

## As to Party Funds

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The situation in the party was of such a character that large sections of the membership were unwilling to intrust any money to the control of the majority of the Central Executive Committee and it was only through the Executive Secretary giving his personal guarantee that the funds would be properly administered that money was paid over to the National Organization. Under these circumstances the Executive Secretary could not and would not turn the funds over to the Central Executive Committee majority, even if there were no other reasons for withholding them.

Another fact to be considered in this connection is that the greater part of the money in the hands of the Executive Secretary had come from the Chicago District. This was not only true in regard to the money loaned but the collections for dues, organization stamps and defense fund stamps in the Chicago District were nearly equal to the collection from all other districts combined. The Chicago District Committee had turned in this money on the personal guarantee of the Executive Secretary that it would be correctly administered and the Executive Secretary would have been untrue to this trust had he permitted this money to fall in the hands of the "majority" of the C. E. C.

Although the "minority" group has the support of the greater part of the party membership, the "majority" of the C. E. C. has secured for its own use a larger part of the funds of the party than is under control of the "minority", when the obligations for loans are deducted. A sum of \$1,000 had been appropriated for a certain purpose but was not used for that purpose and this was returned to the acting secretary for the

"Majority." The Russian Federation had not paid the party for dues stamps sold in December and owed between eight to twelve hundred dollars on this account and this has been paid to the acting secretary of the "Majority." In other words the "Majority" group received approximately \$2,000 of the party funds, whereas over and above loans which it is obligated to repay the "minority" holds about \$1500.

## Costs Of Strikes.

A New York bank figures the cost of our 1919 strikes at \$2,000,000,000. Of this total \$750,000,000 is stated as loss in wages, \$1,250,000,000 as loss to the industries. Indirect costs, due to higher prices, higher rents on account of stoppage of building, was not estimated.

These figures are obviously inaccurate, because the normal capitalistic interruptions of production would probably have created a large part of the loss in wages anyhow. There is no free, maximum production under capitalism, so that it is likewise inaccurate to assume a loss of the potential output during the work time lost. For example, the steel industry, in spite of the world needs for steel, was probably ready for a curtailment of production because of the inability of foreign customers to pay or give satisfactory assurances of future payment. The coal industry only operates intermittently under normal conditions, so that the operators likely sustained no losses which are not perhaps to be more than offset by the higher prices.

The significant thing is not the monetary calculation, fundamentally unsound, but the condition of anarchy in the economic system which is indicated by these strikes. The cry is for "arbitration," for "industrial courts," for laws against strikes, for

organization of the middle classes against the organized workers.

The Communists realize that these strikes are an inherent part of capitalism itself, just as imperialistic wars are inherent in capitalism. No mandates, no coercion, no schemes will abate these strikes. — Nothing short of elimination of the root cause, the system of production for profit.

Communism proposes to give to these strikes an affirmative, militant character, directing them to the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism.

## New Offensive Against Soviet Russia

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mainstay of reaction and its leader the world over. It is to the British workers therefore that a most important part in this struggle will fall. Let us firmly resolve of us to do our duty.

Be prepared for a general strike against the coming attack on Soviet-Russia.

Answer the Polish - French - American - Finnish - British - Hungarian - Roumanian - Japanese etc. offensive by a mass-movement the world over in all countries and with one common purpose: the rescue of Soviet-Russia and of the world out of the hell of Imperialism unto the new life built up by labor for labor.

For the Amsterdam Sub-Bureau  
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## The Coming Elections

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on the ground that it violates the provision in our Party program against making nominations for executives.

But the stubborn fact is that under the conditions of the Presidential elections in general, and under the prevailing conditions of our Party in particular, there can be no real campaign without a Presidential candidate. I would much sooner see no local candidate at all than making no nomination for President. It is absurd, moreover, to argue that our candidate may have to assume responsibility for the acts of the bourgeois state — such an argument makes absurd the Party's conception concerning executive offices.

The Party must discourage becoming so absorbed in a theory as to develop mongers of phrases instead of doers of deeds.

Theory is not action, but the means to action.

Moreover, the nomination of C. E. Ruthenberg (who in every sense is the logical candidate) would be a revolutionary challenge, considering his innumerable arrests and the fact that now there are four indictments against him and prospects of 30 to 40 years in prison — a challenge none the less real because only of moral value.

Active Communist Party participation in the campaign would:

a) prove an enormous agitational factor.

b) Constitute a means of action against him and prospects of 30 to 40 years in prison — a challenge none the less real because only of moral value.

c) Prove of real value as an answer to the reaction and the repression, impart an impulse to the Party's recovery, unify the Party and contribute to making it an aggressive factor in the struggle.

The Communist Party is in a favorable or unfavorable position — accordingly—to the measure in which it combines concepts and practice, theory and realism.

Not a single opportunity for struggle must be avoided. Not a single means of action in accord with our tasks and our principles must be missed. The test of a Party's revolutionary integrity is not the formal, mechanical adherence to a Program, but the capacity to use programs for purposes of revolutionary action.

Berlin — March 10, 1900.