, militant in character and based upon industrial instead of craft lines. It is fundamentally necessary that our party aggressively take the lead in the formation of these new industrial unions. At the same time the Party shall continue and extend through the trade union fractions, and the T.U.E.L. its revolutionary work in the old unions.

In the organization of the unorganized, the Party must base its orientation upon the unskilled and semi-skilled masses in the basic industries, the most exploited, and decisive sections of the working class. Trustified American capital, with all its economic strength and with all the powers of governmental repression at its disposal, will violently resist the organization of the workers in the basic industries. The new unionism will be established, but only by determined struggle. Hence the Party in its great task of organizing the unorganized must undertake its work with firm determination and with a thoroughgoing mobilization of all available forces.

The line of the Lovestone group in this vital work is a right wing line which liquidates the Party's efforts to organize the unorganized. Its principal defects are: (a) resistance to reorientating the Party decisively in the direction of the building of new unions, and, (b) dilettante approach to the mass organization campaigns and failure to carry them through with the vigor and persistence necessary to this success. The whole American Party was slow in orientating towards organizing new unions, but the Lovestone group is primarily responsible for this, because it has resisted and is still resisting despite the pressure of the Comintern, the Profintern, and the minority of the C.E.C. Principal causes of wrong Lovestone policies in organizing the unorganized are:

1. Lack of faith in the possibility for effective struggle of the masses resulting from the overestimation of the reserve powers of American capitalism and underestimation of the industrial depression, the capitalist offensive and the developing mood of resistance among the workers.
2. Tendency to orientate upon the organized

The following is the second installment of the document submitted by the delegation of the Opposition in the American Party to the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International, in July 1928 and signed by James P. Cannon, William Z. Foster, William F. Dunne, Alex Bittelman, J. W. Johnston, Manuel Gomez and George Siskind. The Lovestone-Pepper majority has voted to prohibit the publication or circularization of this document in the ranks. We will print it consecutively in "The Militant." —EDITORS.

1. Overestimation of the diminishing influence of the skilled workers due to the mechanization of industry and the growing gulf between the skilled and unskilled.
2. Tendency to orientate upon alleged differences in the upper strata of the labor bureaucracy.
3. Underestimation of the crisis in the trade unions, and a tendency to minimize the necessity for new unions. Illusions regarding possibilities of organizing the masses into the A. F. of L. unions. (Articles and speeches by Comrades Pepper and Lovestone).
4. Constant practice of placing the interests of the Lovestone faction ahead of those of the Party, and the sacrifice of mass campaigns for factional advantage.
5. Tendency to toy with mass organization campaigns instead of pushing them through aggressively. The majority leadership of the Y.W.L. which is an organic part of the Lovestone faction in the Party, follows the same opportunist line in its industrial work.

Typical examples of these wrong tendencies and policies are:

1. Rejected as dual unionism the proposal made by the C.E.C. minority, in May, 1927, for the calling of an open conference of the left-wing and progressives in the coal industry to wage direct struggle against the Lewis machine.
2. Condemned as dual unionism by a campaign throughout the whole Party the proposal of the C.E.C. minority in its thesis of May 1927, that the Party should "unhesitatingly" establish new unions wherever the old unions are decrepit or non-existent.
3. In the February, 1928 thesis, the Lovestone group simply repeated the year old Comintern decision regarding new unions, although the Comintern was then in the process of developing another resolution, which on the basis of the industrial depression and the deepening crisis in the old unions, laid far greater emphasis on the formation of new unions.
4. Resistance to the introduction of the slogan "Organize New Unions in Unorganized Industries" into the Party national election platform.
5. Failure to push forward vigorously for new unions in the needle industry. In this industry the Lovestone leadership has a craft union ideology and is afflicted with right wing theories that the workers cannot fight the employers and that the unions must cooperate in building up associations of employers.
6. Resistance to open struggle against the Lewis machine and building new union in mining industry.
7. Failure to concentrate Party forces for determined organizing campaign: example, total lack of preliminary work in New England textile industry prior to New Bedford strike.
8. Systematic factional discrimination against comrades capable for trade union work. Placing and displacing of field and district organizers and industrial organizers solely with regard to factional interests, with resultant damage to mass organization.

V. Resistance to Orientation of Active Struggle Against Lewis Machine and for Building New Union in Mining Industry.

The most important industrial struggle ever carried through by our Party and its biggest achievement in trade union work is the left wing struggle now being waged in the mining industry. The driving force in the formulation and execution of correct policies and mobilization of Party forces in this campaign was the CEC minority. The policies of the Lovestone group, dictated by an underestimation of the whole fight, definitely militated against the development of the aggressive action necessitated in this crucial struggle and prevented this work making greater success. With the coal industry in a deep crisis (due to the over-development of the industry, use of substitute for coal, etc.) and with the union, weakened by the heavy unemployment and the shifting of the industry to the South, being rapidly torn to pieces under the

impact of the attacks of the employers and the treachery of Lewis, our Party orientation should have been definitely in the direction of an open struggle against the Lewis machine and for the formation of a new union. The policy of the Lovestone C.E.C. majority placed many obstacles in the way of developing and executing such a policy. Among these are:

1. Rejection of the open conference proposed by the CEC minority. This action checked the Party orientation towards a new union and confused and demoralized the miners' left wing and left the miners movement without a definite perspective and disconnected our Party from the discontented masses of miners who wanted to struggle against Lewis. Renewal of the motion several months later by the CEC minority for an open conference and a direct struggle against Lewis, its acceptance by the Polcom, reestablished our leadership over the masses who were in grave danger of being demoralized by the I.W.W.
2. Failure of the CEC to vigorously combat the deep-seated pessimism and systematic resistance against the application of the policy of open struggle, after this policy, upon motion of the minority, had been formally adopted by the CEC. The task of breaking down the resistance of the Lovestone District Organizers fell chiefly upon the CEC minority who were sharply criticized by the Lovestone majority for these actions. The right wing tendencies of these organizers, signaled by reluctance to fight the Lewis bureaucracy and by a general underestimation of the fighting spirit of the miners, were most clearly exemplified by the letters of Comrade Bedacht, District Organizer of Illinois to the CEC.
3. From December 1926 till December 1927, including 9 months of the miners' strike, the Lovestone majority failed to publish a left wing miners' organ. This was due on the one hand to the underestimation of the struggle and on the other to yielding to the demand of the so-called progressives (Brophy, Hapgood, etc.) that no criticism of Lewis should be made during the strike.
4. For six months no efforts were put forth to establish a left wing miners' relief organization and relief campaign, which offered exceptionally favorable means for the left wing to establish mass contacts. This relief organization could only have been built by an open fight against the Lewis machine and the A. F. of L. bureaucracy.
5. Factional juggling in the anthracite districts. This was based upon the established principle of the Lovestone group of keeping minority comrades from key positions. By placing incompetent organizers in charge of the Party apparatus and by carrying on a sharp factional war, the whole campaign in the anthracite was gravely injured.
6. Failure to initiate in time and to prosecute vigorously the campaign to organize the unorganized in Western Pennsylvania prior to the calling of the April 6th Strike and for the formation of a new union.

TO BE CONTINUED

HELP PUBLISH THE SUPPRESSED DOCUMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION!

The Editors of The Militant are undertaking the task of publishing all the suppressed documents of the Russian Opposition, a treasure of Leninist literature, in pamphlet form as well as serially in the columns of The Militant. This material throws a Marxian search-light on the historic events of the past five years and draws the necessary deductions for the tactics of the Communists in the great revolutionary struggle which lies ahead. A study of this material, hitherto prevented by its suppression, is indispensable for the education of the Party. Your help is needed in this revolutionary work. Contribute to the fund for the publication of this material and the maintenance of The Militant. Follow the example of a group of Communist workers in New York in pledging a regular contribution weekly or monthly. Use this blank.

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