

that the actions of the party ought not to be called forth by any Tom, Dick or Harry.

We must not be misunderstood. We are not here speaking of conspiracy tactics. It is clear that the taking by surprise of the ruling class by a small minority (Blanquism) not only is impossible today but does not represent the form of the proletarian revolution, which can only be made by the masses. The task of the Communist Party is to become the general staff of the proletariat and prepare them spiritually and materially so that at the time of inevitable conflict with its enemies it shall have grown and become powerful. The Communist Party must take the initiative itself, and as far as conditions make it possible to make the conflict reach a point which gives the proletariat the best possible chances of success. This sentence must also be taken within certain limitations, as the world war and the economic crisis and therewith the present revolutionary period, were dependent factors altogether removed from our influence, the passage, too, of the general crisis to an acute condition of conflict between the classes depend upon factors the influencing of which to a great extent, lies beyond our control. A political party, however, which controls masses of workers can determine whether a situation can be intensified and brought to head.

Serrati's view of the fatalistic coming of the revolution according to which all who want to make the technical preparation for the revolution are branded as

Utopians and ridiculed as "romanticists of the Barricades," represents a typical opportunist distortion of the materialistic conception of history of which the Social-Democrats of all countries made a fairy wand with which they believed that they could fool the proletariat and conceal their own inactivities. For the theory of fatalism expresses the practice of inaction.

When Pannekoek, in his well known polemics against Kautsky, characterized the position of the latter as "the position of passive radicalism and a theory of inactive expectancy" the position of Serrati could not be made clearer than this. It is this "theory of inactive expectancy" which builds the viaduct by which the purest waters of reformism are conducted to the centrists.

The distinction between Serrati and that of frank opportunism, consists merely in this, that the opportunists still hope to be able to avert the revolution and consequently come out openly against it, while Serrati seeing that the revolution is inevitable now wants to co-operate with the reformists in order to make the revolution a painless process, although he must realize that co-operation with the reformists must divest the revolution of its Communist character.

Nevertheless, how far Serrati has approached the opportunist stand can be seen from the cautious clause appearing in his letter that "*those Socialist followers are to be drawn from the revolution which is possible only according to the times and the surroundings.*" One can readily

understand Renner and Seitz who declared after the November revolution in Austria that the conditions of the times and the surroundings made possible only a coalition with the Christian Socialists. Perhaps Serrati does not mean this in as complete a sense as Renner and Seitz in Austria, and as Turatti and Modigliani in Italy would interpret it. When, however, one is asked by his comrades to explain his views of the position to be taken by the party during a crisis, one should not express himself in the manner of the oracle of Delphi.

After these more or less veiled acknowledgments of opportunist-centrism Serrati still dares to refer to his intransigence as against Lenin's "opportunism" because on the question of the entrance of the Communist Party of England into the British Labor Party, the agrarian question and the colonial and national question he stood in opposition, an intransigence which, nevertheless confined itself merely to England, Asia, and Africa, but led him in Italy to create and lead a faction for the unity of the party with the opportunists.

In this new position, G. M. Serrati is too little known in other countries, which still see in him the unfrightened revolutionist of the war period. Only the right wing of the Independent Socialist Party of Germany properly and readily estimated his worth. At the Congress at Halle Crispian, Hilferding and Dittman continually appealed to Serrati for support and with unerring instinct they made Serrati, the Italian authority for their Kautskyism.

Soviet Russia's Concessions to Capitalism.

By KARL RADEK

WHEN the working class of Russia took over power in November, 1917, neither the bourgeois nor the Socialist world believed that it would maintain the state power for three months, let alone three years and more.

That German imperialism dealt with Soviet Russia in general was but the result of its straightened condition because of the war. It wanted to conclude peace in the East, even with an entirely transitory government, in the well founded belief that when the Bolsheviks disappeared the peasants could not organize a party or a government at any time within sight.

Soviet Russia, however, had to have peace, not only because it had no army but because it could only become a reality if it had a breathing space. At the time of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations Soviet Russia was only a program; it existed

only in the decrees announced by the Council of People's Commissaries.

At that time the underground organs of Czarist absolutism were not completely destroyed, nor was feudal possession rooted out. The forms of Soviet government in country and city appeared still as experiments not as organized realities.

The Bolshevik Government had the choice either of being a government of revolutionary partisans carrying on a guerilla war with the aid of the Allies against German imperialism and permitting Russian capital to accomplish its restoration under the protection of German bayonets, or else treating the Brest road of Golgotha, at the price of national humiliation, to accomplish first of all the work of defeating the bourgeoisie and of organizing the proletariat.

When the fools among the German Independents still speak of an illusory

foreign policy of the Soviet Government (after their own November experiences they ought to keep to themselves the charge of "disorganization" of the Russian army by the Bolsheviks), then indeed, these bankrupt Wilsonians cannot be helped.

That the policy of the Soviet Government, which was based on the conviction that the process of breaking up world imperialism would not be retarded by the Brest peace but would be accelerated, was correct, showed not only its triumph but also that Soviet Russia, though in a position between the devil and the deep blue sea, could so collect and organize itself that one year after the collapse of German imperialism it wrested the acknowledgment from the representatives of the victorious Entente imperialism that "Bolshevism could not be crushed by the sword."