

tion affiliated with the International, the one vote is divided equally). Meetings of the sub-bureau may be held when there are present representatives of five out of the following countries: England, Germany, France, Italy, Holland, the United States.

b) An Executive Committee was elected composed of Henriette Roland-Holst, S. J. Rutgers and D. I. Wynkoop. The executive is located in Holland: it is to act for the sub-bureau and to issue a bulletin in German, English and French.

c) The Sub-Bureau and the Executive Committee are empowered to complete certain phases of the work of the Conference. Their chief task is to link up the world movement with the Central Executive of the International in Moscow: and to facilitate this task the Conference created two subsidiary bureaus—(a) A Central European Bureau, for activity in Germany, Austria, Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria; (b) the American Bureau of the Communist International, to be organized, provisionally by the Communist Party of America: this bureau to call a Pan-American Conference of Communist organizations at which the bureau is to be organized on a permanent basis. It has since transpired that a representative of the International recently organized a Latin-American Bureau, the machinery of which must be utilized and transformed into the larger activity of the American Bureau of the Communist International through the intervention of our party. The American Bureau is to represent the International on the American continent, unite the movement of Latin-America, the United States and Canada and issue proclamations on affairs and issues immediately concerning the proletariat of the Americas.

d) The Executive Committee is to publish in one volume the reports on the movement in various countries: while the sub-bureau after adequate study of the situation in each country, is to issue a comprehensive declaration on prospects, tactics and action. This declaration on prospects, tactics and action will survey the whole international movement, measure the maturity and relation of forces, interpret revolutionary experience and prospects of revolution, and indicate the phases of immediate struggle most calculated to promote the revolution. In its organization measures the Conference partially met the needs of the International for centralized contact and authority: but the measures are only partial, and the problem still requires serious consideration and action. This task of organization is crucial in the progress of the Communist International.

*The Conference and Problems of the International.*

A vital phase of the thesis adopted at the Conference is that they provide the material for an answer to many of the problems now agitating the International. Among these problems are: (1) Unionism; (2) the Functions of a revolutionary political party; (3) Shall Communists stay in the old opportunist organizations to "capture" the party, or shall they split; (4) the basis of admission to the Communist International.

1. The split in the Communist Party of Germany is fundamentally, the product of antagonistic conceptions of unionism. The Central Committee of the Party favors working in the old trade-union—"boring from within": and rejects absolutely the agitation for and construction of industrial unions. The opposition favors an intense struggle against the trades-unions, considering the breaking of their power indispensable for the proletarian revolution, urging the agitation for and construction of industrial unions: (the opposition, however, rejects the non-political and non-Communist concepts of the I. W. W., conceiving mass action, Soviets and Proletarian Dictatorships as the means for the conquest

of power). On this problem of unionism, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany holds a position of hesitation, evasion and compromise, justifying its "boring from within" policy on the plea that the trades-unions include the bulk of the proletarian masses, and the Communist Party must not "isolate" itself from the masses,—a plea familiar to the students of the Russian, British and American movements as being repeatedly used by the Menshevik and the compromiser. This compromise tendency expresses itself in another form by the Communist Party (Central Committee) participating in the Betriebsrate (shop-committees) formed by the government and under direct government control, after dissolving the militant Betriebsrate formed during the revolution: and participation in these government organizations is justified on the plea that "we must not isolate ourselves from the masses." The Central Committee, moreover, argues that, Germany being in a state of revolution, it is futile to develop a program of initiating new forms of industrial organizations which would necessarily require a span of years for its fulfillment, thereby hampering instead of promoting on industrial unionism, as on other problems, considers the moment in the struggle, and adapts itself to the requirements of the moment: emphasis varies as conditions vary. The agitation for industrial unionism justifies itself even should actual organization never materialize, in the sense that it is imperative to break the faith of the proletariat in the trades-unions and in the machinery of the trades-unions as means for revolutionary action. In the United States, which is not in a state of revolution, more emphasis is necessary on the organization aspects of industrial unionism than in Germany. The defect in the policy on unionism: and that it is, in tendency at least, compromise, is proven by participation in the government betriebs-rate. The struggle against the trades-unions and for industrial unionism (even should new organizations never materialize) is a necessary factor in developing revolutionary consciousness and struggle. The Conference of the Communist International, in its thesis on Unionism makes a definite answer to the problem.

2. Another fundamental problem concerns the function of a revolutionary political party—of the Communist Party. Two tendencies are apparent: (a) that represented by the British Socialist Party (inherited in spirit from the moderate Socialism from the 2nd International) which maintains that the political party must not "dictate" to the economic movement, the unions to initiate mass action and general political strikes, the Communist Party performing simply the functions of agitation; (b) that represented (but as yet only in tendency) by the Opposition in the Communist Party of Germany, which maintains that the unions (revolutionary) and the political party are equal to each other, over-emphasizing the industrial organizations—a conception which in tendency, particularly when accompanied by rejection of the revolutionary use of parliamentarism, proceeds directly to elimination of the political party. Now it is a fundamental Bolshevik (and Communist) conception that the political party is the spear-head of the revolutionary movement, dominant and decisive in the revolutionary struggle for power. The function of the Communist Party is action, not simply agitation: it must necessarily assume the initiative in developing general political strikes, in mobilizing and directing the mass action of the proletariat for the conquest of political power. The thesis on social-patriots and unity adopted at the Conference proposes four fundamentals on the basis of which Communist groups still in the old opportunist organizations should unite and the first is: "mass action as the fundamental means

for the conquest of power—the Communist Party as the unifying and directive factor in this mass action."

3. The Conference decisively rejected the concept of "unity of the party"—that concept which degrades revolutionary initiative and audacity, and which, at this moment, prevents a Communist Party being organ by the process of inner transformation. The Communist struggle in an old party stultifies itself if it allows "unity of the party" to penetrate its consciousness; nor must it become a movement to "capture" the party, thereby weakening the struggle to capture the revolutionary masses in the party. The machinery of the old party can never become an adequate means to express our Communist aspirations and tactics; the simple fact of a split, of a decisive break from the old and the creation of a new party in itself contributes enormously to the development of revolutionary ideology and practice. The ideology of "capture" of the party is usually identified with that of "unity of the party"—and each is Menshevik in tendency. To persist in the struggle to "capture" the party and avoid a split means to make an end of the means, to compromise our revolutionary purposes; the "capture" of a party, with the retention of the Centre (and perhaps of the Right) is antagonistic to uncompromising revolutionary practice. Our most dangerous enemy is the Centre; the "capture" of a party (or its ideology) means to agree and unite with the Centre, while to split the party means immediate and rigorous separation from the Centre. The Conference in its thesis on Social-patriots and Unity emphasizes the necessity of rigorous separation of the Communists from the social-patriots and opportunists, urging Communist groups still in the old party organizations to split and unite in the Communist Party—the concept of "unity of the party," which some Communists still cherish is as much a phase of a petty bourgeois ideology of Moderate Socialism as are Reformism and Parliamentarism. This unity of the party" concept dominates the Socialist Party of Italy, preventing the expulsion of the social-patriots and opportunists, and prevents even disciplining the parliamentarians who openly flout the party's revolutionary aspirations and practice. This situation in Italy has its immediate and peculiar reasons, perhaps; but still it is a serious defect produced largely by the concept of "unity of the party."

4. One of the most important and immediate problems is the basis of admission to the International. The problem may be put this way: Communist parties or groups in almost every country have affiliated with the Communist International; but, the old International now being broken in pieces, there are Socialist Parties in some of these countries seeking admission to the Communist International—the Left Wing Independents of Germany, the American Socialist Party, the Left Wing of the Independent Party of England, the Socialist Party of Spain, and others who may seek admission, such as the French Socialist Party (Longuet majoritaires), etc. What shall be done with these? The spirit of the discussions and theses of the Conference mean to double-bolt the door of the Communist International to these undesirable Centre and wavering elements. This answer to the problem is emphasized by two declarations issued recently by the Executive Committee of the International in Moscow, one of the Independent Socialist Party of Germany, the other to the Socialist Party of France, in which these organizations are condemned in severe style, and informed that they are mistaken if they imagine they can enter the Communist International without purging themselves of the social-patriots and the social-traitors—imagine the Socialist Party of France being admitted to the Communist International without having purged

**STATEMENT OF THE EXEC. SEC. TO THE MAJORITY GROUP OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL**

Comrades:

At the meeting of the Executive Council on Tuesday I withdrew from further participation in the meeting when the Council made a decision which I considered an effort to bolster up the control of a certain group in the Council at the expense of creating a situation which might result in the disruption of the party.

Before stating the course of action which it is my intention to follow, I wish to review the circumstances which lead up to this decision.

After the recent meeting of the Central Executive Committee opposition to the decisions of the majority group of the committee developed in the Chicago District. This movement, as expressed by the Chicago District Committee, which claims that it is but carrying out the wishes of the membership in that district, was based on the following indictment of the majority group of the Central Executive Committee:

1. That this majority group "packed" the Chicago Convention through securing the election of about twice the number of delegates representing its viewpoint than any membership basis gave authority for and through its caucus controlled the convention and placed its members in control of the party.
2. That since the convention, this majority group, in place of devoting its energies to building up the party has been largely concerned with the work of maintaining its control and has decided every question that has come before the Central Executive Committee from the standpoint of its interests and the maintenance of its control of the party, rather than from the broader standpoint of the building up a strong, unified Communist Party in this country.
3. That within a month after the convention certain individuals of this majority group, who largely controlled its actions, became more concerned with the question of obtaining for themselves the opportunity to make a junketing trip to Europe at the party expense than any interest of the party.
4. That Comrade Andrew, after his designation as one of the delegates who were to go to Europe if a Congress of the Third International was held, began an intrigue to secure party funds to enable him

(Continued on page 8)

itself of the Centre and the Right of Jean Longuet as well as Marcel Cachin—sympathy for the Russian revolution or deciding to join the Communist International are not enough: there must be acceptance of revolutionary principles and practice. Imagine the American Socialist Party being admitted to the Communist International while it repudiates Communist fundamentals—mass action, Soviets and proletarian dictatorship; and while it is still dominated by Morris Hilquit, Victor Berger, Meyer London, Seymour Stedman, by all its infinite variety of opportunists and social-patriots—on this problem the Communist International will act uncompromisingly, ruthlessly; it will meet the problem by rigorous exclusion, by using the dictatorship of its revolutionary aspirations and practice.

The Conference met a moment of intense agitation in the International, serious problems of immediate policy and practice pressing for consideration and answer. The Conference met these problems in a style that places the Conference definitely in the Left Wing of the International—a circumstance of supreme importance in the development of our movement.