

A Mightier American Militarism

A FEW months ago a bill was introduced in the Senate concerning the reorganization of the army of the United States. The authors of this bill are Secretary of War Baker and Chief of Staff March. This bill was discussed recently in the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, and in the near future will be discussed in the Senate.

The aim of this bill is to strengthen and insure the militarization of the United States. This militarism is being forced upon the country, in spite of the fact that armament preparations were supposed to end with the signing of peace. If any one had hopes of this, he should discard these hopes now that the bill of Baker and March is being considered. The authors of this bill have apparently learned a big lesson from German militarism, to "crush" which all the power of the land was mobilized. They know that militarism does not make peace, even with democracy. Therefore they prohibit the intervention of civilians, and even of Congress, in the internal affairs of the army.

In the past Congress decided upon the size of each army unit, cavalry, infantry, artillery, etc. Congress decided upon the budget. Congress appointed committees to investigate whether money for the army was expended as Congress decided. In the near future, if the Baker-March bill passes, conditions will change. The chief of staff works out the expenditures for the entire army. He hands these figures to the secretary of war and the latter through the secretary of the treasury hands the figures to Congress. Neither the secretary of war nor the secretary of the treasury are at liberty to make changes in these figures. Congress must appropriate the required sum wholesale. This sum is divided among the different departments by the secretary of war only

with the assistance of the commander-in-chief. The commander-in-chief superintends the reports of all expenditures. In this way the proposed bill takes away from Congress the only means it had with which it could control an ever increasing militarism. Now this last means—the expenditure of the people's money—is taken away from Congress and given to the commander-in-chief.

The main reason for this bill is to strengthen the power of the General Staff. For this end its membership is very much enlarged. Previous to the war the membership of the General Staff consisted of 55 officers, 2 of whom were Generals, 10 Colonels, 10 Lieut.-Colonels, 15 Majors, and 17 Captains. According to the law of May 12, 1917, the number of officers of the General Staff was increased to 91. A new law increased the number of officers of the General Staff to 231. Of these some will have the full rank of generals, 5 Major-Generals, or Lieutenant-Generals, 5 Brigadier-Generals, 41 Colonels, 73 Lieut.-Colonels, 89 Majors and 17 Captains.

This means that for the command of a half-million army, $3\frac{1}{2}$ times as many officers are appointed as was necessary previously for a four-million army. This will become clear from the following comparison. Until this time the army of the United States had no officer who had the rank of full general. This bill provides for one full general, who will command the General Staff. Before one major-general was necessary for every two million soldiers, now one major-general for every 80,000 soldiers. At the time of war the entire four million army had no Brigadier-Generals, now a half-million army will have five Brigadier-Generals. Before one Staff Colonel was enough for each 400,000 soldiers, now there will be one Staff Colonel for every 12,000 soldiers. Before one

Lieut.-Colonel was enough for every 210,000 soldiers; now for every 7,000. Now one Major for every 5,600 soldiers; before one Major for every 100,000 soldiers. The result is that in comparison with the number of soldiers in the army the number of Generals increased twenty-five times, the number of Colonels thirty-three times, the number of Lieut.-Colonels thirty times, and the number of Majors eighteen times. Besides this 5 new Brigadier-Generals are appointed and one full General. This increase concerns only the General Staff.

The bill further takes away the power of the Senate to protest appointments. Article 32 says that the "president has the full power to appoint any officer for any service which he finds necessary and for whatever period he thinks advisable." Therefore all these newly formed, well-paid positions will be in the hands of the president a tool for remuneration of all well-deserving citizens who are his servants and valets.

Generally, the General Staff will control the life of not only a half-million army of soldiers, but of thousands of officers of all ranks and titles. The General Staff, according to its own opinion, will be able to force the officers to resign or transfer them to another corner of the world. The General Staff has acted in this way more than once recently. Many officers, knowing this practice of the General Staff, refused to give evidence of any sort to Senate committees investigating military expenses. For these officers the Senate's anger was less important than the anger of the leaders of the General Staff.

The bill gives the General Staff power also over the officers in reserve forces. Even in times of peace any officer in reserve may be taken away from his family, for military service; but this service cannot last more than 25 days.

Industrial Unionism and the Revolution

WAR and revolution have shattered many things besides cathedrals and thrones.

Old theories of social development were blown to the winds with the first shot of the world war. What were considered up-to-date notions of progressive development went the way of the obsolete with the bursting forth of the world revolution in 1917.

Even the professed revolutionists have had to shift their ground and review afresh the relationship of their ideas on industrial organization to the achievement of a social revolution.

The class struggle has been proclaimed, Industrial Unionism has been advocated, and a variety of methods adopted to achieve the organization desired. But in most cases it has been assumed that before a revolution could be achieved it would be essential for the working class to adopt Industrial Unionism.

History has proved this idea to be as wrong in experience as the theory that it would be necessary for all countries to go through a stage of highly-developed Industrial Capitalism prior to a revolution leading to Socialism.

Industrial Unionism is a theory of organization arrived at as a result of the examination of industry, and a consideration of what would be the most effective manner of waging the conflict against the Capitalist class.

That this theory has contributed valuable assistance to the workers in their struggle none can dispute.

But it must never be forgotten that organization is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end: a weapon, something with which to wage a fight for an objective other than itself.

By J. T. Murphy.

From "The Workers' Dreadnought" (Eng.)

However desirable a perfect weapon may be, we are compelled by the force of circumstances to accept the weapon which history provides.

The economic antagonisms in society provide the impelling force which drives us to fight. The conception of a new social order derived from human experience and demanding a social revolution provides us with the objective which must be the determinant of the nature of our activities in the fight.

The failure of many industrial unionists to appreciate these facts has stultified their activities.

A subject class cannot choose either the ideal moment to move or the ideal weapon with which to fight.

Its subjection compels a continuous struggle against odds.

Such has been the struggle of the working class throughout its history. Hampered by its wide distribution, its lack of consciousness of itself as a class, disintegrated by a multitude of minor interests, it has fought onward through the years.

It has never yet set out to achieve anything as an organized class, and never will do, so long as it is a subject class.

Such a movement pre-supposes a general intellectual revolution prior to a social revolution, the thinking in terms of a new order not yet in existence.

Mankind does not act in this manner. Its movements are urged by its elemental needs, and when any social order fails to meet them, it is superseded by another.

The mass moves intuitively in response to the pressure of circumstances and is

launched into revolutionary deeds, unconscious of the fact that they are revolutionary.

It does not follow from these observations that none are conscious of the direction of these movements. But it does follow that they who are conscious of the direction in which things are moving, and are confessedly out to achieve a social revolution, have before them a clearly defined responsibility, i. e., to harness these intuitive movements of the masses that they may lead to social revolution.

When the masses move it is useless to tell them they cannot do anything until they have embraced Industrial Unionism.

Certainly it is all to the good for Industrial Unionist ideas on organization to be applied. The masses, however, will not move because they are Industrial Unionists or trade unionists, but on account of the pressure of circumstances. Under such stress they will use any organization, old or new.

The movement of the masses towards Socialism is the thing that matters.

The value of all ideas on organization will be tested by the degree to which they can be applied in a crisis, in a revolutionary transition, and in the maintenance of the revolutionary victory.

A year of revolution will teach the masses more of industrial organization than fifty years of propaganda.

Social Revolution should be the objective determining our activities.

Industrial Unionism should be the armory from which can be drawn valuable ideas to help in the conflict.

Industrial and political crises should be regarded as the revolutionary situations to be harnessed for social revolution.