

nor Semba nor Varenne. But we have Karl Liebknecht. He also was a member of parliament. The capitalist and social-patriotic rabble tried to drown his voice. But the few words of denunciation and appeal which he succeeded in throwing out over the heads of the German oppressors awakened the class consciousness of hundreds of thousands of German workers. From parliament Karl Liebknecht went out to the Potsdam square calling the proletarian masses to an open fight. From the square he was taken to prison, from there he went on to the barricades of the revolution. An ardent partisan of the Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat, he considered it necessary to take part in the elections to the German Constituent Assembly, and at the same time he was organizing Communist soldiers. He perished at his revolutionary post. Who was Karl Liebknecht? A syndicalist? A parliamentarian? Journalist? No, he was a revolutionary Communist who finds his way to the proletariat through all obstacles. He appealed to the syndicates denouncing the German Jouaux and Merheims. He conducted the work of the party among the soldiers, preparing the uprising. He published revolutionary newspapers and appeals, lawful and illegal. He went into parliament to serve the same cause which at other hours he served in secret.

So long as the prime of the French proletariat will not create for itself a centralized Communist Party it will not gain possession of the state power, it will not suppress the bourgeois police, the bourgeois army and private ownership of the means of production. And without all this... the workshop will never supplant the state. Whoever has not mastered this after the Russian revolution, is altogether hopeless. But even after the victorious uprising will have given the state power into the hands of the proletariat, the latter will not be able to liquidate the state immediately, by transferring the legislative power into the hands of the proletariat, the latter will not be able to liquidate the state immediately, by transferring the legislative power to the syndicates. The syndicates are the organizers of the higher stratifications of workers according to the trades and industries. The ruling power must voice the revolutionary interests and needs of the working class as a whole. That is why not syndicates, but Soviets must be an organ of proletarian dictatorship, because they are elected by all the workers, including millions of such of them who never belonged to any unions and who have been awakened for the very first time by the revolution. And it is not enough to elect Soviets. It is necessary that Soviets should carry on a definite revolutionary policy. They must clearly distinguish between friends and foes. They must be capable of decisive, and if need be, relentless measures. The bourgeoisie, as the experience of the Russian revolution and the Hungarian and Bavarian as well, shows, does not lay down its arms after the first defeat. On the contrary, when it begins to see, how much it has lost, its despair doubles and trebles its energy. The Soviet regime is that of a harsh struggle against the counter revolution, both in its own and foreign countries. Who will be able to give the Soviets elected by the workers of different degrees of class consciousness a clear and distinct programme of action? Who will help them to make distinctions among the confused and tangled international conditions and choose the right way? Evidently, only the more class-conscious, more experienced advanced proletarians closely united by their single programme. This is the Communist Party.

Some simpletons (or perhaps they are the sly ones) point out with horror that in Russia the Party is "in command" over the Soviets and Labor unions. "The French syndicates—say some syndicates—demand independence and they will not suffer that any party should be in command over them." How then, dear friend, I repeat—do the French syndicates allow Jouaux to command them, Jouaux—a direct agent of French and American capital? The formal independence of the French syndicates does not preserve them from being under the command of the bourgeoisie. The Russian syndicates desisted from such independence. They overthrew the bourgeoisie. They achieved this by driving away from their midst such gentlemen as Jouaux, Merheim, Dumoulin and replacing them by loyal experience and reliable fighters, that is, Communists. In this way they guaranteed not only their independence of the bourgeoisie, but their victory over the latter. It is quite correct that our party is leading the labor unions, the Soviets. Was it always so? No—the party acquired its leading position during the constant struggle against the petty bourgeois parties—the Mensheviks, Social-revolutionists, and against the non-party, i. e. backward or unprincipled elements. It is true, the Mensheviks whom we have defeated say that we obtain our majorities by "force." But how do the working masses, who have overthrown the rule of the Czar, and afterwards that of the bourgeoisie and the coalition government, although the latter all possessed the apparatus of force, how do they now not only suffer the "enforced" power of the Communist Party, leading the Soviets, but they are even entering our ranks in ever greater numbers? This is to be explained exclusively by the fact that during the course of the last years the Russian working class has passed through a great experience and has had occasion to verify

in practice the policy of the various parties, groups, cliques, and to collate their words and actions, and thus come to the final conclusion that the only party which has remained true to itself at all moments of the revolution, during failure as well as success, was and remains the Communist Party. It is only natural that at all elections, meetings of workers, labor conferences the masses elect Communists to the most responsible posts. This is how the leading role of the Communist Party is to be explained.

At the given moment the revolutionary syndicalists, or more rightly, the Communists like Monatte, Rosmer and others constitute a minority within the limits of syndicalist organizations. They are in the opposition, criticising and denouncing the machinations of ruling majority, which is carrying through reformist, that is to say, purely bourgeois tendencies. The French Communists occupy the same position within the limits of the Socialist Party, which is supporting the ideas of petty-bourgeois reformism.

Have Monatte and Jouaux the same syndicalist policy? Nay, they are enemies. One of them serves the proletariat, the other carries through bourgeois tendencies in a masked form. Have Lorient and Renaudel-Longuet the same policy? No, one is leading the proletariat to a revolu-

tionary dictatorship, the other is subordinating the working masses to a national bourgeois democracy.

In what then does the policy of Monatte differ from that of Lorient? Only in one thing, namely, that Monatte chiefly in political organizations. But it is only a simple distribution of labor. A bona fide revolutionary syndicalist of labor. A bona fide revolutionary Socialist must become united in a Communist Party. They must cease to be in the opposition within other organizations. They must, as an independent organization, adhering to the banner of the Third International, stand face to face with the broader masses, give clear and precise answers to all their questions, be the leaders of their struggle, directing it on its way to a Communist revolution. Syndicalist organizations, cooperative stores, political organizations, the parliamentary tribune, municipalities, etc., etc.—all these are only organization forms, practical methods, different points of support. The struggle remains the same as to its substance, whatever branch it may occupy. The bearer of this struggle is the working class. Its leading advance guard is the Communist Party, in which the bona fide revolutionary syndicalists should occupy a place of honor.

Yours,

L. TROTSKY.

The Situation in Eastern Asia.

by R. Member of the Korean Socialist Party

CHINA.

The war between North and South China is continuing endlessly. The conferences convened several times for the purpose of establishing normal relations between both parts of China have not brought any positive results. Moreover, in consequence of financial difficulties, both the warring governments cannot develop the offensive and thus promptly put an end to the miserable conditions under which the long suffering Chinese people are living; at the same time Japan and the European powers which are interested in the Chinese civil war are assisting both sides and are the chief cause of the continuation of the war. The split between the North and South is rendered more acute by the circumstances that the military circles of the government of Peking, paying no attention to public opinion, are realizing a military dictatorship within the country and contending to carry on a coalition policy with Japan, whose main object is to oppress and weaken the Chinese nation. In connection with the Shantung question the popular indignation against the Peking government is fast increasing and the hatred of Japan growing ever stronger, including all the classes of the Chinese people, except the official functionaries and the military, who have united in a group called "An-Fu." At the head of the anti-governmental and anti-Japanese movement is the progressive youth—the Chinese studentry. The boycott of Japanese goods by the Chinese merchants is continuing now for two years and is especially felt in South China. Japan tried to stop this movement by all the means in her power, demanding that the Peking government should adopt decisive measures and enforcing her demands by threats. But becoming convinced that the Peking government was powerless to stop the anti-Japanese movement Japan decided to use other methods of struggle. She artfully made use of the power-loving Cossack hetman Semenov for her own interests, by putting him forward as a pretender to the title of "Grand Duke" of "independent Mongolia." On the other hand she tried to awaken the fears of the Peking government by predicting a "Russian invasion of Mongolia" advising the government to adopt defensive measures against the "Russian Bolshevik invasion" and promising to help China financially in the struggle against Mongolia's attempts at independence supposed to be supported by Russia, and for the reconstruction of a railway between Kolgan and Urga. The Peking government dispatched a detachment of troops to Mongolia under the command of General Sui-Su-Tsian, who occupied Urga and by an order received from Peking deprived Mongolia of the right of self-government. But after the Chinese occupation of Mongolia Japan completely changed her tactics. She began to put off indefinitely the fulfilment of her promise of financial assistance, as in reality she had only desired to divert the attention of Chinese society from Shantung, and to direct it towards Mongolia. In this skilful diplomatic strategy she attained quite satisfactory results. Such Semenovs and the Chinese "An-Fuists" in their striving after fictitious power are often simply pawns in the game of Japanese diplomacy. In agreeing to advance a loan to the Peking government for the construction of a railway, Japan proffered the three following demands:

1. All measures of a political-economic nature in Manchuria and Mongolia are to be introduced only subject to the approval of Japan.
2. All the finished and unfinished railways which are now under the temporary control of Japan are to be placed under the jurisdiction of Japan.
3. The Chinese government must guarantee that it will never proceed to the construction of a railway line between the towns Tkhlo-Nan and Jrie-He in the north-west direction to the railway line Kolgan-Urga.

South China, desirous of establishing a Democratic republican order in the country, is struggling against the invasion of all foreigners and particularly the Japanese. The head of the South Government is Tian-Chun-Sian. Without any considerable military forces, not yet recognized by the other powers and torn by intrigues in its own midst, the South Government is becoming exhausted in the fruitless struggle. However, according to latest information the troops of the South have carried a victory over those of Peking.

In Tibet the situation is growing acute owing to the intrigues of the British government which is instigating the local population to insubordination against the Peking government. At the present moment the Tibetan question is one of the chief puzzles in the Far East.

Shanghai is now playing the role of centre in the political life of Eastern Asia, therefore it is also the centre of the Chinese Social movement. Sun-Yat-Tsen is working there, and is practically the leader of the Chinese Youth, which is growing more and more Left Wing. He personifies the intellectual forces of the Chinese revolutionary movement, in particular the anti-Japanese movement. Sun-Yat-Tsen is especially valuable to us in that he was the first to understand clearly the incapacity for state construction of the old Chinese aristocracy infected by Asiatic stagnation and feudal traditions, and he has desisted from all hopes in the possibility of evolving a revolutionary creative power from the elements of the old world. But as an intellectual man he cannot break abruptly and completely with the past, so long as the outlines of the new world are not quite clearly defined in the mists of the future. With all his genius of mind and talents as a statesman and reformer, he is not able to steer resolutely and firmly his political ship to meet the advancing wave in spite of all difficulties and submarine reefs which must inevitably turn up on the long revolutionary road leading to the bright ideal of liberated mankind. The political horizon of China is not clear yet. A bright torch is urgently necessary to dispense the darkness and become the guiding star for the advanced thinkers of revolutionary China. Soviet Russia and the Communist International must help the Chinese intellectual revolutionist by teaching him the simple, clear, proletarian tactics in the internal doctrinary-political struggle, so that he could break all connections, not only with the old past of his own country, but with the entire bourgeois world and undeviatingly adopt the point of view of the Communist International. It is necessary to explain to him the great truth of which we are deeply convinced that the liberation of China and of whole enslaved Asia is possible only if the ideals of the proletariat will triumph. At the same time, while consequentially carrying on our revolutionary policy in the East, we must take account of the peculiarities of Chinese culture. At present there are four or five Socialist papers published in China, the two principal ones are: "I-Shi-Bo" in Peking and "Dui-Guo-Jiboo" in Shanghai.

With the actual political situation, in China the South is naturally nearer to comrade Arinzo Sun-Yat-Tsen than the reactionary North. However, in watching attentively the work of Sun-Yat-Tsen during the last period it is easy to perceive that in directing the anti-Japanese movement by means of the Studentry (Japan being the most openly barefaced enemy of China) he is hoping to win the sympathies and confidence of the wider circles of the popular masses in order to carry out a third revolution for the overthrow of the power of the feudal nobility and the official functionaries. We must take advantage of this movement, we must render all moral and material assistance to the advent to the joyful day of the victory of the Third Chinese Revolution.