

# PARTY MATTER

## SOME DECISIONS OF THE LAST C. E. C. MEETING

**JEWISH FEDERATION QUESTION**  
(EXTRACTS FROM THE MINUTES)

1. Not being opposed to the Jewish branches which took the side of the "majority" holding a convention of their own, we instruct these branches not to participate in any convention together with Jewish branches which have taken a definite stand with the "minority."

2. To appoint a provisional committee to organize the "majority" groups of the Jewish Federation with instructions to issue in Jewish translations of the statement and other important C. E. C. communications relating to the present split in the party.

3. To instruct the Jewish Provisional Committee to call as soon as possible and practicable, a convention of all those branches of the Communist Party who will re-affirm their affiliation with and allegiance to, the Party as represented by its C. E. C.

4. That the Jewish Provisional Committee work under the supervision and control of the C. E. C. of the Party, and that its members cannot be members of any official body of the former Jewish Federation at same time; and, if they are now, they should immediately upon acceptance of their appointment withdraw.

### QUESTION OF FORMER EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

That we instruct the Executive Council to issue and publish a resolution branding former Executive Secretary Damon for all his treacherous acts against the Party,—for his seizure of Party funds and records, for continuing to sign as the Executive Secretary without any authority, for issuing his paper under the Party name and Seal, etc., etc.

### INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1. To write to the Amsterdam Bureau repudiating as entirely unauthorized, the participation of N. . . . . in the Feb. 3-8 International Conference at Amsterdam, in the name of the Communist Party of America.

2. L. Frajna theses on "The Coming Elections," proposed for discussion and action by the Communist Party.

After some discussion the following resolution was adopted unanimously:

"Whereas, recommendation in the letter of Comrade L. Frajna of March 10, 1920, to nominate and campaign for a presidential candidate is contradictory to Communist principles and tactics as enunciated and incorporated in the Communist Party program and tactics adopted at the First Convention of the Party; and, Whereas, besides being against a change in the program along the line suggested by Comrade L. Frajna, the C. E. C. of C. P. has no authority to make such a change;—

Therefore, be it resolved to refer Comrade Frajna's letter to the coming Party Convention for consideration under the proper order of business.

### COMING PARTY CONVENTION

Tentative order of business (Agenda) drawn up for the coming convention (printed on first page), to be submitted through regular party channels for discussion among the groups, branches, sub-districts and district electors meeting.

Note: Other decisions pertaining to the coming Party convention are being transmitted to membership through regular Party channels.

### REPORT OF DISTRICT ORGANIZERS AND FEDERATIONS

**District 1 (New England).**  
Entire District Committee with exception of Jewish, with the C. E. C. Lowell, Haverhill and Lawrence English groups with the C. E. C. Polish comrades with C. E. C. Comrade Smith (former District Organizer) now organizer for English groups in District, working under supervision of District Organizer. About twenty four Letts with "minority" and elected 7 electors to "minority" district convention. C. L. P. in Mass. knew of split even before the District Comm. "Minority" statements and papers are distributed in this District through C. L. P. channels. All other party units with C. E. C.

**District 2 (New York, New Jersey, Conn.).**  
District Committee with C. E. C. Sub-district Committee of N. Y. City, Upper N. Y. State, Conn.

and New Jersey with C. E. C. membership in Conn., Upper N. Y. State and New Jersey solidly with C. E. C. About 60% of English groups in New York City with C. E. C. and of the remaining 40% many are still neutral with a few groups for "minority." Estonian branch and about five German branches with "minority" in New York City. No information about Polish branches, as there seems to be a split in the Polish Federation C. E. C. Jewish br. 50-50. Remaining membership with C. E. C. comprising about 90% of the district.

### District 3 (Eastern Penn.).

Out of nine hundred members only a little over one hundred (mostly Jewish and a few Germans and Estonians with "minority.") Russian District Convention with C. E. C. Baltimore Sub-district sent in resolution against "minority." Lithuanians also with C. E. C.

### District 4A and 4B (Pittsburg and Cleveland).

Pittsburg 25 branch organizers solidly with C. E. C. at meeting where Damon spoke, with exception of one South Slavic organizer, but So. Slavs are splitting. Cleveland, Damon's stronghold, Letts turned back to C. E. C. after hearing report of Federation representative. 30 Lithuanian groups withdrew their delegates to "minority" convention. Germans not all lost. About 50% in Cleveland with C. E. C.

### District 4C (Detroit).

District Committee, including Jewish with C. E. C. Fisher ("minority") was able to get only 12-Estonian, 20 German, 15 Armenian members and Lithuanian representative to go with him in entire district. But Lithuanians are all with C. E. C. All others with C. E. C.

### District 5 (Illinois, etc.).

Membership led into split blindly—did not know any facts. Letts in Chicago solidly with C. E. C. Russians will stand with C. E. C. in Chicago; at their Sub-district conference they voted 5 for C. E. C. 8 for neutrality and 5 not voting. None for "minority."

Lithuanians and Ukrainians O. K.; stronghold branch of Jewish Federation in Chicago with C. E. C. Polish Federation C. E. C. decided against taking part in the "minority" convention (4 to 3); Kenosha, Milwaukee and Racine with C. E. C. Minneapolis Letts with C. E. C. Kansas City not with "minority." Defense Committee of Chicago, with about \$1300.00 in hands of Isaacs.

### RUSSIAN FEDERATION

All District Conventions (except Boston which is neutral—in principles with C. E. C.—and Chicago District Convention not yet held but in process of turning back to their Federation) with the C. E. C. Milwaukee, Kansas City, Kenosha and St. Louis with C. E. C. Central Committee of Russian Federation issued ultimatum to all branches to take definite stand with C. E. C. or would be expelled. Initiated Federations Conference with the result that Russian, Lettish, Ukrainian and Lithuanian Federations adopted strong resolution for C. E. C. and against the "minority."

### LITHUANIAN FEDERATION

Sold with C. E. C. Some branches elected delegates to "minority" withdrew their delegates when informed of the facts.

### LETTISH FEDERATION

All branches solidly with C. E. C. and fighting the "minority." In Cleveland they withdrew from "minority" upon report of their Federation representative. Chicago same.

### UKRAINIAN FEDERATION

Representative unavoidably absent (missed address). But report from Federation is excellent. Whole Federation solidly with C. E. C.

### "MAJORITY" ELEMENTS OF JEWISH FEDERATION

A representative from the "majority" elements of the Jewish Federation was present unofficially and reported that Jewish Federation is splitting despite neutrality of its C. E. C. In New York, only the Harlem and West End Branch with "minority." The other New York branches (2 or 3 branches) with "majority." Detroit and Paterson with "majority." Chicago largest and best branch with "majority." In Philadelphia most of Jewish members with "minority." Prospects good for a strong Jewish Communist Federation.

## POLICY OF ENGLAND

(Continued from page 2.)

demobilization of the armies had put social problems as the "next order of business," when revolutionary fermentation among the workers had shown to the English Government that the victorious countries were themselves not free from the menace of Bolshevism—then the struggle against Soviet Russia took on primarily a social character.

The capitalist class of England decided to crush Soviet Russia as the center of the world revolution. Even then Lloyd George doubted the possibility of armed victory over Soviet Russia, but the majority of the English bourgeoisie, blinded by their hatred and fear, took the point of view expressed by the first councillor of the British Embassy at Petrograd, Mr. Lanley, in his letter to Curzon in these words: "They should be treated as pariahs."

The crushing defeats of Kolchak, Yudenitch and Denikine by the Red Army proved to the English bourgeoisie how right was Lloyd George when he opposed the military adventure. The English bourgeoisie understood then that it would not succeed in crushing directly the revolutionary center in the East. She then decided to turn her energies to crushing the revolutionary elements at home. Succeeding there, she would have time enough to turn her attention to Soviet Russia later.

From this point of view, the change in the English policy towards Russia in military terms signifies the following: Since to a great extent the offensive on Soviet Russia failed because an ally of Soviet Russia was working in the rear of English Imperialism—the English working class—English Imperialism decided to strengthen its rear for the present through a victory over the English workers. To attain this victory—and here we are dealing with the peculiar flexibility of English politics—English Imperialism decided to utilize precisely peace relations with Soviet Russia. Establishment of peace relations is intended to pacify the English workers united under the slogan: "Hands off Soviet Russia," and is also intended to lay the foundation for a lasting pacification of the English proletariat.

The main reason for the peaceful character of the English labor movement during the last decade has been the low prices for the means of existence. Parallel to the growth of high cost of living during the last years before the war was a growing fermentation and unrest among the English workers. The main source of the present revolutionary fermentation in England is the rise of prices after the conclusion of peace. One of the

reasons for this rise in prices is the American monopoly of bread and raw materials. Should English Imperialism succeed in reorganizing the Russian transportation system and in receiving cheap bread from Russia in exchange for industrial products, it hopes to master the revolutionary crisis at home.

But does it not raise before the leaders of English Imperialism the question of the possibility of strengthening Soviet Russia by coming to an agreement with it? To this question asked of Lloyd George by a portion of the bourgeois press he gives an answer which reduces itself to the following: "It is impossible to build anything stable on the basis of Communism; Society can exist only on the basis of private property and private initiative. The Communist danger lies not in that Communism may forever replace capitalist society but in the destructiveness of revolutions. After the period of destruction, however, each country returns to capitalism. And Russia will also return to it, and return the sooner it will enter into commercial relations with the capitalist world. Through the "concessionaire" factories, foreign capitalists will prove to the Russian workers that capitalism is better than Communism. Should the blockade be lifted, commerce will be carried on not only with the Soviet Government; speculators (profiteers) will be able to build secret apparatus of commerce with foreign capital which will destroy the whole economic policy of the Soviet Power. And should the Soviet Power—unconquerable by force of arms—not have crumbled in a peaceful economic struggle, it must regenerate, become a power, reconciling the interests of the capitalistic farmer with the interests of the worker on the basis of exchange economics. Thus, by concluding peace with Soviet Russia it is possible to hope for success in the struggle not only against the English, but also against the Russian revolution."

This is the trend of thought of the leaders of English Imperialism while entering into relations with us. Not considering it our duty to enlighten the English ministers, we may decline to criticize their opinions which we only cited in order to show our readers the reasons of the English peace policy toward Russia.

### ENGLISH PEACE—IS A CONTINUATION OF ENGLISH WAR AGAINST SOVIET RUSSIA WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ECONOMIC WEAPONS.

The possibility of a victory or defeat of English policy depends upon the degree of disorganization of the capitalist economic system of England and the organization of the Communist economic system of Russia.

(Translated from the Moscow "Pravda," No. 81, of April 17, 1920.)

After the S. P. Convention no one need be in doubt as to what Hilquit meant when he once said: "We will fight like tigers on the barricades." For further particulars apply to Ebert, Scheidemann-Noske & Co., Berlin.

Seven thousand dollars is a high price to pay for getting rid of Damon, Isaacs, Langley & Co.—but the members must bear in mind the High Cost of Splitting this year.

Except for Damon's stealing of party funds and property the whole affair would be "side-splitting."

The only difference between Harold Lord Varney and Isaacs (Y. P.) is—Varney got ten cents a word for his.

"The Toller," official organ of the C. L. P. of Ohio, invites Engdall, Kruse, Tucker & Co. to unite with them; the "Communist Labor," official organ of the N. E. C. of the C. L. P., invites Damon, Isaacs, Langley & Co. to unite with them. Which, reminds us of the watchword of the Independants of Germany: "Widest possible fraternity to Right and Left, but preservation of principle." The P in preservation is silent, of course.

"Members of the Communist Labor Party whose love for Debs overshadows their loyalty to Communist principles should, in justice to our party and to themselves, resign from the Communist Labor Party." Extract from a declaration adopted May 1st by the N. E. C. of the C. L. P. Suggestion to the C. L. P. for their next convention: Elect Debs on their N. E. C. and preserve the membership of their party.

The funny thing about these unity fiends is that the only thing that they can agree upon is unity, and in order to have "unity" as a constant issue, they can never "unite," since no two of them agree upon anything more fundamental than "unity." (From the Cleveland District Organizer.)

## CONVENTION CALL

(Continued from page 5.)

in this manner, and AT THE CONVENTION CALLED BY THE C. E. C. can all real Communist forces be brought together into one party convention.

DON'T BE FOOLED BY THE BRIBE OF AN "IMMEDIATE" CONVENTION THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO CONFUSE THE ISSUES.

Wait for the convention call to be issued by the C. E. C. giving all necessary data as to time, place and method of elections (consistent with the proper secrecy which must be maintained in order to make the convention a success). The party units will receive full information through the regular party channels.

WAIT FOR THE CONVENTION CALL OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

(Signed) Central Executive Committee of The Communist Party, D. Hunter, Acting Secretary.

## A SIGNIFICANT LETTER

(Continued from page 3.)

It had not a purely mendicant character, then both Comrade Martens and his Bureau would have become the center of proletarian spirit and sympathy (though undoubtedly, he would have lost a great deal of sympathy of liberals and highly-situated personages); the activity of the Bureau would not go on so listlessly and colorlessly with such deep indifference to it from the even more conscious elements of the masses of the working class (we are not speaking here of the party elements). True, it is quite possible, that he might have been deported much earlier than he may be under the present circumstances (if at all),—but then, his deportation, and the very preparations for it—his examination, trials, etc., etc.—would not have passed so unnoticed and so quietly as is now the case...

But alas! Instead of the uncompromising Communist way, Comrade Martens chose the humiliating way of compromise and backstairs diplomacy. Instead of listening to Communist organizations, he selected as his political advisers and guides such "opportunists of the worst kind" as Comrade Rutgers puts it, as Nuorteva, Hilquit and others (we are not referring in this instance to non-partisan "experts," whose work in the Soviet Bureau is limited by the more or less narrow sphere of their specialties and who do not interfere with the political activities of the Bureau). Those—pardon the expression—"political advisers" were directing the whole activities of the Bureau, spoke in the name of and for Comrade Martens, showed him off to Senators whenever they found it necessary,—in a word, conducted themselves in the Bureau as if everything in it, including Comrade Martens himself, was their property...

And lately, these "political advisers" becoming bolder, openly (secretly they were doing this all the time) used their prestige and connections with the Bureau in the service of a contemptible, slanderous campaign carried on by the Right Wing Socialists—in approved Scheidemann fashion—against the Communist Party and its leading figures; contaminating whatever they touch, these advisers from the camp of the putrescent Socialist Party of America, are poisoning with their breath even the Soviet Bureau, putting it in danger of becoming the center of Scheidemannism of the worst kind!

Whether the Soviet Bureau will escape the danger threatening it, whether it changes its "line of behavior,"—we don't undertake to predict. Only the future will show. This will depend to a great extent of course, upon whether or not the same "political advisers" and pilots will remain at the helm of the Bureau...

As to the question of a "capitalist peace" between the United States (and other capitalist countries) and Soviet Russia, to which Comrad Rutgers refers in his letter, we reserve this for a special article at some future date.

\*\*The reader will find references to this question in the International Secretary's report published in the last issue and to the Thesis on May 1st which due to lack of space, will be published in the Supplement.