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02 02 03 04 1918 25
02 02 03 04 1918 25 black white

74 THE CLASS STRUGGLE cohesive power of the autocratic forces was eliminated from the social structure of Russia. This very thing would likely happen in any other country in which the fetish of government authority would be destroyed in one way or another. In view of this fact, the peace negotiations became a necessity, already as a Russian matter alone, The international of labor is forever indebted to the Russian socialist statesmen, because they utilized this national necessity so as to try to safeguard the vital interests of international labor, even to the point of almost breaking with the masses who wanted peace and peace at any price. No greater mistake can be made in regard to Russia than the presumption that the pacifist leaders compelled the masses to accept a peace which they did not want. The real situation is the very opposite of this presumption.
At this point it should. be understood that there certainly existed a certain amount of difference between the tactics of Lenine and Trotzzky. Lenine, a cool, calculating exponent of economic determinism, altogether devoid of any sentimental considerations, fully understood the above mentioned situation and took the propagation of peace at any price as a matter of prosaic necessity, well understanding that any particular peace terms at this moment did not count much as the abolishment of the battle fronts between Russia and Germany was the first preliminary for the success oi the Revolution in Russia and in Germany, and only such a revolution would rewrite any peace terms made at this moment. Lenine also had no faith in the possibility of a revolution in Germany during the war, and he forsaw the inevitableness of more harsh terms and ruthless invasion of Russia by Germany if the Hoffmann peace terms were not accepted. Trotzky, on the other hand, although he, too, understood the above mentioned situation in general, laid more stress, led by his more imaginative and temperamental nature, upon sentimental considerations of the honor of the socialist movement. He also always has been inclined to exaggerate the revolutionary THE FUTURE OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 175 readiness for action in Germany and the possibility of creating there a revolutionary sentiment by more or less abstract and sentimental presentation of the danger facing the international labor movement through the Hoflmann plans.
We can well presume that the somewhat dramatic performance of Trotzky at Brest Litovsk his refusing to sign a treaty with the German imperialists, yet proclaiming the war ended, and his parrying Hofl mann cool suggestion that in such case the Germans would instantly take Reva. by saying that the working class of Germany never would allow him so to do probably would not have taken place if Lenine had been at Brest Litovsk in place of Trotzky. It is very likely that Lenine would have signed Hofimann peace terms at least as readily as he signed the much more outrageous terms now presented by the German government.
Yet, on my part do not believe that either course would have resulted in anything much difierent from the situation prevailing in Russia now. If there could have been a difierence it might be said that the present situation has some distinct advantages in comparison with the one which might have been created if the Hoffmann peace treaty had been signed.
As will be seen from the following paragraph, the writer of these lines does not at all pessimistically regard the present situation in Russia. do not believe for a moment that Germany will be able to crush Russia or the Russian revolution.
And as appalling as the present situation looks it is not a very important matter whether the Germans just now are fifty or a hundred miles more eastward or westward. The advantages of the present situation are that if the BrestLitovsk treaty had been signed it would have established a. somewhat undesirable modur wndi in Germany and Russia.
That situation would have been indeed of more actual advantage to Germany because she then would have been able more easily and peaceably to utilize the material resources of Russia. But now, in spite of the bombastic terms of the enforced peace treaty, Germany actually has to fight for every ounce of bread which she will get from Russia. The greatest advan