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view is nothing but the "regurgitation" of the attitude of the "heroes" of the infamous 2d International.

If there is one outstanding difference between the 2d and the 3d International—aside from the vital difference in principles and tactics—it is, that the 3d—*Communist*—International, must be, and is a living and vital organism, actually functioning in the world-revolutionary movement, guiding and shaping the policies of Communist Parties in all countries.

According to this, the only real Communist point of view, not only must the Communist Party see to it that it has actual physical contact with the 3d International, through the sending of its full quota of delegates to all Communist International Conferences and Congresses—but it is one of the highest duties to the 3d International to make every effort to be actually represented, and actively participating in the work of, those conferences and congresses.

These Conferences and Congresses undoubtedly affect the policies and tactics of Communism in all the countries affiliated with it. They not only provide for exchange of information and experience at their meetings, but on the basis of this, formulate policies and a common course of action for all Communist parties. The Communist parties of all countries must be nothing more or less than branches of one, strong, highly centralized, harmoniously-working proletarian International.

In this International, mere correspondence and "red tape" cannot replace actual physical meetings of delegates. Only the merest tyro, the unsophisticated neophyte in the Communist movement can hold a different point of view.

In conformity with this point of view, the Communist Party of America at its first convention elected an International Secretary and four International Delegates. By this, the Communist Party showed that it wished to take its rightful place in the 3d International IN FACT, and not merely by resolutions on paper. So strong was this attitude, that the convention elected its full quota and not merely a perfunctory one or two. It even elected its full quota of alternates, in case some of the delegates elected would, by unforeseen circumstances, be prevented from attending.

In this connection it should be borne in mind, that the meetings of the 3d International—which the capitalist governments use every means from taking place—cannot be held at stated times. Travel is long and difficult under these circumstances, and information regarding such meeting must, of necessity, be at hand at the earliest possible time, and be secret, in order to facilitate the realization and success of the meetings, and to protect the delegates and the meetings as well.

Nevertheless the "minority" strenuously opposed the sending of the International Secretary immediately to establish connections in Europe and go on to Moscow,—but were overruled by the "majority." At the same meeting of the C. E. C., again in spite of the opposition of the "minority," to send two of the delegates elected by the convention as those who should proceed to Europe as soon as "further proof" (as if the proof at hand was insufficient) was received that a meeting was to be held. The motion to send them abroad immediately was defeated. And it is these trips to Europe, to attend the International Communist gatherings, that the "minority" characterized at that time—and characterizes even now—as "junketing trips" of "international politicians" for their own pleasure, and against the interests of the party.

The International Secretary finally went abroad. But, by various machinations and intrigues the "minority" succeeded in preventing other delegates from following him.

Surely we need not recite here in detail

the highly important work that our International Secretary has accomplished abroad in the interest of the Communist Party of America particularly, and in the interest of the Communist movement in general.

The report of the Holland Conference is eloquent testimony on this score. Suffice it to mention his thesis on *Unionism*, which he introduced by instruction by the C. E. C. and which has contributed greatly towards clarifying that question.

His thesis on *Social-Patriots and Unity of the Party* has also been of tremendous importance, clearing up the attitude of the 3d International towards the Centrist parties which seek to swamp it and thus destroy its revolutionary effectiveness. The adoption of this thesis shuts the door to the Independents of Germany, the French Centrists led by Longuet, the Labor Party of Great Britain, the American Socialist Party, the Socialist Labor Party of America, etc.

Lastly, the instruction to the Communist Party to organize, provisionally, a Pan-American Bureau, is a direct result of the International Secretary's presence there.

Were it not for the foresight of the "majority" even the International Secretary's trip would have been cancelled and the party would have had no representation at that Conference whatever.

But the "minority" even at this time, in spite of the services rendered to the party, by the participation of the International Secretary in the Amsterdam Conference, dares to continue its attacks and slanders on the "majority," and even upon the International Secretary himself as one of the "majority."

*Mass Action.*

Another vital and fundamental difference that arose between the "majority" and "minority" was on the question of Mass Action.

The "minority" conceives of Mass Action as of some nebulous economic power of the working class, organized industrially and exerting pressure industrially on the capitalist system, in order to topple it over. They believe that the use of FORCE (armed revolution and civil war) may or may not be necessary in order to accomplish the overthrow of the capitalist state, depending upon circumstances. They are opposed to propagating the inevitability and consequently, the necessity, when the time will come, of the USE OF FORCE to conquer the power of the state,—as "premature" at the present time. They claim they are not even certain on that score, and therefore object to propagating this doctrine to the workers. Mass Action to them means only the use of general strikes and mass demonstrations—they contend that Manifesto and Program, adopted at Chicago, nowhere implies anything else beyond this point.

With this conception of Mass Action the "majority" completely disagrees. Our conception of Mass Action, is that expressed by the Manifesto of the 3d International. We maintain, that if the lessons of the history of all revolutions—and particularly, the proletarian revolutions—means something and teaches us anything (lessons which the 2d International completely failed to learn),—we must propagate to the workers the USE OF FORCE as the ONLY MEANS of conquering the power of the state and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. And that, instead of remaining silent on this question, we must constantly STRESS it, in order to show the workers the utter futility of hoping for any "peaceful revolution," accomplished either through the parliaments, as the opportunistic Socialists teach—or, by mere general strikes, as the syndicalists teach.

Those familiar with the discussion in the Russian Social-Democratic literature on the same subject (some years ago), will easily recognize that the "majority" takes

the same position as the Bolsheviki took at that time; while our friends of the "minority" are innocently repeating the arguments of the Mensheviki . . .

*Language Federations.*

As the climax of the differences between the "majority" and "minority," as expressed in the field of organization problems, the question of language federations recently came to the front again. This time it came in the form of an attempt to change the method of selling dues-stamps to the Federation branches, through the District Organizers, instead of through the Central Executive Committees of the Federations. This was intended to be "the first step in the process of abolishing the federations," as frankly stated by the Executive Secretary of the party, himself the proud author of this motion. It will be well to bear in mind that this is exactly the method of paying dues adopted by the C. L. P., which, as is well known, differs fundamentally with the Communist Party, on the question of federations.

This proposition was defeated both in the Executive Council and in the Central Executive Committee. This defeat intensified the bitterness and opposition already existing towards the "majority" in the ranks of the "minority" . . .

Needless to say, like typical Centrists, the "minority" in their fight against the "majority" evaded the fundamental differences with them, as described above. Instead, they preferred to wage a vicious campaign of personal slander and villification—a method of attack which is characteristic enough not to need any comment.

Their opposition to the stand of the "majority" on principles was camouflaged by reducing them to technicalities of administration routine. Their opposition to federations, for example, was never expressed as such, but was screened behind the technical detail of changing the method of paying dues . . . Their opposition to sending delegates to the International Communist Congress or Conference was masked behind the objection to the use of party funds for "junketing trips" . . . They were opposed to the C. E. C. because the convention was "packed"—because the National Headquarters were removed from Chicago to New York,—because Wicks had been eliminated from the C. E. C.,—because Langley had been removed from the Council and replaced by Andrew, etc., etc., ad nauseum.

Failing in their attempts to change the decisions of the C. E. C., to which they were opposed, they resorted to personal misrepresentations and nasty insinuations against the "majority" members of the C. E. C. "feverish talk-conspirators" — "politicians who were making a plaything of the party" — "self-seekers," and similar terms were only a few of the epithets hurled at the heads of the "majority." They kept up a ceaseless campaign of villification and abuse, which for venom and bitterness, outdid the attacks of the C. L. P. itself.

The "minority" having control of the party organ and the organization machinery, spread their slanderous campaign among party units, thus hoping to create a "revolt" and dissension in the party, leading to the elimination of those members of the C. E. C., who stood against them. The "majority" position was never presented, neither in the party organ, nor among the party units.

*"Chicago Affair."*

The Chicago "insurrection" came as the climax to this campaign of personal attacks, slander and villification.

The "secession movement" came to the attention of the Executive Council about the 1st of April. The Executive Secretary, at this meeting reported that a serious situation had arisen in Chicago—the Chicago District Committee was going to hold a meeting at which an attempt would be made to repudiate the authority of the C. E. C.

and to call a conference of party officials to elect a new C. E. C.

The reasons for their opposition the C. E. C., was their displeasure with the "majority" of the C. E. C., based upon the charges which have been mentioned in the course of this statement and need not be repeated here.

The Council authorized the Secretary to go to Chicago and gave him full power to deal with the situation, "to come down upon them with both feet," as he himself expressed it.

At the next meeting of the Council the Secretary returned and made a verbal report, to the effect that the "secessionists" had withdrawn their contemplated course of action on the promise of complete immunity to all concerned.

The Council, not satisfied with the report, and the terms of the settlement, passed a motion to send a special representative to Chicago to investigate and clarify the situation, and to remove the Chicago District Organizer, if he found that he could not be entrusted with carrying out the policies of the C. E. C. At this point, the Secretary, acting as the spokesman of the "secessionists," stated, that if this motion was passed and carried into effect he would withdraw from the meeting and decide what course of action to pursue. The motion passed and the Secretary withdrew from the meeting.

At the next meeting of the Council the Secretary returned and read a statement, reciting in detail the charges of the Chicago District Committee, claiming that he agreed with those charges, and ended with the following threat:

"Should it (the Council) persist in the course of action determined upon at the last meeting and this result in the removal of the Chicago District Organizer and refusal of the Chicago District to further recognize the authority of the Executive Council and the Central Executive Committee until the convention, it will be impossible for me to continue to work with the present majority of the Executive Council. I will continue to conduct the work of the office of Executive Secretary and Acting Party Editor and will carry on the work of the party through the District Organizations, including the Chicago District Organization as now constituted, holding all funds and report of my work for submission to and disposal of by the convention."

The Council, immediately after the reading of this statement, called for a special meeting of the Central Executive Committee, inviting all District Organizers and Secretaries of the Federations to attend. Another motion was then passed removing the Executive Secretary as Acting Party Editor, pending the decision of the C. E. C., because he could not represent the views of the C. E. C. in the party organ.

As another "Kornilov revolt," the Chicago "insurrection" besides Kornilov, personified by the Chicago District Organizer, had also its "Kerensky" in the person of the Executive Secretary, who returned to the Council, not as its representative, but rather, as the spokesman of the Chicago District Committee, but like Kerensky upon his return from a parley with Kornilov, he announced his terms of settlement—completely immunity to the Chicago "insurrectionists" and denial of the right of the Council or the C. E. C. to remove their agent who had proven to be a traitor to his trust.

*C. E. C. Meeting.*

The Central Executive Committee meeting opened with the reading of the minutes of the previous meeting. At this point seven members of the C. E. C. submitted a written protest against the distortion and method of preparation of minutes on the question of UNITY—as the minutes on